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Abstract
A high world market competition has imposed a search
for new markets and the optimization of the existing ones.
As a result, several sectors in the maritime industry are at
stake. Today's challenge is to find and predict new
competitive markets and efficient corridors of commerce.
If South America finds a low cost way of moving cargoes
from the core of the continent to deep ocean ports, it will
become an attractive optional market specially for North
America. This aspect is crucial for the consolidation of
the North-South American bloc of commerce.
This project explores the use of the Parana-Paraguay
River Basin and the development of new intermodal
transportation systems to achieve a cost efficient cargo
movement in South America.
This project looks for solutions and alternatives to
the existing constraints in the area. It includes:
* The analysis of navigational conditions of the Basin;
* A study of the existing port capacities and future
needs;
* An optimization model for inland water
transportation, based on current prices, regulations
and port capacities;
* The analysis of fleet needs and replacements;
* An study of the port privatization program in
Argentina and the analysis of key safety and
environmental issues.
Acknowledgements
To those persons who supported me in this project.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 11
CHAPTER I: GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
PARANA-PARAGUAY RIVER BASIN
1. The Parana-Paraguay River Basin. An
Integration Factor 17
CHAPTER II: NAVIGATIONAL CONDITIONS
Introduction 31
Identification of Navigational Constraints 36
1. Buenos Aires-Santa Fe 37
1.1. The River Plate Channel from the Access
to Buenos Aires 37
1.2. The River Section from Buenos Aires
to Rosario 41
1.3. The River Section from Rosario to
Santa Fe 43
2. Santa Fe-Confluencia 43
3. Confluencia-Apa River 46
3.1. Confluencia to Asuncion 46
3.2. Asuncion to Apa River 47
4. Apa River-Ponta do Morro 51
5. Ponta do Morro-Caceres 52
CHAPTER III: PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS
1. Port of Caceres 58
2. Port of Central Aguirre 58
3. Port of Corumba 59
4. Port of Ladario 59
5. Port of Gregorio Curvo 60
6. Port of Murtinho 60
7. Port of Vallemi 61
8. Port of Pinasco and Casado 61
9. Port of Concepcion 61
10. Port of Villa Hayes 62
11. Port of Asuncion 62
12. Port of Villeta 62
13. Port of Formosa 63
14. Port of Corrientes 63
15. Port of Barranqueras 64
16. Port of Reconquista 64
17. Port of Santa Fe 65
18. Port of Diamante 66
19. Port of San Martin 67
19.1. La Plata Cereal 67
19.2. Bunge & Born 67
19.3. IMSA 68
19.4. Cargil 68
19.5. Terminal 6 68
20. Port of San Lorenzo 69
20.1. Pecom Agra 69
20.2. Vicentin 69
20.3. Asociacion de Cooperativas
Argentinas 70
20.4. Exxon/YPF 70
21. Port of Rosario 70
21.1. Unit I 71
21.2. Unit II 71
21.3. Unit III 71
21.4. Unit IV 71
21.5. Unit V 72
21.6. Unit VI 72
21.7. Unit VII 72
21.8. Genaro Garcia 72
21.9. Guide 73
21.10.Punta Alvear 73
21.11.Louis Dreyfus 73
22. Port of Constitucion 73
22.1. Unit I 73
22.2. Servicios Portuarios 74
23. Port of San Nicolas 74
24. Port of Ramallo 74
25. Port of San Pedro 75
26. Port of Atucha 75
27. Port of Zarate 75
28. Port of Campana 76
CHAPTER IV: OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR PARANA-PARAGUAY RIVER
1. Characteristics 81
2. Objectives and Parameters Description 82
3. Assumptions 85
4. The Model 87
CHAPTER V: IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PARANA-PARAGUAY RIVER
BASIN
1. Water Improvements 123
1.1 Aids to Navigation 123
1.1.1 Improvements on Navigational
Conditions 123
1.1.2 Improvements on the Bouying
System 126
1.1.3 Establishment of a Maintenance
System 128
1.1.4 Improvements on Chart System 129
1.2 Vessel Traffic System 130
1.3 Fleet Modernization Plan 139
2. Land Side Improvements. Ports and
Terminals Infraestructure 143
1.2.1 Port of Caceres 143
1.2.2 Port of Central Aguirre 144
1.2.3 Port of Corumba and Ladario 144
1.2.4 Port of Concepcion 144
1.2.5 Port of Villa Hayes 145
1.2.6 Port of Asuncion 145
1.2.7 Port of Villeta 145
1.2.8 Port of Barranqueras and
Reconquista 146
1.2.9 Port of Santa Fe 146
1.2.10 Port of Diamante 146
1.2.11 Port of Rosario 147
CHAPTER VI: PORT PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION
1) The Port Privatization Program.
Introduction to the Privatizations 148
2) Safety and Environmental Problems in
Argentinean Ports 152
2.1. General Framework 152
2.2. High Risk Situations Requiring
Immediate Attention 156
2.3. Chronic Environmental and Safety
Problems 157
2.4. Emergency Response 162
3) Port Organization in Argentina. Operational
and Institutional Issues and Problems 164
3.1. Federal, Provincial, and Local Roles
and Responsibilities 166
3.2 Port Planning and Port Cargo Flow 168
3.3 Prefectura Naval Argentina vs.Navy 171
3.4. Prefectura Naval Argentina vs.Ports 173
3.5. Lack of Technical Analysis and
Unclear Concession Patterns 174
CONCLUSIONS 178
APPENDICES 182
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
LIST OF APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1:
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX 6:
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
Pluviometric Regime in the Parana-Paraguay
River for 1993, 1994, and 1995
River Plate Chart
Emilio Mitre's Channel
Parana Bravo/Guazud Chart
Air View of a Panamax Vessel Sailing
the Curve of San Antonio
Curve of San Antonio
Hydrographic Details
Selzo-Pindoty Pass
Corumba's Approach, Air View
Port of Rosario
Dredge Cost Analysis
VTS Devices
Dock Sud Chart
182
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
222
LIST OF EXHIBITS
1.1 Demographic Distribution in the
Parana-Paraguay Basin 17
1.2 World River Basin Characteristics 19
1.3 Water Transportation HP/ton Relationship 20
2.1 River Plate Channel Characteristics 40
2.2 Critical Passes Buenos Aires to Rosario 42
2.3 Crossing Restrictions Buenos Aires to Rosario 42
2.4 Critical Passes Rosario to Santa Fe 43
2.5 Mean Water Altitude in Corrientes and Santa Fe 44
2.6 Determinant Passes from Santa Fe to Confluencia 44
2.7 Determinant Passes from Confluencia to Asuncion 46
2.8 Media Water Altitude Asuncion-Formosa 47
2.9 Determinant Passes Asuncion-Apa River 47
2.10 Percentage of Water Levels with 50% Probabilities
between Asuncion and Apa River 50
2.11 Percentage of Water Levels with 10% Probabilities
between Asuncion and Apa River 50
2.12 Determinant Passes from Apa River to Ponta do Morro 51
2.13 Percentage of Water Levels with 50% Probabilities
between Apa River to Ponta do Morro 52
2.14 Determinant Passes from Ponta do Morro to Barr of
Bracinho 53
2.15 Summary of Determinant Navigational Conditions of
the Parana-Paraguay River Basin 55
3.1 Summary of Port Infraestructure Characteristics 77
4.1 Port Cargo Network 86
LIST OF EXHIBITS (Continued)
5.1 Long and Medium Term Improvements 125
5.2 Improvements in Navigational Conditions 127
5.3 VTS Coverage Stations in the River Plate 135
5.4 VTS Stations in the Parana-Paraguay River 136
5.5 Barge Fleet per year Built 139
5.6 Tug Fleet per year Built 140
5.7 Tug and Barge Fleet Requirements 142
5.8 Fleet Replacement Schedule 143
6.1 Grain Transshipment Cost in the River Plate 176
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Parana-Paraguay River Basin. General View 16
2. Parana-Paraguay River Basin View Chart 18
3. Parana-Paraguay River Basin View Chart 32
4. Sections of the Parana River and Secondary Rivers 34
5. Port Distribution in the Parana-Paraguay River Basin 57
6. Displacement Resistance of Convoys 84
7. Effective Push of Tow Boats 84
8. Organization Structure Parana-Paraguay Commission 122
9. VTS Stations in the River Plate 134
10. Barge Fleet per year Built 140
11. Tug Fleet per year Built 141
12. Distribution of Cargoes in Argentina 151
13. Train Cargo Movements in Argentina 152
INTRODUCTION
A high world market competition has
imposed a search for new markets and the
optimization of the existing ones. As a
result, several sectors in the maritime
industry are at stake. Today's challenge
is to find and predict new competitive
markets and efficient corridors of
commerce.
If South America finds a low cost way of
moving cargoes from the core of the
continent to deep ocean ports, it will
become an attractive optional market
specially for North America. This aspect
is crucial for the consolidation of the
North-South American bloc of commerce.
This project explores the use of the
Parana-Paraguay River Basin and the
development of a new intermodal
transportation system to achieve an
efficient North-South American maritime
trade.
I propose to design a model of maritime trade that will
increase and develop new commercial relationships between
the U.S. and South America.
The U.S. maritime industry, as many other countries, is
facing one of the most difficult moments in its history.
Several sectors are at stake.
The companies cannot compete against third-flag
vessels' low operating costs. They can compete only with
efficiency of services and advance technology. To do so,
they need to maintain a cash flow in a market that is
becoming more constricted.
U.S. shipyards are heavily dependent on Navy contracts.
They have been operating under governmental subsidies.
Today, they are in a weak position to compete in the
international shipbuilding market. Because they need advance
technological construction methods, they are more expensive
and they do not have a significant market outside the U.S.
On the shipper's side, the Antitrust Immunity Act for
conferences does not give them the opportunity to enhance
free competition in ocean shipping. It is estimated that
the antitrust immunity, granted by the FMC under the ocean
liner conference system, will cost $2-3 billion per year to
the consumers. The National Performance Review has
published that the abolition of the antitrust immunity will
yield economic benefits for U.S. consumers'. Savings will
stem from reductions in shipping rates (about 15%),
increases in revenues from higher sales volumes and, more
U.S. exports and U.S. jobs.
Lastly, the unions face severe job reductions partly
because of the introduction of onboard technology and flags
changes that allow the companies to hire cheaper labor.
Because of this situation, U.S. companies as well as
the Naval industry are looking for a comprehensive answer
that would contribute to the welfare of each sector.
The operational situation of U.S. liner and bulks in
the Pacific and Atlantic lines are as follows.
The Pacific line experieces severe competition in the
Japanese and Chinese markets. Thus, technological
development is a crucial factor. The companies look for an
economic balance among vessel operation, container services,
and efficiency. Economies of scale have been changing port
and ship infrastructure. The key point to maintaining a
leading position is to lower the costs and to improve the
service.
1 "Eliminate the Ocean Liner Antitrust Exemption and Enforcement
of Compulsory Tariff Filings"
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The Atlantic line has been over time losing its market
shared as compared to the Pacific line. Currently, with the
E.C., the competition has become extremely sharp.
My proposal of designing a model of maritime trade
between the U.S. and South America tries to provide a
solution for the U.S. shipbuilding industry, as well as to
develop the maritime sector in South America. I expect that
the model will help each sector involved to absorb a market
of great economic potential and to perform the domestic re-
organization needed to reach a competitive level in the
European and Asian markets.
Summarizing, the model is as follows: U.S. maritime
lines, currently operating in Asia and/or Europe, would
continue with technological development in the North Pacific
and Atlantic trade to remain competitive--introducing 45/48
ft containers, COFC intermodal systems, fourth-generation of
container vessels, etc. Simultaneously, they will introduce
the technological replacements and small vessels in the
South American line.
South American trade has historically been a high cost
controversial market. The lack of technology and
political continuity have conveyed economic and social
instability, labor unrest, etc. Despite these factors,
lately, there has been an increase in the total imports and
exports between the U.S. and South America. The prediction
is that this trade will continue to increase as commitment
to democracy and more stable economic policies would
progress in most South American nations.
The company, or the nation that knows how to capture
this market will be in an advantaged position for the year
2000.
The development of the South American market seeks two
main goals: to gain the market of raw materials and to re-
locate U.S. intermodal and port infrastructures where
needed in South American's ports.
This study represents a first step to establish North-
South maritime trade. It will examine the use of the
Parand-Paraguay River Basin as a low cost way of moving
cargoes from the core of South America to deep ocean ports.
I argue that the use of the Parand-Paraguay Basin as an
efficient corridor of commerce, the development of inter-
modal systems, and the improvement of port infrastructure
and organization are key factors for South American growth.
In essence, Argentina and its neighbor nations need a cost-
efficient transportation system for their raw materials as
well as an improved port planning and management
organization.
This project looks for solutions and alternatives to
this dilemma. It includes:
* the analysis of navigational conditions of the Basin;
* a study of the existing port capacities and future
needs;
* an optimization model for inland water
transportation, based on current prices, regulations
and port capacities;
* the analysis of fleet needs and replacements;
* an study of the port privatization program in
Argentina and the analysis of key safety and environmental
issues.
I have attempted to provide complete and accurate
information as well as professional expertise where
necessary. My extensive experience, as a professional
mariner and a sailor, has nourished the basis to analyze
this project.
Chapter I contains a brief analysis of the geopolitical
aspects and legal framework of the region.
Chapter II describes a bathymetric study of the Parand-
Paraguay Basin, a determination of the critical navigational
points: narrow curves, buoys marking, port facilities, etc.
Chapter III contains an intermodal study, an analysis
of the rail infrastructure, and ports and transshipment
terminal capacities.
Chapter IV consists of an optimization model for inland
waterway transportation using trains and the River Basin. I
designed this model base on present constraints and prices
in the area.
Chapter V addresses improvements to the Parana-Paraguay
River Basin based on the results of the analysis performed
in Chapters II, III and IV.
Finally, Chapter VI discusses port planning and
organizational issues as well as safety and environmental
concerns that Argentina should solve to succesfully
implement the corridor of commerce.
I believe that this model will assist South-American
businesses to gain a market of great potential. It will
modernize their technology and find a competitive market for
their products. The development of the inland water
transportation system should be recognized as a major step
for regional growth.
Moreover, this development will allow the U.S. to swap
the technology cast off from the Pacific line. U.S.
shipyards will benefit with an increase in vessels'
navigation and barges' sale, an intermodal structure's
interchanged, and the development of shipyards' projects in
South America.
The following figure shows the ParanA-Paraguay River
Basin in the context of South America.
Figure 1: Parana-Paraguay River Basin General View.
CHAPTER I
THE PARANA-PARAGUAY BASIN. AN INTEGRATION FACTOR
Before the development and analysis of the
transportation model for the Parand-Paraguay River Basin,
I feel it is important to give to the reader a minimum
background on the political positions and interests at stake
and how the present situation has evolved. This chapter
describes briefly the geopolitical aspects and concerns of
the nations involved.
The Parand-Paraguay River Basin has a total surface of
3,199,653 km2 . In terms of percent, 32.3% of it belongs to
Argentina, 44.2% to Brazil, 12.7% to Paraguay, 4.4% to
Uruguay, and 6.4% to Bolivia.
The total population of the countries of the Basin is
157,137,000, and 51.7% of them live in the Basin area
(81,209,170 people). The demographic distribution is the
following:
Exhibit 1.1
Country Demographic Distribution
Argentina 25.9%
Brazil 65.2%
Paraguay 3.7%
Uruguay 3.6%
Bolivia 1.6%
The following figure shows the Parand-Paraguay Rivers
and their areas of influence.
Figure 2: Parana-Paraguay River Basin View Chart.
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The hydrologic characteristic of the system brings to
the region extraordinary possibilities to use this river for
commercial navigation, energy, and irrigation. The natural
condition of the Parand-Paraguay River favors the
development of commercial navigation. The Parand-Paraguuay
River reaches 100 meters of altitude from the level of the
sea, at kilometer 1,912. If we compared it with other
rivers in the world heavily use for navigation, we can
appreciate the potential uses of this Basin. Exhibit 1.1
shows distances from the sea where other rivers in the world
reaches 100 meters of altitude:
Exhibit 1.2
Name of the River Km from the Sea
Rodano 245
Loire 198
Oder 524
Seine 556
Rhine 621
Elba 662
Volga 2,000
The Brazilian section of the Parand-Paraguay Basin,
rocky and with sections of high grounds, is more useful to
obtain energy.
The Argentinean section, flat and deeper, favors
navigation. But, unfortunately in the last years, the main
objectives of the Argentine investments in the Basin were to
produce energy instead of maximize, promote and improve the
navigational conditions of the Basin.1 Argentina never knew
1 An example of that is what was called the Plan of Public Services
for the Year 2000 developed by president General Videla (non-
constitutional) and the ministry of economy Martinez de Hoz-Bronstein.
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how to attract cargoes and how to use efficiently this
corridor of transportation and commerce.
Water transportation has great advantages especially
for long distance movements of bulk and non-perishable
cargoes. Water transport is 5, 15, and 60 times less
expensive than train, truck, and airplane respectively.
This is equivalent to say that water transport represents
only a 20% of train fees, 7% of truck fees, and 1.66% of air
fares. These are general proportions for developed
countries where oil prices are fairly stable. In developing
countries where the oil price is not always constant the
indices of consumption per ton transported are very
important. If we analyze consumptions per ton for water
transportation, we can see that they have the most efficient
HP relationship. Exhibit 1.3 shows HP/Ton relationship for
different modes of transport.
Exhibit 1.3
Mode of HP per
Transport Ton
Truck 5/10
Train 1.3/2.5
Barges 0.3/0.5
Overseas 0.1/0.15
Vessels
The region has to recognize the importance of an
efficient transportation system, for its economic and social
implications. Moreover, it has to define its geopolitical
macro-project for the Parand-Paraguay River Basin soon. The
They invested 55,000 million dollars in the Basin, where energy aspects
accounted 66% of the total investments and improvements to improve
navigation and transportation systems only accounted for 0.9%. The
energy works and projects were never finished.
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region should be able to reach a minimum level of
development so as to satisfy internal needs, optimize the
utilization of resources, and integrate isolated areas to
contribute to the regional consolidation as a unit.
Regional and national plans have to come together with major
political and economic developments.
Latin-American integration and its insertion in world
globalization do not have to affect regional socio-
economical objectives.
Only with an optimized development of the inland water
transportation system, Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay
and Bolivia would support and contribute to an efficient
regional growth and integration process.
Now, it is interesting to briefly describe the
evolution of waterway international legislation to see how
these tendencies have been applied in South American river
regulations.
Rivers regulation started in France in November 16,
1792, with the first set of rules for the Escalda and Mosa
Rivers.
In 1804, the Convention of L'Octroi signed between
France and Germany for the Rhine River, was the first to
centralize administration of a river. Later in 1814, the
Treaty of Peace of Paris established freedom of navigation
in the Rhine River for all flags.
Also, during the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Rousseau
introduced the idea of international rivers.
In 1816, seven European states signed the Maguncia
Treaty. This was the first treaty oriented to promote river
commerce and navigation.
Another important concept was developed by Thomas
Jefferson, whom argued that states located at the north end
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of river waters have no rights to impede or limit commercial
operations of states in south areas of the rivers.
In this century, the main steps to develop inland water
regulations were: the Law of the Rhine, which has been
implemented by the Convention of Barcelona 1921 with the
participation of 42 countries. The Treaty of Versailles, in
1919, met in Strasbourg--in the palace of the Germany
emperor--and it was the most relevant step to regulate Rhine
River navigation and to be the base of European inland water
rules. It was complemented with the Conventions of
Strasbourg of 1963 and its protocol of 1972.
It is important also to mention the Paris and the
Belgrade Conventions of 1921 and 1948 respectively, that
both emphasize freedom of navigation on the rivers and the
commerce coordination within sovereign states.
The evolution of river regulations, especially in
Europe, had affected the beginning of river legislation in
South America.
A movement of politics started to adopt and develop
some European ideas in Paraguay in 1812. The first law was
issued in 1845 by the governor of Paraguay, Mr. Carlos
Antonio L6pez. He emphasized the need for a comprehensive
and pacific way to use the Basin among nations, promoting
commerce and freedom.
In Bolivia, in 1853, Manuel Isidoro Belzd issued a
decree establishing freedom of navigation on the river and
encouraging other nations to do the same. At that moment,
Belzd thought that the Paraguay River was joint with the
Amazons, and he put great emphasis on the concept of freedom
of navigation and efficiency in commerce to utilize the
river to bring the option to get an open sea alternative for
Bolivia.
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In Argentina, Justo Jose de Urquiza, in October of
1852, declared freedom of navigation for all vessels in the
region of Parand and Uruguay. Buenos Aires, after the
battle of Pav6n and the signature of the pact of San Jose de
Flores in 1959, joined the confederation and also declared
the freedom of river navigation for international flags.
In 1853, the government of Uruguay declared river
navigation as the most efficient and important way of
commerce to contribute to the development of Uruguay as a
nation.
Even though through the years Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia have signed different
agreements; the Treaty of Asunci6n2, signed on March 26,
1991, among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay,
provided the bases for the MERCOSUR Treatment.
The MERCOSUR was the first initiative that takes
actions and pushes the nations to an effective integration
and to perform an open block of commerce.
The treaty of Asunci6n, mentioned above, is similar to
the treaty of Rome of 1957, composed of 248 articles, and
that has established the basis for the Economic European
Community. The Treaty of Asunci6n intended to initiate a
similar movement in South American countries.
The MERCOSUR, that follows this process, establishes in
article 1 the intention of generating a free movement of
goods, services, and people among the signing nations. The
treaty promotes equal rights and obligations among the parts
and to create equal market conditions among the countries
involved. The main initiative is the elimination of export
tariffs among countries starting in 1995 (Paraguay and
Uruguay will start in 1996).
2 The Treaty of Asunci6n is a small document with 24 articles
and 4 annexes.
The organizative structure of the MERCOSUR has two main
bodies: the Common Market Council (CMC) and the Common
Market Group (CMG).
The ministries of foreign affairs and economy integrate
the CMC. Once a year the presidents have to participate in
an annual meeting. The objective of the body is to reach
political coordination and to develop common programs for
commerce.
The CMG, formed by representatives of different
ministries, have the objective of developing and
implementing plans to obtain the goals set up by the CMC.
Both bodies have the intention to promote common
efforts in South America, and to develop common regulations
for commerce in the area. One of the main objectives is the
development of common and efficient waterway regulations.
With the signature of the MERCOSUR treaty in 1993, it
appears to have created an opportunity to use the Parand-
Paraguay River more wisely and eficiently. This treaty
looks like the realization of a process of integration among
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and Bolivia. Those
nations are looking for optimal alternatives to move cargoes
and to compete in international markets.
But, the process of integration is not an easy task.
There are two conditional aspects that makes this process a
very delicate matter: (a) the geopolitical interests of the
countries, and (b) the socio-demographic imbalance generated
by megapolitic developoments.
(a) Regarding the geopolitical interests of the
nations, the countries signed the Agreement of the River
Plate Basin, for which, an integral study to use the River
Plate Basin3 will be developed. Even though the goals were
3 Article 1, states the main objectives: to impulse regional
ensemble, to promote the development and establishment of
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clear and a noble principle, they are still unfulfilled.
The main reasons are the following:
1. The historical rivalry, between Argentina and Brazil
for the regional supremacy, has never contributed to a
fluent relationship with the goal of integration.
2. The major countries, Brazil and Argentina, have always
tried to attract the small countries to their sphere of
influence--essentially economic. On the other hand,
the small countries consistently adopted changing
attitudes to get economic benefits, to increase their
power of negotiation, and to maintain certain
independence in their political decisions.
3. The last three decades have been politically and
economically difficult for these Latin-American
countries. Many governments have prioritized social
and economic development without common international
or regional objectives.
4. The River Plate Basin has been used as a forum to
settle political disputes between Argentina and Brazil
rather than to integrate the region as stated in the
agreement. Both nations have parceled the river out
instead of setting common goals for its
exploitation.
Specific problems between Brazil and Argentina have
been raised during the last decades with the construction of
the dams in Corpus and Yaciretd (see figure 4). As Brazil
and Paraguay have control over the dams, it directly affects
the navigational conditions in the Argentinean sections of
the Parand River. As a result Argentina and Brazil have
different geopolitical interest that are difficult to
balance.
industries, and to promote multilateral programs to ensure the
economic growth of the area.
The geopolitical controversy among the Basin nations,
particularly Argentina and Brazil, comes from the times of
the colony with the Tordesillas Treaty. In that treaty,
Brazil vindicated the development of an horizontal axis of
commerce, moving the cargo up to Brazilian ports. Argentina
defended the development of a vertical axis that would
follow the natural flow of the ParanA River, moving the
cargoes down to the port of Buenos Aires.
Argentina has always favored this position because it
allow the movement of Argentinean grains and agricultural
products from the main regions to deep ocean waters. This
position has also benefited Paraguay and Bolivia as they get
direct access to the sea, and Uruguay as its ports could
participate in transshipments and other marine operations.
The prevailing geopolitical positions of the nations of
the Basin can be summarized as follows:
Uruguay is a "hinge" between Brazil and Argentina. A
well known South American geopolitist Mr. Quagliotti de
Bellis has defined the attitude of Uruguay as a "hinge" and
he states that the bases of this synergy are: (a) the
hydroelectric enterprises among the three countries, (b)
great parts of the road system between Brazil and Argentina
cross the territory of Uruguay, (c) the Uruguayan
possibility of being a center of supply for vessels calling
river ports.
Furthermore, other authors say that the geopolitical
behavior of Uruguay is more like an "stopper nation", if
they decide to play in favor of one of the contender.
Paraguay has traditionally adopted a "pendulum"
position. They have been focused on minimizing economic
efforts and waiting for major investments coming from
Argentina or Brazil. Paraguay is an important nation to
keep north-south supremacy. So far, Paraguay has been prone
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towards Brazil, probably, because Brazil knew better than
Argentina how to negotiate and satisfy Paraguays economic
and social needs.
Bolivia has low influence for the economic integration
of the area, since it is at a geographic disadvantage. They
want an outlet to the sea.
The absence of port facilities and investments in
appropriate technologies represents a barrier for Bolivian
development. Bolivias economy has been invariably weak and
has impeded the countrys growth. So, the Bolivian position
has followed erratic patterns, from one side or the other,
trying to fulfill their national needs.
To get their access to the sea, they have three
options: to the Atlantic the Parand Basin or the train from
Santa Cruz de la Sierra to Santos in Brazil, and to the
Pacific the train from Corumba to Arica.
On the Parana-Paraguay Basin, they have a free zone in
the port of Rosario (Argentina); but they still have not
used this option. The train from Santa Cruz de la Sierra to
Santos o Corumba to Arica has still one part unfinished --
between Santa Cruz and Sucre.
(b) Regarding the socio-demographic imbalance, the
Basin shows a sociological pattern of development along its
vertical axis. Population decreases in quantity from south
to north, and concentration of industries and level of
education follow the same pattern. Sociologists and
geopolitics experts such as: Gildenberger, Kempff Bacigalupo
and Errandonea express that these patterns will
significantly influence in the development of the vertical
axis of commerce and the integration of the region.
The interdependence among South American societies is
growing, essentially supported by the technical evolution
and the management of technological change done by private
companies and governments. The ideas of international
borders are changing. Nowadays, we cannot consider them
watertight lines that a abstract nation from its neighbors.
The consistency of a border lies on the social and economic
stability of the societies embraced.
For that reason, a movement of regional integration
like this must have the idea of international and national
interdependency.
In the history of development of the Parand-Paraguay
Basin, technological and economic interchanges have favored
few megalopolis rather than regional areas. Regional and
economic development should be based on consistent and
common goals. Disparity on that generates megapolitic
developments.
An example of that it can be seen in Argentina. The
Argentinas 25.9% of its demographic distribution (showed in
exhibit 1.1) represents a 75% of its entire population.
According to the last census almost 50% of the population in
Argentina live in Buenos Aires, and if we add the river side
states of Santa Fe and Entre Rios, it represents almost the
70% of the population. The difficult economic and social
situation in Argentina in the last ten years induced
internal movements of population. People from northern side
river states4 have moved to Buenos Aires looking for better
employment opportunities. These have produced a
geographical imbalance in gross national product with 90%
concentrated in the states of Buenos Aires, C6rdoba and
Santa Fe. The northern side river states show a double
digit index in illiteracy (more than 10%) compared with the
average index of the country.
This is a sign of how technological and economic
interchanges have favored few megalopolises rather than
4 States of Chaco, Corrientes and Santiago del Estero.
regions increasing social disparities and creating a barrier
against the development of the Parand-Paraguay corridor of
commerce.
These two conditional aspects or barriers not only have
been against the ideas of vertical axis of commerce, but
also they have been an incentive for the development of a
New Transversal Determinism in South America. Other
countries that are not part of the MERCOSUR and the Treaty
of the River Plate, are looking for transversal corridors of
commerce between the Pacific and the Atlantic to attract Far
East cargoes for new South African and European markets, e.g
Chile. Efficient corridors of transportation usually
generate antagonistic axis of commerce serving different
hinterlands around deep water ports. Sometimes cost
efficiency per kilometer is the determinant to favor one
corridor that may not br geographically closer to deep water
ports. That is why the development of transportation
strategies developing efficient corridors for commerce is
decisive for nations and regions growth.
As we can see, the diversity of national interests
favors more a polarization than an integration. This is
exactly what the MERCOSUR treaty is trying to harmonize: the
interest of all the nations. The development of the Basin,
based on economic and cost-effectiveness rather than
geopolitical interests could achieve the ultimate goal of
integration.
The issue of economic integration and the development
of the River Plate Basin is a complex problem that the
countries in question should solve. The issue becomes more
important today due to the role that Latin-American nations
could play in the next decade for South America and World
commerce.
Going back to the bases of the MERCOSUR, we can see
that it claims the same principles that Carlos Lopez, Manuel
Belzd or Juan Josd de Urquiza had claimed in the last
century: freedom of navigation for all vessels, to promote
commerce and improve the economy of the region using the
river, and to agree in the adoption of common regulations.
And this is the MERCOSUR, no more than what for some
politics was a dream in 1812, a reality for the people that
are living today.
s For a complete analysis of this subject see: Gildenberger, Carlos:
"Las Condiciones Sociales para la Integracion Subregional de Areas
Fronterizas: El Caso de la Cuenca del Plata". Revista Argentina de
Relaciones Internacionales, Buenos Aires, August 1979.
CHAPTER II
NAVIGATIONAL CONDITIONS
Introduction
The Parand-Paraguay River Basin has natural
characteristics that allow commercial navigation along its
1,860 nautical miles. Therefore, it could be a very useful
inland water transportation system. With the help of modern
technology, the countries of the Basin will have ample
possibilities to increase the use of the river in many
aspects: navigation, energy production, soil irrigation, and
trade.
Despite that, only a few actions have been developed to
improve the River Basin (some dredging, rocks removed, and
dead trees cleaned up).
Two natural features of the Parand River contribute to
the optimization of a system of commercial navigation.
First, as mentioned, it has nearly 100 m of altitude from
its mouth, in the River Plate, to the port of Buena Vista
(mile 1082 in the Republic of Paraguay). Second, it is the
only river in the world that, with its natural conditions,
allows commercial traffic year round. The River has a
minimum of 1.6 m of water; and it does not register delays
for low tides or frost because of its regular volume of
water.
Studies show that these exceptional conditions are due
to three main reasons: first, the effect of the regulation
of the Marshlands of Matogrosso; second, the small slope of
the river; and, lastly, the phase out of the pluviometric
regime of the area.
Figure 3: Parana-Paraguay River Basin View Chart.
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The Parand River ranks fourth in importance in the
world. The engineer, Ludovico Ivanissevich, has pointed out
that its operation represents "a challenge to technical
capacity and future governments and company commitments."
The Parand Basin grows in the central mountains of
Brazil and flows down to the Atlantic through the River
Plate. The extension of the Basin is 2,500,000 km2 . It is
fed by the rains of the central part of Brazil with a rate
over 1,500 mm/year. It receives the contributions of other
rivers: the Paraguay, Paranaiba, Grande, Iguazi, Pilcomayo
and Bermejo in the Argentine-Paraguayan zone as well as the
Tiet4, Paranapanema, Tibaji e Ivai in Brazilian lands.
It crosses the Argentinean territory on one of its most
fertile areas, where the production of grains and
agricultural products is concentrated.
The Parand Basin is geographically divided in three
areas of study:
- Part I: The lower Parana, from the River Plate to
Santa Fe
- Part II: The middle Parand, from Santa Fe to
Confluencia
- Part III: The high Parana, from Confluencia with
Paraguay to the Iguazu River
The following figure shows the three areas of study and
secondary rivers in the area.
Figure 4: Sections of the Parana River and Secondary Rivers.
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The lower and middle ParanA run exclusively in
Argentine territory. They have an extension of 1,244 km with
42 m of unevenness--32 in the middle and 12 in the lower
ParanA.
The middle sector goes through a ravine area, from
Esquina in the state of Corrientes to Santa Fe, while the
lower part is flat.
During extraordinary rain seasons, the water floods the
countryside up to approximately 40 km of each side of the
river.
The high Paran& is 688 km long. It is rocky and has
deep areas of 40/50 m (150 ft). The maximum flow of water
is between January and March, and the minimum between July
and September.
The most important property of the Paran& Basin is that
when the northern part registers high level of waters, the
southern part has low waters. The average time that high
water in Posadas takes to move down to Rosario is
approximate 25 days. (For more information about water
course see pluviometric curves from 1993 and 1994 in
appendix 1)
The average flow of the ParanA River is 16.000 m3/s,
with a minimum of 5,000 m 3/s. The flow varies between 8,000
m 3/s and 25,000 m 3/s, 90% of the time. The highest historic
altitude, registered in 1905, had 45,000 m3/s for 11 days,
provoking a flood of 100 km to each side of the river
(approximately 4,500,000 ha). The lowest altitude,
registered in 1944, had 2,900 m 3/s, generating irrigation
and navigational problems.
In its confluence with the Paraguay River, the Parand
is 3,000 m wide. Close to it, it receives the Bermejo
River, which is the main source of sedimentation. The
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Bermejo brings 75% of the solid sediments transported by the
Parand to the River Plate, averaging 92,000,000 m3/year.
The hydrologic cycles between the ParanA and Paraguay
Rivers are out of phase for about five months. The reason
is the delayed effect of the Matto Grosso marshlands. It
plays the roll of a huge sponge, holding rain water until
its capacity is filled.
Finally, the Paraguay River has an average flow of
4,500 m3/s with maximum during July at south of CorumbB, and
February at the Matto Grosso. It is navigable from the
Parana River to Port CAceres in the central-west part of the
Matto Grosso. It has favorable sailing conditions for
almost 2,000 km.
Identification of navigational constraints
To improve and optimize the commercial utilization of
the Basin, we need a detailed analysis of its navigational
conditions to detect the critical points. In addition to
determine the best type of vessels for commercial
navigation, we need to identify minimum depths, radii of
curves, width of the critical passes, and buoying system.
For these, I have divided the Basin in five sections
that present different situations and characteristics:
1. Buenos Aires - Santa Fe.
2. Santa Fe - Confluencia.
3. Confluencia - Apa River.
4. Apa River - Ponta do Morro.
5. Ponta do Morro - Caceres.
The sources of information for this chapter were
interviews to pilots, local researches, and from the
analysis of cartographic materials.
1. Buenos Aires-Santa Fe
The River Plate is the access to Buenos Aires for
vessels coming from high seas. Presently, Panamax vessels
stop in Buenos Aires and go up the Parand River to the ports
of Santa Fe or Rosario.
To analyze the critical points on this section, it will
be useful to sub-divide it in three areas:
1.1) The River Plate channel from the access to
Buenos Aires
1.2) The section from Buenos Aires to Rosario
1.3) The section from Rosario to Santa Fe
1.1) The River Plate Channel from the Access to Buenos
Aires:
Coming from the sea to the River Plate, there is a
buoying vessel, Ponton Recalada (where the pilot has to be
taken), and two lightening areas--Alfa and Beta. There, it
begins the channel that goes into the port of Buenos Aires.
The "Principal Channel", as it is called, is 92
nautical miles long, 200 m wide, and 30 ft deep. It has
three sections: the Punta Indio's Channel, the Intermediate
Channel, and the Banco Chico's Channel. Following the
Principal Channel, there is another piloting and lightening
area where the Access Channel to the port of Buenos Aires
starts (See chart in appendix 2).
The Intermediate and Banco Chico sections are
approximately 40 mi long, and 350 m wide. They pass through
two sandbanks--Ortiz Bank and Chico's Bank. There is a
buoying system similar to the IALA, with distances of 1.5 to
3.0 mi, which made navigational conditions relatively safe.
The Punta Indio's Channel has different
characteristics. Due to cross currents of diverse intensity
and direction and cross winds, the navigational conditions
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in this section are dangerous; and vessel's evolution is
severely affected.
The general direction of the Punta Indio's channel is
NW-SE between km 121 and 141. Since the current follows the
same direction it is easy to sail.
Between the 141 and 147 km, there is a curve where the
channel faces E-W, and in which currents, with an incidence
of 50, 600 and 900 against the axis of the channel, could
occur. The speed of the currents varies between 1,5 to 3,5
knots. There are records of vessels sailing with 150/170 of
drift.
Due to the cross currents, the walls of the channel are
frequently deteriorated and less depth can be found.
Therefore, the area is frequently dredged.
The buoying system is the same as in the other
sections. Radar navigation is not recommended because the
current moves the position of the buoys that do not have
Racom; and the coast is shallow without points of reference.
One thing to consider when sailing the Punta Indio's
channel is the loss of manoeuvrability from squat effects
and its relationship with the width of the channel. For
example; a panamax vessel at a VMG of 10/11 knots has a
squat between 23.5 and 31.5 inches. The humid section of
the Punta Indios channel is 2437 m2 and the section of the
panamax vessel is 299 m2 . This give as a relationship of
8.15. The recommended relationship by the Hydraulic
Congress of Philadelphia is 5. But, when two panamax
vessels cross each other in the Punta Indio's channel, the
relationship under the VMG conditions mentioned above drop
to 4.1.
Therefore, crossing situations in this section of the
channel are dangerous and require special caution. The
Argentine Coast Guard (PNA) issued a set of regulations,
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written down in the Maritime Ordinances and in the REGINAVE,
for crossing and overtaking maneuvers in this section of the
channel.
Due to the dangerous sailing conditions, there has been
more than 50 vessels sunk in recent years: the Dutch tanker
Pendrecht, the tanker Tien Chee, the bulk carrier Royston
Grange, the Ushuaia, and the Ciudad de Asunci6n, among
others. The number does not include grounding otherwise it
would have been larger: L'Etoile" of Monsieur Louis Antoine
de Bouganville on July 1767, the Endeavour of Cap. James
Cook on July 1769, the aircraft-carrier Minas Gerais, and
the cruising "Eugenio Costa" most recently.
Finally, after the Banco Chicos Channel between km 1
and 37, starts the Access to Buenos Aires Channel, with the
two entries: North and South.
The channel is a straight line except for a curve of
150 to starboard at the 22 km (outgoing direction), and
another of 90 to port side at 28.7 km (See appendix 3). The
current flows with an angle of 120 between km 37 and 28.7.
It runs parallel to the channel between km 28.7 and km 22,
and with 180 between km 22 and km 6.
The channel is 100 m wide between km 22 and 28.7. This
area is of great concern for panamax or container vessels
with great displacement due to squat effects. Given that
the beam of these vessels is usually between 30 and 33 m
with only 30 of drift, it will increase to 43.4 ml, which is
almost half of the channel. In crossing situations,
1 AB= B cosa + L cosa
AB= Apparent Beam
B = Beam of the vessel
L = Length of the vessel
a = Drift angle respect to the course.
specially at the two inflections mentioned above, occasional
touches of the side of the channel can occur with dangerous
results.
At the 12 km, the Emilio Mitre's channel that goes into
the Parand River starts. In the junction there is a current
increment of 1/4 knot with ESE downstream and WNW upstream
direction.
The channel has an IALA-B buoying system that does not
present any difficulty to navigational conditions.
The following table resumes the determinants passes and
depths of the River Plates Channel:
Exhibit 2.1
Between Position Wide of Depth
(km) (km) Channel Determinant
Intermediate --- --- 250 31
Channel
Chico's Bank --- --- 100 30
Channel
Punta Indio's 141-147 --- 100 32
Channel
Access Channel 22-28.7 --- 100 30
to
Buenos Aires
South Access 6.2-6.8 6.4 100 28'11"
North Access 37.0-12.0 13.8 100 29'06"
12.0- 7.3 7.6 60 28'03"
7.3- 1.7 5.2 60 25'11"
As a final remark, dredging can affect the channels
traffic.
For example, a margin of 10% of ship draw (security
margin) in 30 ft, it is 3 ft or 36 in. As the sinking of a
panamax vessel is 1"/150 tons, it represents 5,400 tons of
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cargo. If we assume a 15% margin, it will give 4'06" and
8,100 tons.
Now, the approximate number of vessels arriving at
Buenos Aires is 4,500 merchants, 3,600 river vessels, 2,000
barges, and 200 barges and river vessels from Paraguay;
totaling 10,300 vessels per year, with a mean of 28.6
vessels per day. If we multiply these 5,400 tons of cargo,
per way per each vessel, by current freight rates, we will
get a figure big enough to justify dredge activities in the
rare critical sections of the channel.
1.2) The section from Buenos Aires to Rosario:
From the River Plate, there are two alternatives to get
to the Parana River: the Emilio Mitre and the Martin
Garcia's Channel.
The first one is most direct and it can be taken at km
12 of the Access channel. The second can be taken at km 37
all the way to the port of Nueva Palmira. Then, the Parand
can be reached sailing through the Parand Bravo and the
Parand Guazu Rivers. This option has a determinant of 22 ft
in the San Pedro's sand bar. (See appendix 4)
The most used sailing route to Rosario is the Emilio
Mitre's channel because is deeper, less sinuous and shorter.
The determinant pass of this part, the Alvear Pass, is at
km 405. It has 30 ft of water and 60 m of width.
Panamax vessels have to be extremely cautious in the
curve of San Antonio and others similar to it. The
evolution of the vessel requires extreme expertise and
traffic control coordination. Appendix 5 shows an air
picture of a panamax vessel sailing the San Antonio's curve:
notice the presentation of the bow of the vessel at the
moment of the turn, and the relationship of physical space
to react on emergency situations. Appendix 6 shows detailed
hydrographic information of the curve.
Along with this pass, there exist 10 other places where
two Panamax vessels cannot cross simultaneously:
Exhibit 2.2
Name of the Place Position Characteristic
km
Rosario's Dock 419/412 Narrow
channel
Alvear Pass 400/410 Narrow
Paraguayo's Pass 391/389 Narrow
Paraguayito's Pass 387/386 Narrow
Abajo San Nicolas 344/339 Narrow
Las Hermanas E d W 324/315 Narrow
El Cisne 309/308 Narrow
Los Ratones 294/288 Narrow
Las Palmas entry 177/175 Narrow
Also, simultaneously crossing
following ports:
Exhibit 2.3
Name of the Position
Place km
Ppal. Rosario 421/410
Arroyo Seco 398/394
San Nicolds N 351/347
Ramallo 325/324
is not possible in the
To summarize, Panamax vessels can sail from Buenos
Aires to Rosario with a determinant of 28 ft, which
represents a 60% coefficient of cargo. Barges do not have
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limitations. The narrowest area has 60 m. Downstream
currents can reach up to 3/3.5 knots.
1.3) The river section from Rosario to Santa Fe:
The port of Santa Fe is located 90 nautical miles
north of Rosario. Merchant vessel traffic is less frequent
here than in the section previously described. There are 45
merchant vessels (panamax) per year.
The determinant depth is 25 ft. Panamax vessels have
to sail with a 40% coefficient of cargo in high waters
conditions. Downstream current is 3.0 knots.
The following are the critical passes of this area:
Exhibit 2.4
Name of the Place Position Characteristic
Borghi Pass 430/440 narrow
Copello Pass 465/468 20 ft
Abajo Correntoso 472/476 22 ft
Pass
Pelado Island 480/482 20 ft
Paranacito Pass 490/494 20 ft
Las Pencas Island 503/506 20 ft
Los Huevos Island 509/516 18 ft
Paciencia Island 570/582 narrow
There are no limitations for
120 ft wide, and 18 ft of draft.
barges up to 700 ft long,
2. Santa Fe - Confluencia.
This is the Middle Parand sector. It has the
characteristics of a prairie river, with a wide bed and with
long straight extensions, named by the pilots: canchas.
It presents favorable navigational condition for river
vessels and large barges.
The determinants are in September, when the area
registers the lower water levels. Appendix 1 shows the
annual water variation of the zone. With the information on
the pluviographs, we can determine the average pluviometric
regime in different sectors of the river.
The following exhibit shows the mean registered at both ends
during the last 20 years:
Exhibit 2.5
Name of the
Place
Confluencia
Santa Fe
1994
Height Caudal
(m) (m3/s)
2.58 12,544
2.69 3.53
Last 20 Years
Height(m) Caudal
(m3/s)
3.86 17,804
5.30 5.70
The exhibit shows that the mean of 1994 was below the
mean of the last 20 years. Since 1994 was an extremely dry
year, it is useful to explore what determinant passes we can
expect in the sector.
Exhibit 2.6 summarizes the determinant passes
identified with the information provided by charts,
pluviographs, and interviews with pilots:
Exhibit 2.6
Name of the Place Position (km) Determinant
Zapata River 632/639.5 6.24 ft
Mencho Island Pass 702/703 8.20 ft
Las Chacras Pass 719.5/720 8.20 ft
Green Island 731.5/733 8.20 ft
Abajo La Paz 754/755 7.20 ft
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Exhibit 2.6 (continued)
San Juan 780 4.00 ft
Palmira Island 786/787 3.90 ft
La Media Luna Island 788/790 4.10 ft
Costa Brava 812/814 5.00 ft
Las cruces Pass 847/853 7.20 ft
Arahas Island 856/858 5.60 ft
Selzo/Pindoty Island 890/893 5.90 ft
Guaycurd Pass 905/916 4.30 ft
Cabd Cud Island 1068/1069 4.30 ft
Hermes Cue Island 1140/1145 4.60 ft
Calia Island 1191/1194 6.90 ft
Pel6n Island 1115/1117 5.60 ft
Confluencia 1239/1240 5.00 ft
Selzo/Pindoty and Hermes Cue are the narrowest passes.
The first, is 80 m wide in front of El Talar Island and in
the section approaching Selzo island (see Appendix 7). The
second, is 70 m wide in front to Hermes Cue Island.
Depth information in the channels is updated monthly
with hydrologic bulletins, alike notice to mariners,
published by The National Institute of Science and Hydrics
and The Navy Hydrographic Institute. To get the determinant
water column of each pass, we have to correct depth
information from the charts (shown on the exhibits) with the
updated information for the month we are interested on.
Considering 1994 values and on the last 50 year
pluviometric graphs, I can conclude that, during 99% of the
year, the area does not present any inconvenience for
commercial navigation of barges up to 120 ft wide, 700 ft
long, and 12.0 ft of draft.
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3. Confluencia - Apa River.
This segment has also prairie conditions with small
elevations in the south. It is wide, sinuous, and with many
islands. There are many sandy passes, and some rocky
formations at km 1.125. This sector can be divided into two
sub-sections: Confluencia to Asunci6n, and Asunci6n to the
Apa River.
3.1) Confluencia to Asunci6n:
Here, the river is curved. It is 210 nautical miles
long, and has 8 determinant passes. In these passes, some
curves have radius that present problem for large barges.
There are restrictions in crossing situations,
particularly, for large convoys during low water season.
There is an agreement between the Paraguay's and Argentina's
governments to maintain the dredged depth at 9.00 ft.
Without considering dredge activities the determinant
passes are the following:
Exhibit 2.7
Name of the Place Position (Km) Determinant
London Pass 1288/1290 narrow curve
Bermejo's River 1320/1321 2.50 ft
mouth
Sepultura curve 1507/1510 2.00 ft
Dalmacia Pass 1512/1514 4.60 ft
Paray Pass 1523 3.30 ft
Soto Lake 1558 4.30 ft
Buey Muerto Pass 1590/1591 3.60 ft
Villeta Pass 1592/1595 2.00 ft
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Dredging activities done by the Argentine Government in
1994 have ensured 6.60 ft in Villeta and Sepulturas' passes.
The determinants shown on exhibit 2.7 have to be
revised with tide information. Appendix 2 shows the
hydrologic information corresponding to September 1994.
The next table compiles the mean registered at two
sites, for 1994 and the last 20 years:
Exhibit 2.8
Name of the
Place
Asunci6n
Formosa
1994
Height Caudal
(m) (m3/s)
2.76 2,487
2.96 5.47
Last 20 Years
Height(m) Caudal
(m3/s)
4.66 4,663
7.25 7.75
3.2) Asunci6n to Apa River:
This part has 290 nautical miles. There are nearly 15
sandy and sinuous passes that can cause difficulties to
commercial navigation. Due to changing characteristics of
sedimentation and auto-dredging, the critical passes
alternate with each other. The most relevant are the
following:
Exhibit 2.9
Name of the Position Determinant
Place (km)
Remanso Castillo 1654 narrow bridge
San Juan Pass 1746 3.20 ft
Puerto Elvira 1755 3.95 ft
Pass
Exhibit 2.9 (continued)
San Luis Pass 1779 3.13 ft
Pedernal Pass 1884 4.40 ft
Itacurubi Pass 1963 4.25 ft
La Novia Pass 2022 4.60 ft
Pind6 Island 2040 3.95 ft
Arrecifes Pass 2046 narrow/rocks
Pinasco Island 2074/80 3.60 ft
Cad-Pucd-Guazd 2091 3.60 ft
Island
Pefa Hermosa 2115 4.10 ft
Pass
There are 11 curves with radius smaller than 1,500 m,
with an angle to the center of the channel bigger than 150,
and 200 m wide. There are some determinant curves where
crossing are never possible: Carayacito (km 2,098), Pedernal
Island (km 1,882), and Nand-'s cliff (km 1,848).
There are also three places that have individual
geographic characteristics: Arrecifes Pass (km 2,047/49),
Concepci6n Pass (km 1940) and Remanso Castillo Bridge.
Arrecifes Pass has a rocky conformation. It is sinuous
and narrow. There are high currents due to the rocky
configuration. Both sides of the channel have submerged and
semi-submerged rocks not signaled that make crossing
operations remarkably dangerous. Pilots prefer to cross
after or before the pass.
Concepci6n has a rocky formation at Guggiari (close to
Cure bank). During low water season crossing is restricted.
At Concepci6n Pass there are two alternatives: either to
cross it or to take the Negro River branch. The Negro River
is deep and does not have rocks, but it is narrow and it
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does not allow barge crossing along its 49 nautical miles of
length.
Remanso Castillo Bridge is located on km 1,645 close to
Asunci6n; it is the biggest constraint for commercial
navigation. It was built in 1978. It is arc shaped with
160 m between pillars, giving 80 m of wide (at high tide) to
passing vessels. Barges of no more than 36 m can cross the
bridge one by one. In addition, there is a rocky bank, 160
m to the south, that during low water season limits
navigation to 5.00 ft.
The driest months are September and October in the
northern section close to the Apa River; and November and
January in the southern section close to Asuncion. Asuncion
has an irregular regime of water, being the less stable in
the area. The reason is that it suffers the retardation
effect from the Matto Grosso Marshlands. This effect
diminishes at the south of Asuncion due to water
contribution from the High Parand and the Bermejo's Rivers.
The driest year in Asunci6n had a water altitude of
1.65 ft in September, while in a regular year it was 6.80
ft, and 9.00 ft in a high water year. (See pluviographs in
appendix 1)
A study of these pluviographs conducted by Portobras of
Brazil has determined that 50% probability corresponds to
medium water levels, and 10% to dry years, assuming a normal
distribution.
The following exhibit shows the percentage of water
levels that can be found at the medium level with 50%
probabilities:
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Exhibit 2.10
Name of the Water Level (ft)
Place
1% 10% 25% 50% 75%
Casado Port 5.70 6.56 8.39 10.69 12.43
Pinasco Port 5.12 5.90 7.57 9.84 11.41
Conception Port 5.28 6.36 8.00 10.30 12.00
Antequera Port 3.70 4.75 6.33 8.62 10.10
Rosario Port 4.03 5.47 7.11 9.57 11.67
Piquete Cu' 3.77 5.28 6.88 9.31 11.71
Asunci6n 3.54 5.11 6.82 9.35 11.90
Exhibit 2.11 shows the percentage of water levels that
can be found at the lower level with 10% probabilities:
Exhibit 2.11
Name of the Water Level (ft)
Place
1% 10% 25% 50% 75%
Casado Port 2.59 2.85 3.70 5.67 6.56
Pinasco Port 2.00 2.29 2.95 4.92 5.93
Conception Port 2.00 2.32 3.28 5.28 6.49
Antequera Port 0.09 0.49 1.47 3.47 4.78
Rosario Port 0.22 0.75 1.80 4.20 6.00
Piquete Cu6 0.03 0.72 2.26 4.16 9.41
Asunci6n 0.32 0.46 1.37 4.23 6.66
From the previous analysis, we can conclude that,
during low water conditions, convoys of up to 660 ft long,
118 ft beam, and 4.00 ft of draft can sail year round
without additional dredging activities.
4. Apa River - Ponta do Morro:
This section of 462 nautical miles flows along the flat
Matogrosso's marshlands. It is over 600 ft wide, with few
sinuous sections, and many secondary branches or small
rivers and islands. This is the most favorable section for
commercial navigation in the Paraguay River. There are some
limitations due to drought in three passes:
Exhibit 2.12
Name of the Place Position (Km) Determinant
Piuvias Inferior 2,578 6.56 ft
(dredge)
Consejo Pass 2,609 8.20 ft
(dredge)
Branco's River 2,630 narrow
Bridge
The Branco's River Bridge has a distance between
pillars of 295.27 ft. As a result the extent of the passage
is 164 ft, in low water, and 98 ft, in high water. Crossed
currents passing through form a sandy bank close to the left
pillar of the bridge, which sometimes makes necessary to
split the convoys.
There are 23 curves with radius smaller than 1,500 m.
The determinant passes that present crossing restrictions in
low waters are: Formigueio (km 1,481), Rebojo (km 1,303),
Rdpida (km 1,184), and Batinha (km 1,097).
The low water season is from September to November (See
appendix 1). The following exhibit shows the percentage of
water level that can be found at the medium level with 50%
probabilities:
Exhibit 2.13
To conclude, this section of
99% of the year by convoys 690 ft
the river can be sailed
of length, 120 ft of beam,
and 7.00 ft of draft, with the dredging activities mentioned
above. Without dredging the determinant is 4.00 ft in low
waters. North of Corumbd it is wise to consider a
restriction of 120 ft to 78 ft in barge width allowed to
avoid demurrage in crossing situations.
Close to Corumbd it is the juncture with the Tamengo
channel, which connects Caceres Lake with the Paraguay
River. This channel is one access of Bolivia to the
Paraguay-Parand River Basin, therefore, to the sea. The
channel is 5.5 mi long, 328 ft wide, and has depths between
3.30 and 19.60 ft. It allows barge sailing of up to 10 ft
of draft sail during 9 month of the year.
5. Ponta do Morro - Caceres.
In this zone of the river, it is necessary to notice
two parts. The first one is located between Caceres and the
North Barr of Bracinho (km 3,882), where the Paraguay River
Name of the Water Level (ft)
Place
1% 10% 25% 50% 75%
Ladario 2.62 3.28 4.95 8.13 11.25
Da Manga Port 9.97 10.69 12.46 15.97 18.66
Espaeranza Port 1.27 2.09 3.90 7.57 10.20
Coimbra Fort -0.72 0.13 2.19 5.70 8.00
Negra's Bay 2.55 3.47 5.74 9.25 11.64
Branco's Cliff 6.06 7.15 9.61 12.72 14.96
Dos Morros 5.51 6.59 8.79 11.74 13.87
Murtinho's Port 7.61 8.59 10.72 13.51 15.51
runs between hills and is relatively wide (330 ft minimum).
The second is from the Barr of Bracinho to Ponta do Morro.
It is the most critical of the Paraguay River, crossing the
marshes of the Matogrosso. The river is narrow (some places
less than 110 ft) and very sinuous (see air approach in
appendix 8). Many curves have radius inferior to 328 ft,
presenting serious restriction to large convoys. The
determinant passes of the first section are the following:
Exhibit 2.14
Name of the Place Position km
Viejo Pass 3,406
Tucum Pass 3,357
Beicudo Pass 3,345
Barranco Rojo Pass 3,349
Bahiazinha 3,343
Soldado Inferior 3,340
Yeguas Bay 3,333
Descalvados Port 3,303
Pifva 3,288
Japuir& 3,287
The critical passes vary each year due to auto-dredging
activities, but it happens always north of Descalvados Port.
The minimum draft indicated by the charts is 3.00 ft for 99%
of the year. With dredging activities performed by
Portobras from Brazil, the minimum is 4.95 ft. Portobras
guarantees a depth of 4.00 ft all the year with channels
65/130 ft width in the bottom.
This part can be sailed by barges up to 6.00 ft during 6
months. The radius of the curves is more than 560 ft.
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This section of the river can be sailed by barges with
a length of 400 ft, a beam of 40 ft, and a draft of 4 ft
year round.
The second section, from Bracinho to Ponta do Morro, is
very sinuous. Due to its winding, the total sailing
distance expands 140% compared with a straight line. The
worst part is next to Gaiva Lake, where there are 140
curves. Half of them have radius smaller than 656 ft; and
are 130 ft wide. Thirty-four have radius smaller than 320
ft.
The determinants are 5 curves that do not allow
navigation to barges of more than 196 ft of length and beams
of 40 ft. The draft, dredged by Portobras, is 7.50 ft.
This section has occasional demurrage due to objects
that float like trunks and herbs that Portobras usually
removes.
This part of the river can be sailed all year, by
barges with a length of 400 ft, a beam of 40 ft, and a draft
of 7.50 ft. In the five curves mentioned, it is necessary
to break down a convoy with maximum length of 196 ft.
Crossing restrictions affect almost all the curves.
The following table summarizes the navigational
conditions of the Parand-Paraguay River Basin described
along this chapter:
Exhibit 2.15
Section of the Determinant Type of Vessels
River Drought
Buenos Aires to 9.0 m *Panamax vessels of
Rosario 50/60,000 DWT. 60% coef.
(30 ft) occupation
*Other smaller vessels
and large convoys.
Rosario to 6.0 to 7.5 m *Panamax vessels of
Santa Fe (20 to 25 ft) 50/60,000 DWT. 40% coef.
occupation
*River vessels up to
15,000 DWT
*Barges with large
convoys.
Santa Fe to 3.0 m *Barges up to 15,000 DWT
Confluencia with large convoys: beam
(12 ft) 120 ft, length 700 ft.
Confluencia to 2.75 m *Barges up to 15,000 DWT
Asunci6n with 75% coef.
(9.0 ft) occupation with medium
convoys.
Asunci6n to 1.82 m *Barges up to 15,000 DWT
Apa River with 50% coef.
(6.0 ft) occupation with
large convoys: beam 120
ft, length 660 ft.
Apa River to 2.40 m *Barges up to 15,000 DWT
Ponta do Morro with 50% coef.
(8.0 ft) occupation with
large convoys: beam 120
ft, length 690 ft.
Ponta do Morro 1.82 m *Barges up to 15,000 DWT
to Cdceres with 50% coef.
occupation with
medium/small convoys:
beam 40 ft, length 400
ft.
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CHAPTER III
PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND CHARACTERISTICS
For the optimization of the Parand-Paraguay River basin
we need information on port characteristics, infrastructures
and facilities since they may produce demurrages or present
limitations to handling the cargoes.
From the beginning of the basin, in the middle of the
Brazilian territory to the Atlantic Ocean, there are many
ports and private terminals that are used, or were used to
move cargoes. Movements in the basin are centralized to and
from the port of Buenos Aires, which is the most important
in the area and the one that receives the major portion of
international cargoes.
This chapter describes and summarizes port
characteristics along the basin. The intention is to
identify port capacities, types of cargoes, and intermodal
connections. This information will be used to develop the
optimization model in the next chapter.
The next figure shows the location of the major ports
in the basin.
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Figure 5: Port Distribution in the Parana-Paraguay River
Basin
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3.1 Port of Ciceres
This is the northeast port of the Parand-Paraguay River
basin. It has 4,900 m2 of storage room with a loading
/unloading capacity of 60 tons/h. The maximum movement of
grain registered is 34,500 tons/yr.
The principal goods are rice, wood, corn, iron, coal,
and manganese. Some cargoes sail down to Cdceres in small
convoys. There they are transferred to larger convoys and
go to Nueva Palmira in Uruguay.
There is no train access to the port and all cargoes
are moved by trucks.
3.2 Port of Central Aguirre
It is a private terminal on the Tamengo's channel, 1 mi
of CAceres Lake. It has a dock of 30 m (98 ft).
There is a train connection that allows access to the
Corumb&-Santa Cruz line. Trucks also have access to the
port.
This port is in Bolivian territory, close to the
border. The Tamengo's channel and the terminal of Quijarro
were done with the intention of offering Bolivia a waterway
transportation system. Because of the political instability
and weak economy of Bolivia, the infrastructure of the
channel and the lake ports are minimum.
Central Aguirre has a silo with a capacity of 15,000
tons, and 350 m2 storage facility. Loading capacity is 120
tons/h.
The projected surface for Quijarro's terminal is
600,000 m2 with train connection. It is still necessary to
build 3 km more of train lines.
The principal goods are minerals and grains.
3.3 Port of Corumb&
The port of Corumba is a very precarious installation
with a surface of 21,400 m2 . It has one dock of 200 m (656
ft) and one storage of 1,500 m2 .
There are no train facilities. The access is by road
and it is very inconvenient. The road crosses the town,
mixing local traffic with trucks. It ends in the port with
a high slope, impeding loading and unloading operations. The
city has few roads, and traffic congestions are frequent.
The typical movements of CorumbA are, manganese, iron,
grain, cement, and occasionally oil for the town.
3.4 Port of Ladario
Located at south of Corumbd, it has a surface of
50,939 m2 and 250 m (820 ft) of dock. Out of the port,
there is an area of 20,000 m2, which is used as external
storage area.
There is a single rail train system connected with Sao ~
Pablo in Brazil, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra in Bolivia.
The train lines are perpendicular to the dock area,
therefore loading and unloading operations are very
inconvenient. Demurrages are common in Ladario's port since
they required extra movements and trucks. There is a
connection with a route (BR-262), which joins Ladario with
Campo Grande.
There are two sectors in the port: one for bag cargoes
and another for grains and minerals. Bag facilities have a
conveyor belt with a loading capacity of 60 tons/h. There
is an old crane, still in operation, with an outboard
operating reach of 130 feet and a capacity of 1,2 tons.
The grain/mineral terminal has two 380 ft conveyor
belts with a capacity of 260 tons/h that connects the
road/train with the dock.
Silo's capacity: 24,000 tons
Mineral's storage capacity: 30,000 tons
Storage compartments: 4
Barges/trucks/wagon unloading capacity: 260 tons/h
Barges loading capacity: 400 tons/h
Trucks/wagons loading capacity: 200 tons/h
The terminal is used to move iron, manganese, cement,
soy beam, cotton, corn, etc. There is also a ramp for
transportation of animals such as: cows, sheep, horses, etc.
3.5 Port of Gregorio Curvo
It is 76 nautical miles (141 km) at the south of
Ladario. Depth in low waters is 7.00 ft. It has two piers.
There are two private terminals: Minerales Corumbenses
Asociados Ltd (MCA), and SOBRAMIL (Brazilian Society of
Minerals).
Train facilities are available in MCA terminal. Close
to the docks, there is a land area where the cargo is
classified before loading.
This terminal has served barge convoys up to 22,000
tons, even under old port practices. Loading and unloading
operations have a capacity of 1,200 tons/h, using a conveyor
belt system.
The SOBRAMIL terminal has 215 ft of dock space and road
connections. Minerals are loaded by gravity and unloaded by
a conveyor belt with a capacity of 1,600 tons/h. Neither
terminal has cranes.
3.6 Port of Murtinho
It is at 2,232 km of the Paraguay River. Port
infrastructure is precarious. It only has a small dock. It
is served by trucks without train access. It is used as
occasional stop for barges going up the river. The
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government of Brazil is presently promoting this port as a
future center to move agricultural products from the
Southwest Matto Grosso do Sur region.
3.7 Port of Vallemi
The port of Vallemi is 286 nautical miles north of
Asunci6n, on the junction with the Apa River. It has one
dock: 35 ft wide and 164 ft long. The port is essentially
to move lime mines and cement cargo produced in the area.
It has a single pier: 10 m wide and 50 m long. Loading
and unloading capacity is 350 tons/h.
3.8 Pinasco and Casado Ports
These are small ports on the Paraguay River, south of
Vallemi. They are used to move wood from the Brazilian and
Paraguayan jungle. There is a train that goes 40 mi into
the wilderness to bring the wood to the docks. Each port
has 3 old steam cranes. The piers are very precarious.
3.9 Port of Concepci6n
It is 168 nautical miles north of Asunci6n, city of
Concepci6n, an important commercial city. There is a dock
of 430 ft parallel to the current of the river. There are 3
small steam cranes with a capacity of 2 tons each. The port
is served by trucks. There are no train facilities. The
road system between Concepci6n and Chaco is under
construction; therefore, some improvement for the area can
be expected. Principal cargoes are cotton, soy, and coal.
Almost 100,000 tons of soy per year are handled in this
port.
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3.10 Port of Villa Hayes
It is 20 mi north of Asunci6n, next to ACEPAR Co, which
is one of the biggest iron companies in Paraguay. Villa
Hayes moves minerals to ACEPAR exclusively. The company has
a production of 150,000 tons per year. There is a dock: 60
ft wide and 330 ft long. Loading and unloading capacities
are 750 m3/h. The production of ACEPAR demands an average of
80,000 tons of iron and 2,000 of manganese from Corumba, and
15,000 tons of calcaneum stone from Vallemi. Trucks
transport these products since Villa Hayes has no train
facilities.
3.11 Port of Asunci6n
The city of Asunci6n--capital of Paraguay--and the port
of the same name is located on the left side of the Paraguay
River. There is a 1,800 ft dock with a depth of 9.00 ft
behind the piers. The depth of the access channel ranges
between 16 to 23 ft. It is the main port in Paraguay. It
handles cargo and passenger vessels.
There are 5 storages, one fixed crane with a capacity
of 20 tons, and 5 mobile cranes of 3/5 tons.
The port has train line connections and truck access.
The train is connected with an internal train network and
international lines to Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia.
The port moves general cargo, oil, refined products,
and grains.
3.12 Port of Villeta
It is 40 km south of Asunci6n. The docks are 540 ft
long and 50 ft wide.
There is no train line; trucks do all the movement.
This port moves cement mainly. It handles an average of
700,000 tons/yr. It has loading facilities with a capacity
of 350 tons/h, and many storage facilities for cement.
There are many companies in the area that produce cement
with an estimate capacity of 1,000,000 tons/yr.
3.13 Port of Formosa
The city of Formosa is the capital of the Argentine
state of the same name. The port has wooden piers of 110
ft, and a new concrete dock of 750 ft and 9 to 11 ft of
depth.
Two railroad lines serve the port. One of them links
the port with the western part of the country and with Chile
(General Belgrano's line--FNGB). The other (General
Urquiza's line--FNGU) links the port of Formosa with Buenos
Aires. Also, there is train connection with Paraguay.
Trucks access the port through route 11 that is
connected to the Pan-American route.
There is also a small airport close to the port.
There are 3 old steam cranes of 3 tons each one, 2
cranes of 5 tons, and one fixed crane of 8 tons.
The new dock has an open storage of 4,240 m2 with 3
additional cranes of 4 tons. Moreover, there is a grain
elevator with a capacity of 10,000 tons (it is expected to
be expanded up to 20,000 tons).
3.14 Port of Corrientes
It is in the city of the same name, 40 km from the
Paraguayan border. The port has one concrete pier of 1,225
ft with 12.0 ft of depth.
It has train (FNGU) and truck connections with Buenos
Aires and neighbor countries. There is an international and
local airport.
It has 3 electric cranes of 3 tons each, and two
storage facilities for general cargoes.
3.15 Port of Barranqueras
Barranqueras is the port of Resistencia, the capital of
Chaco state. It has a general dock of 2,610 ft, and a
private dock that belongs to the oil company Y.P.F. Both
are 11 ft deep. Services of piloting and towing are not
required to enter the port.
The port is connected with Buenos Aires and the western
part of the country by train. There are also connections
with national routes.
The port operates with grains and paper. The traffic
is 1,966 river vessels/yr and 2 ocean vessels/yr. There are
5 storage facilities of 9,500 m2 each, and 1 open storage of
19,656 m 2 . There are 14 cranes of 1.5, 3, 4, 6, 12, 15
tons, and one P&H crane with a capacity of 45 tons.
Storage grain capacity is 100,000 tons. Loading and
unloading capacities are the following:
Trucks: 500 tons/h
Wagons: 750 tons/h
Barges 1,000 tons/h
To load or unload trucks and wagons, there are two
parallel lines for each. Two barges can be served
simultaneously at the docks.
During 1993, port movement increased 30%, attracting
non traditional cargoes like manganese and leather from
Brazil. Moreover, during the same year, the port received
3,700 tons of cotton from Russia. In 1994, the port moved a
total of 1,000,000 tons. The total capacity of the port is
4,500,000 tons/yr.
3.16 Port of Reconquista
The Reconquista's port is on a small branch of the
Parand River: San Ger6nimo River. There are 6 piers of 60
ft; water depth ranges between 12 to 16 ft. There are two
piers for roll-on roll-of operations.
Though the port has no train lines; the FNGB line
crosses the area 10 mi from the port. Truck services serve
between these two points. There is a local airport that
connects to Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. There are also
connections with the national routes.
The port has two cranes with a capacity of 8 tons each.
The cargo moved is mainly for local consumption: sugar,
grains, domestic oils, etc. The average total volume is
120,000 tons.
3.17 Port of Santa Fe
The port of Santa Fe is 300 mi north of Buenos Aires
and serves an important agricultural area of Argentina. It
has two docks (# I and # II) and a cabotage terminal with a
total surface of 500,000 m2 . (See appendix 9)
The port is served by two train lines the (FNGU) and
the (FNGB), which connect the port with Buenos Aires, the
western part of the country, and internationally. There are
connections with national routes and two airports. Pilots
and tugs are compulsory.
Dock # I has 1,850 ft in the east part and 2,200 ft in
the west. There are 19 portico cranes; 5 vessels can be
served simultaneously. Crane capacity ranges from 1.5 tons
to 20 tons. There are 3 oil storage tanks with 4,000 tons
capacity and loading/unloading facilities for 400 tons/h.
There are 5 storage facilities for general cargo with 18,900
tons capacity.
Dock # II is located parallel to dock # I. It has
2,950 ft in the east and 2,400 in the west. It is 400 ft
wide. It can serve 10 vessels at a time. It is intended to
operate with grains. It can handle 10,000 tons/d. The
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storage capacity is 50,000 tons. The loading rate of the
facilities are the following:
Wagons: 1,350 tons/h
Trucks: 450 tons/h (36,000 m 2 for parking trucks)
Vessels: 1,800 tons/h
The cabotage terminal has 3 docking areas:
Dock # 1: it is 3.000 ft long. It has capacity to
serve 3 vessels. There are 2 portico cranes. The grain
storage capacity is 50,000 tons, and the loading bulk rate
is 1,000 tons/h and 90 tons/h in bags.
Dock # 2: it is 1,900 ft long. It can serve 2 vessels
at a time. There is one portico crane of 20 tons. It has
grain storage capacity for 6,000 tons and loading facilities
of 360 tons/h. In bags, it can be handle 50 tons/h.
Dock # 3: it is 2,400 ft long. It can serve 2 vessels.
The grain storage capacity is 10,500 tons. It has bulk
loading facilities of 800 tons/h. In bags, it can handle
230 tons/h.
The average cargo moved in the port of Santa Fe is
1,000,000 tons/yr.
3.18 Port of Diamante
The port of Diamante is 26 mi south of Santa Fe. It has
a pier 492 ft long and 60 ft wide with 16.5 ft of water
depth. It is served by train (FNGU) and by trucks.
The principal goods are cereals. Silo capacity is
34,500 tons. It has bulk loading facilities with a rate of
900 tons/h. Bag storage capacity is 17,000 tons. Loading
capacity is 1,200 tons/h. There are vegetable oil tanks
with an storage capacity of 91,000 tons. There are four
grain terminals to operate with vessels. Pilots and tugs are
compulsory.
The annual movement for 1993 was 411,829 tons,
including grains, wood, and sand. During 1994, 228 river
vessels and 16 small ocean vessels called the port of
Diamante.
3.19 Port of San Martin
The port of San Martin is where the most important area
for grain exports begins. During 1993, the area has
exported 17,481,448 tons of grains, with the total exports
of the country being 24,035,714 tons. There are 4 private
terminals: La Plata Cereal, Bunge y Born, IMSA, Cargill, and
Terminal 6. The principal characteristics of these terminals
are:
19.1-La Plata Cereal S.A.: It has 1,640 ft of docking
facilities. It can serve vessels up to 800 ft. Water depth
close to the docks is 30 ft. Two pilots are required to
reach this port when coming from Buenos Aires. It is
dedicated to grains and domestic oils. It has train and
truck access.
Grain storage room is 150,000 tons, and loading
capacity to vessels is 1,000 tons/h. The facilities can
handle 400 tons/h of grain from trucks, and 200 tons/h from
wagons.
Tanks to storage vegetable oil have a capacity of
40,000 tons. There are also 2 pump lines of 600 tons/h
each. Parking facilities can accommodate 850 trucks.
The total volume moved was 753,149 tons, during 1993,
and 966,080 tons, during 1992.
19.2-Bunge y Born S.A.: The B&B terminal has docking
facilities 500 ft long, with 35 ft of water depth. It is
dedicated to grains and vegetable oil. Storage capacity for
grains is 25,000 tons and for oil 10,000 tons. There are
two pipes to load vessels with a capacity of 800 tons each.
Reception facilities have a capacity of 400 tons/h.
Truck parking place can receive 60 units. The train
passes at 9 mi of the terminal, but there is no line to
connect with it. The total volume of cargo moved was
902,987 tons, in 1992, and 621,616 tons, in 1993.
19.3-IMSA: The terminal is dedicated to grains and
vegetable oil. It has a dock 656 ft long, with 30 ft of
water depth. Vessels coming from Buenos Aires require two
pilots. The storage capacity for grains is 200,000 tons, and
35,000 for vegetable oil. Bagged storage capacity is 42,000
tons. Bulk loading facilities have 4 pipes with a loading
capacity of 600 tons/h each. There are two pump lines of
500 tons/h for vegetable oil.
Truck parking can receive 700 units. There is a train
connection that goes into the terminal. Total movement of
cargo during 1993 was 1,468,339 tons.
19.4-Cargill: The dock is 470 ft long and has 32 ft of
depth. There are two silos with grain storage capacity of
280,000 tons. Loading facilities can handle 1,000 tons/h.
There are vegetable oil storage facilities for 30,000 tons,
with a pumping rate of 1,000 tons/h.
Truck parking is available for 550 units. There is no
connection with train lines. The total volume of cargoes
moved during 1993 was 1,984,742 tons.
19.5-Terminal 6: It is the most modern grain terminal in
Argentina. The dock is 2,624 ft long, and has 42 ft of
depth. It can handle 2 vessels at a time. Ocean vessels
Cape Size (900 ft) and Panamax can operate in this place.
It has an storage grain capacity of 360,000 tons. The
unloading capacity for trucks is 1,500 tons/h, and for
wagons 800 tons/h. Regarding loading capacities, site #1
has a rate of 1,000 tons/h, and site #2 a rate of 3,200
tons/h.
The terminal has train connections with all the lines
in the country. Total movement was 3,192,010 tons, during
1993, and 3,280,368 tons, during 1992.
3.20 Port of San Lorenzo
The port of San Lorenzo has 4 terminals: Pecom Agra
S.A., Vicentin SACI, ACA (Asociaci6n de Cooperativas
Argentinas), and EXXON/YPF.
20.1-Pecom Agra S.A.: It is an storage terminal without a
pier. It operates with the docks of Vincentin S.A. It has a
storage capacity of 170,000 tons. The transference capacity
is 1,000 tons/h. Reception rate for trucks is 350 tons/h.
There are parking facilities for 300 units. The train
connection is under construction.
20.2-Vicentin SAIC: This terminal handles grains and
vegetable oil mainly. There are 4 docking places, one for
ocean vessels, two for barges, and one for vegetable oil
vessels. Water depth is over 40 ft.
There are 3 storage tanks for vegetable oil (10,000
tons each), and two silos of 15,000 tons each are under
construction. Grain reception capacity is 2,300 tons/h
(train and trucks), and vegetable oil reception capacity is
800 tons/h. Loading rates are 1,200 tons/h for grains, and
1,000 tons/h for vegetable oil. Train lines are available.
Total movement during 1993 was 2,220,281 tons.
20.3-Asociaci6n de Cooperativas Argentinas-ACA: It has a
dock 280 ft long and 45 ft deep. It can operate with ocean
vessels and barges. Dedicated to moving grains and
vegetable oil, it has storage facilities with 64,000 tons
capacity for grains, and 25,000 tons for bags. There are 4
pipes with a capacity of 900 tons/h. Oil storage capacity
is 12,800 tons, and pumping rates are 900 tons/h.
Truck parking is for 420 units. Train facilities are
available. Total movement during 1993 was 873,316 tons.
20.4-EXXON/YPF: There are 7 docking places of 260 ft long.
Three belong to YPF, two to EXXON, and two to a governmental
gas company. Water depth close to the piers is 30 ft.
The YPF docks have pipe lines with diameters of 4", 6",
10". The EXXON docks has pipe lines with diameters of 6",
8", 10".
3.21 Port of Rosario
The port of Rosario is the most important port in the
Parand River. It has an extension of 2,470 acres. The city
of Rosario is a major industrial center and also the
location of principal agricultural activities. The total
length of the docks is 11,500 ft with 28 ft of water depth
(See port of Rosario in Appendix 9).
There is a contract with Jan De Nul--Belgium company--
to dredge the river from Rosario to Buenos Aires up to 32 ft
of depth. There are four train lines serving the port and
providing national and international connections. Local and
international airports are also available.
There are 11 terminals: Units I, II, III, IV, V, VI,
VII, Genaro Garcia, Guide, Punta Alvear, and Louis Dreyfus &
Cia. The facility can assist Panamax vessels and barges up
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to 50 tons simultaneously. Port pilots are compulsory. Tug
services are optional. The total storage capacities are:
Vegetable Oil: 105,533 m2
General Cargo: 30,000 m2
Grain Bags/Pallets: 80,000 tons
Silos: 967,600 tons
The main characteristics of the terminals are the
following:
21.1-Unit I: It operates with vessels up to 800 ft. The
depth alongside the piers is 31 ft. Silo storage capacity
(27 silos) is 18,870 tons. Truck and wagon loading rates
are 450, and 400 tons/h respectively. The loading
capacities for barges and vessels are 1,500 tons/h.
Truck parking facilities can accommodate 550 units. The
record of cargo movement was in 1986 with 1,126,897 tons.
21.2-Unit II: It belongs to the ex-National Grain Board. It
allows one vessel alongside. It has a berth front with two
dolphins set 100 m apart, and a water depth of 29 ft. It
has storage capacity for 22,800 tons. Unloading rates for
trucks and wagons are 300 tons/h; and loading capacity is
600 tons/h. There are train lines and truck access from and
to different national routes.
21.3-Unit III: It has a dock 760 ft long and 33 ft depth.
Grain storage capacity is 82,130 tons. Loading rates are
1,000 tons/h. It has train and truck access. Presently,
this terminal is out of service and under privatization
process.
21.4-Unit IV: There is a dock 660 ft long, and 27 ft deep.
It has a storage capacity of 36,200 tons. Loading rates for
wagons are 1,200 tons/h, and loading rates for barges and
vessels are equal to 1,000 tons/h. It can only operate one
Panamax at a time. Vessels do not require tug services.
21.5-Unit V: It has a dock of 835 ft long and 33 ft of
water depth. It has 120 silos of 200 tons each one, having
a total capacity of 24,000 tons. Moreover there is a
vegetable oil storage capacity of 11,000 tons. Storage
space for general cargo is 30,000 tons. Loading facilities
have a rate of 500 tons/h. It has train and truck access.
Tugs are required.
21.6-Unit VI: It belongs to the ex-National Grain Board.
It offers one berth for panamax, with a front of 780 ft long
and two dolphins. Water depth is 34 ft. Grain storage
capacity is 140,600 tons. The loading facilities have 8
pipes with a total rate of 3,200 tons/h. The record of
movement was registered in 1985 with 103 vessels and
2,009,300 tons.
21.7-Unit VII: It has dock 600 ft long, which can serve one
vessel at a time, and 37 ft of water depth alongside. Grain
storage capacity is 80,000 tons. Wagon reception rates are
850 tons/h. Loading facilities for barges and vessels use
three lines of 1,200 tons/h each, totaling 3,600 tons/h.
21.8-Genaro Garcia: It has a dock 360 ft long and 30 ft
water depth alongside the piers. Grain storage capacity is
80,000 tons. Vessel loading rate is 1,000 tons/h. It has
reception facilities for 900 tons/h. Trucking storage can
receive 500 units.
21.9-Guide S.A: The dock is 1,300 ft long with 28 ft water
depth. It is for vegetable oil. It can store up to 77,533
m3 of oil in 26 tanks. The loading rate is 850 tons/h. The
record of cargo movement was in 1991 with 604,296 tons.
21.10. Punta Alvear: The dock is 740 ft long with 32 ft
water depth. It has a grain storage capacity of 253,000
tons. Loading facilities have two pipes, 1,000 tons/h each.
Truck parking area can receive 700 units. Exports during
1993 were 1,270,270 tons.
21.11. Louis Dreyfus: It has 1,390 ft of docking space, and
36 ft of water depth. It can serve 2 Panamax vessels and a
barge simultaneously. Storage grain capacity is 230,000
tons, and 50,000 tons for bags/pallets. It has tanks for
vegetable oil, with a total storage capacity of 17,000 tons.
Grain loading rate is 1,000 tons/h. Vegetable oil loading
rate is 800 tons/h. Truck parking is for 350 units.
3.22 Port of Constituci6n
The port of Constituci6n is divided in two terminals:
Unit I, and Servicios Portuarios S.A. It has an average
movement per year of 600,000 tons. The main characteristics
of the terminals are the following:
22.1-Unit I: It has a dock 540 ft long, and 31 ft water
depth. Grain storage capacity is 60,030 tons, in silos, and
170,580 tons, in underground storage. Vessel loading rate
is 1,000 tons/h, using two lines. It has train and road
access. Port and river pilot, and tug services are
compulsory.
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22.2-Servicios Portuarios S.A.: It has a dock 780 ft long,
with four dolphins, and 24 ft water depth. This terminal is
dedicated to minerals and coal. Total storage capacity is
92,000 tons. There are 4 silos of 22,000 tons, and one of
4,200 tons. Loading services for vessels have two lines
with a rate of 500 tons/h each. The record of cargo
movement was in 1991 with 365,401 tons. Port and river
pilot and tug services are compulsory.
3.23 Port of San Nicols
The port of San Nicolds has 2,540 ft of dock, and 30 ft
of water depth. The average movement is 5,500,000 tons/yr.
There are two terminals: ACEROS PARANA S. A, ex-SOMISA, and
San Nicolds Terminal.
ACEROS PARANA, dedicated to iron and coal, has 3
portico cranes, two 15 tons and one 30 tons. Loading
capacity for coal is 500 tons/h.
San Nicolds Terminal has docks of 1800 ft long, 150 ft
wide and 32 ft of water depth. There are 7 cranes: 6 type
GANZ, and one COLBY of 30 tons. Coal loading rate is 1,000
tons/h with 2 pipes. Reception rate from trucks is 600
tons/h. Coal storage capacity is 185,000 tons. Also, it
has bag grain storage for 10,100 tons. Truck parking
facilities are for 190 units. Pilots are required, tugs are
not.
3.24 Port of Ramallo
The port of Ramallo is 168 nautical miles from Buenos
Aires. It has 3 piers for general cargo with an extension
of 1,700 ft and 26 ft of water depth. There is another pier
of 780 ft for animals. Grain storage capacity is 11,640
tons in 16 silos. Reception facilities allow 400 tons/h.
The loading facilities have two pipes with a rate of 600
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tons/h. There is no train serving the port. The access is
by truck. Port pilot services are compulsory, tug services
are not required.
3.25 Port of San Pedro
The port of San Pedro is 151 km from Buenos Aires. It
has a dock 740 ft long with 30 ft of water depth. The
average vessel movements are 1,000 river vessels/yr, and 25
ocean vessels/yr. Grain storage capacity in vertical silos
is 29,540 tons, and 84,000 tons in 14 underground silos.
Grain loading rate is 1,000 tons/h. Truck parking
facilities are for 100 units. There is no train. Port
pilot is compulsory.
3.26 Port of Atucha
This is the port for Atucha Nuclear Center, which is on
the right margin of the Parand River, 21 mi up the river
from Campana. The concrete berth is 260 ft long and 90 ft
wide, and it has two mooring dolphins. It was built to
discharge heavy materials for the atomic plant. There is a
crane with a capacity of 300 tons. Depth alongside is about
44 ft. Port and river pilot services are required.
3.27 Port of Zarate
The port of Zarate is 51 nautical miles from Buenos
Aires. It has 272 acres of land. Main cargoes are sand and
wood. The average annual movement is 76,988 tons, with 660
river vessels and 11 ocean vessels per year. There are 4
piers, which length is between 100 and 500 ft. The
structure is precarious and water depth is shallow (9 ft).
There are 4 cranes of 1.5 tons and 3 tons. The port has
train and road access. Pilot services are required. Tugs
are not compulsory, but usually they are indispensable.
3.28 Port of Campana
The port of Campana is 52 nautical miles from Buenos
Aires. It is the major crude oil and iron port in the
river. It has an average movement of 6,000,000 tons/yr, with
more than 1,700 river vessels and over 60 ocean vessels per
year. EXXON has three pipe lines for unloading and loading
vessels with operating rates of:
Crude oil: 700/1800 cbm/h
Fuel oil: 500/550 cbm/h
Naphtha: 280/340 cbm/h
Petcoke bulk: 4,000/5,000 m/d
Water depth alongside the docks is 35/40 ft.
Dalmine Siderca is the pier that operates with minerals. It
is 610 ft long and 35 ft water depth. Loading rates are 800
tons/h. There is a private pier 590 ft long that belongs to
Euroamerica Co. This pier usually exports general cargo,
citric, iron pipes, and wood. The use of one tug boat is
compulsory for vessels with a LOA above 157.5 m.
The following exhibit summarizes the port information
already described and condenses the necessary data that will
be used in the design of the optimization model in the next
chapter:
Exhibit 3.1
Name of the Depth Storage Loading Cranes Trans Pilot/
Port in ft Capacity per hour Capacity Tug
CAceres 9 4,900 m2 Bgs: 400 none Truck yes/no
Gr: 60
Central 9 15,000Tn Gr: 120 none Train yes/no
Aguirre 350m 2  Truck
Corumb& 10 1,500 m2 none Truck yes/no
Ladario 10 Gr: Bgs: 60 #1-1.2 Train yes/no
24,000 Gr: 520
Mi: Truck
30,000
Gregorio 7.00 Gr:1,600 none Train yes/no
Curvo Gr:1,200 Truck
Murtinho 12 none Truck yes/no
Vallemi 12 Mi: 350 none Truck yes/no
Pinasco/ 27 #3-1.2 Truck yes/no
Casado
Concepci6n 16 #3-2.0 Truck yes/no
Villa Hayes 11.0 Mi: 750 none Truck yes/no
Asunci6n 9.00 #1-20; Train yes/no
#5-5 Truck
Villeta 14 Mi: 350 none Truck yes/no
Formosa 11.0 Gr: #3-3; Train yes/no
20,00020,000Bgs: #2-5; TruckBgs:
4,240 #1-8
Corrientes 12.0 #3-3 Train yes/no
Truck
Barranqueras 11.0 Bgs: Gr: #14-1.5 Train yes/no
9,500 1,000 to 15;
Op: #1-45;
19,656
Gr:
100,000
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Name of the Depth Storage Loading Cranes Trans Pilot/
Port in ft Capacity per hour Capacity Tug
Reconquista 14.0 #2-8 Truck yes/no
Santa Fe: Gr: Gr: #4P-20 Train yes/yes
66,500 1,000
Bgs: 90 Truck
* Dock I 18 Oil: Oil: 400 #19P-1.5 Train yes/yes
4,000 to 20GC: TruckGC:
18,900
* Dock II 23 Gr: Gr: #1P-20 Train yes/yes
50,000 1,800 Truck
Diamante 16.5 Gr: Gr: 900 none Train yes/yes
34,500 Truck
Bgs-
17,000
San Martin:
*La Plata 30 Gr: Gr: none Train yes/no
Cereal 150,000 1,000
Veg.Oil: Veg.Oil:
40,000 1,200
*Bunge & 35 Gr: GR: 900 none Truck yes/no
Born 25,000 Veg.Oil:
Veg.Oil: 800
10,000
*IMSA 30 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
200,000 2,400
Veg.Oil: Veg.Oil:
35,000 1,000
*Cargill 32 GR: Gr: none Truck yes/no
280,000 1,000
Veg.Oil: Veg.Oil:
30,000 1,000
*Terminal 6 42 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
360,000 3,200 TrainTrain
San Lorenzo:
*Pecom Agra -- Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
170,000 1,000 Train
78Train
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Name of the Depth Storage Loading Cranes Trans Pilot/
Port in ft Capacity per hour Capacity Tug
*Vicentin 40 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
30,000 1,200
Veg.Oil: Veg.Oil: Train
30,000 1,000
*ACA 45 GR: Gr: none Truck yes/no
64,000 3,600
Veg.Oil: Veg.Oil:
12,800 900
Bgs:
25,000
*EXXON/YPF 39 Pipes: Truck yes/no
4", 6",
8", 10"
Rosario:
*Unit I 31 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
18,870 1,500 TrainTrain
*Unit II 29 Gr: Gr: 600 none Truck yes/no
22,800 Train
*Unit III 33 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
82,130 1,000 TrainTrain
*Unit IV 27 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
36,200 1,000 TrainTrain
*Unit V 33 Gr: Gr: 800 none Truck yes/no
24,000 Veg.Oil:
Veg.Oil: 500 Train
11,000
GC:
30,000
*Unit VI 29 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
140,600 3,200 TrainTrain
*Unit VII 37 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
80,000 3,600 Train
*Genaro 30 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
Garcia 80,000 1,000 TrainTrain
Name of the Depth Storage Loading Cranes Trans Pilot/
Port in ft Capacity per hour Capacity Tug
*Guide 28 Veg.Oil: Veg.Oil: none Truck yes/no
77,533 850 Train
*Punta 32 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
Alvear 253,000 2,000 TrainTrain
*Louis 36 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/no
Dreyfus 230,000 1,000
Bgs: Veg.Oil: Train
50,000 800
Veg.Oil:
17,000
Constituci6n:
*Unit I 31 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/yes
170,850 2,000
Bgs:
60.030
*Servicios 24 Gr: Gr: 500 none Truck yes/yes
Portuarios 92,000
San NicolAs:
*Somisa 30 Mi: 500 #2P-15; Train yes/no
#1-30 Truck
*San 30 Mi: Mi: #7-10 Train yes/no
Nicolds 185,000 1,000 #1-30Bgs: TruckBgs:
10,100
Ramallo 26 Mi: Mi: 600 none Truck yes/no
11,640
San Pedro 30 Gr: Gr: none Truck yes/yes
113,540 1,000
Atucha 44 #1-300 Train yes/no
Truck
Zarate 9.0 #2-1.5; Train yes/no
#2-3.0;
#1-6 Truck
Campana 35/40 Oil: 800 #3-4; Truck yes/yes
CHAPTER IV
OPTIMIZATION MODEL
1.Characteristics of the Model
The technological developments and the changes in the
operating environments have forced private companies and
governments to work for strict standards of efficiency,
reliance, and service. Tactical decisions on fleet
specifications, and technological and methodological
requirements became more critical each day.
This optimization model intends to demonstrate that the
Parand River can be used efficiently to transport cargoes,
downstream and upstream, from the core of South America to
ocean ports. Moreover, this model will be useful to design
an intelligent plan to modernize barge and tug boat fleets,
port infrastructures, and intermodal systems.
The model is based on the projected productions of
grains, by products, and minerals in the regions adjacent to
the river for 1995 given by the Argentine government.
From the study showed in Chapter II, I determined the
geographical constraints that could limit the type of
barges, size of the convoys that would be used in the river,
and possible areas of congestion if ship traffic is
increased.
From the study showed in Chapter III, I determined port
constraints regarding loading capacities, cargo handling,
storage infrastructures, and ship turn around times.
In addition, the model contemplates the increase in
transportation costs due to expected queueings for
increasing traffic in critical passes.
Furthermore, the model considers the option of using
Panamax vessels up to the port of Rosario to assess the
efficiency of this type of vessel for inland water
transportation under the Parana River conditions. The
purpose of this is to the evaluate the decision of the
Argentine government, which has just signed a contract with
the Belgium company Jan de Nul to dredge the river to 32
feet, up to the port of Rosario. The government will invest
$345,000,000 for dredging plus $78,000,000 in equipment.
See cost analysis of this operation in appendix 10.
2. Objectives and Parameters Description
As it was mentioned above, the model developed attempts
to minimize the operating cost of moving the projected
annual production of grains, minerals, and several by-
products in the area of the Parand River; subject to the
geographical and port constraint described in Chapters II
and III. It includes 35 main ports and terminals.
The natural characteristics of the waterway,
essentially depth and width, will be a major constraint
affecting flotilla resistance as well as tow boat effective
push. For the calculation of the size of the flotillas and
the required power for tow boats I used the model developed
by Howe where he concluded that the resistance of the barge
flotilla can be represented by:
(1.46 50
0.6+( 50 V38R= 0.07289xek 1 x S2 xH B-x L 3 x B119
were,
R= Resistance of barge fleet
D= Depth of the waterway
W= Width of the waterway
B= Breadth of the fleet
L= Lenght of the fleet
H= Draft of the fleet
S= Speed in knots
and the effective push (EP) of a tow boat given by:
EP= 31.82HP - 0.0039HP2 + 0.38HP x D - 172.05S 2 - 1.14S - HP
The basic technological equilibrium constraint which
must hold for any towing system is that EP=R. EP can be
related to the tow boat characteristics and speed, and R to
the flotilla characteristics and speed. This equation will
permit the determination of the equilibrium speed for any
flotilla.
Using the waterway characteristics described in Chapter
II a family of curves is derived to determine the maximum
size of the fleet for each section of the basin, and the
required push power for the tow boats.
The following graphs show the curves obtained. We can
see, (a)that the total product curves for a fixed horsepower
are strictly concave, reflecting the diminishing marginal
productivity of the barge input; and (b)the marginal
productivity of the horsepower input decreases. Moreover,
beyond some point, the tow system is subject to decreasing
returns to scale within a waterway given depth and width.
In addition, as the horsepowers increases, effective push
decreases because of restricted water flow to the screws,
and resistance increases because of an extreme drawing of
water from under the flotilla, causing the barges to
squat.
Figure 6: Effective push of tow boats
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In this model, "total cost" includes the following
aspects:
a) daily running costs
b) fuel costs
c) pilot and channel fees
d) port charges
e) capital costs
f) maintenance and repairs
g) P&I
h) stevedoring and administrative costs
Agency fees and commissions to cargo brokers are
excluded.
Distances must be introduced in kilometers (common
measure used in the area), and the speed in knots.
Railroad costs have been provided by official sources
of the local government.
The output of the optimization model includes the
following information:
a) required number of tow boats
b) required number of barges
c) required number trains
d) required number of panamax vessels in the route
e) sensitivity analysis of suggested port infrastructure
improvements
3. Assumptions of the model
It is assumed that the river can be sailed 24 hours.
This assumption will be possible after the materialization
of the modernization of the buoying system carried on by the
Argentine Oceanographic Institute.
To facilitate a traffic schedule and control program--
which is not part of this thesis-- each group of convoys
would have an assigned route serving particular ports of
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origin and destinations based on supply and demands of
geographical centers. The election of these routes is also
based on the number of terminals available at each principal
port. The ports, terminals, and routes selected are the
following:
Exhibit 4.1
Number Port Name Terminal Name Orig/Dest
Route
1 Corrientes Corrientes 1-4-8-15
2 Barranqueras Barranqueras 2-4-8-15
3 Reconquista Reconquista 3-4-6-7-15
4 Santa Fe Dock I, Dock II 4-15
5 Diamante Diamante 5-15
6 San Martin La Plata Cereal, 6-15
Bunge&Born, IMSA, Cargil,
Terminal 6.
7 San Lorenzo Pecom Agra, Vincentin, ACA, 7-15
Exxon.
8 Rosario Unit I to VII, Genaro 8-15
Garcia, Guide, Punta
Alvear, Louis Dreyfus.
9 Constitucion Unit I, Servicios 9-15
Portuarios.
10 San Nicolds Somisa, San Nicolds S.A 10-15
11 Ramallo Ramallo 11-15
12 San Pedro San Pedro 12-15
13 Zarate Zarate 13-15
14 Campana Campana 14-15
15 Buenos Aires Buenos Aires ---
Grains, minerals, and by-products are the main
downstream cargo. Buenos Aires supplies to the northern
states barges with containerized cargoes coming from
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international trades. The balance of cargo is not discussed
on this thesis.
Currents, upstream or downstream, are considered
constant in each particular direction. The average obtained
from pluviograms and hydrographic information is 1.5 knots.
Port operating times are derived from their capacity
and current work regulations for the stevedores in the area,
which stipulates the following schedule:
Mondays to Fridays: from 07.00 AM to 17.00 PM
Saturdays: from 07.00 AM to 13.00 PM
4. The Model
Based on the objectives and assumptions described
above, the general mathematical expression of the model is:
P M
Min I (CfR, +CBz +C Y, +Cz'Pz
r= z=1
Where,
C== Total cost of a tow vessel on route r with product z
R,= Number of tow vessels on route r
Cb'= Total cost of a barge on route r with product z
Brz = Number of barges on route r
C,== Total cost of a train on route r with product z
YZ= Number of trains on route r
Cz,= Total cost of a Panamax vessel on route r
with product z
Prz= Number of Panamax vessels on route r
In this equation each total cost depends on different
factors and it can be defined by,
c, = c' + c;
where,
C, = Cost of a tow vessel sailing route r
C, = Cost of a tow vessel at port in route r
And,
cz = C"" +C jP
where,
C,,= Cost of a barge sailing route r
C,== Cost of a barge at port in route r
And,
cz =Cs +C'pr pr pr
where,
Cp = Cost of a Panamax vessel sailing route r
Cp== Cost of a Panamax vessel at port in route r
In addition each of these sailing and port costs can be
defined as follows:
* The cost of a tow vessel sailing route r, C, is given by
C = (T& o + S + r Tr r)
where,
T,= Time a tow vessel spends sailing route r in days
0== Operating cost tow vessel sailing route r
s = Fees due to pilots in route r in dollars per day
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F,= Expected total delay due to queuing in route r in days
D,,= Total operating cost of a tow vessel in delays at
route r
Pr,= Probability of delay in route r
Where the time that a tow vessel spends in the sailing
route r is,
Ts= dt
Dx Sk
where,
dt= Distance in kilometers between ports of origin and
destination in the route r
(== Conversion factor to adapt kilometers and knots
(44.448)
And, the S,= average speed over the ground of the
convoy expressed in knots given by,
S,= Sk + (-1)8S,
where,
Sk= Speed tow boat over water
6 = 1 if upstream and 0 downstream
S,= Current speed
And, the operating cost of a tow vessel sailing
route r, Ot is,
O = aOp, +a1 + P& Ie +dM o R a + Ad b + o,
t= Oil and lubes consume per day of a tow boat on route r
p,= Oil price on route r
ns= Crew cost per day for the tow boat sailing route r
P&I= Protection and Insurance cost per day for tow boat
sailing route r
M&Rs= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for tow boat
sailing route r
Ads= Administrative expenses p/day for tow boat sailing
route r
g,= Capital cost per day for tow boat sailing route r
* The cost of a tow vessel at port in route r, Cr, is given
by,
P P
c; = T r; o: + ; +TP rP
p=1  p=l
where,
P
ETt = Total time a tow boat spends at ports in route r
p-1
O0= Operating cost of a tow boat at port in route r
=,P= Docking fees and working tows at ports in route r
•= Pilot fees at ports (intermediate stops) in route r
And where the operating cost of a tow boat at port in
route r, OP is given by,
O = p + + P&IP +M&Rt +Adtr +qtr
where,
aP= Oil and lubes consume per day of a tow boat at port
on route r
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p,= Oil price on route r
92= Crew cost per day for the tow boat at port in route r
P&I= Protection and Insurance cost per day for tow boat at
port in route r
M&RP= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for a tow boat
at port in route r
AdP= Administrative costs p/day for tow boat at port in
route r
gq= Capital cost per day for tow boat at port in route r
And,
p
," = dk,1 T, + A PTAor
p= 1
where,
,P,= Docking fees and working tows at ports in route r
dk,= Docking rate for tow boat
p
1 T/= Total time a tow boat spends at port in route r
p=l-1
A P == Total Cost of an auxiliary tow boat operating at port
TA= Time auxiliary tow boat operating at port
Or8,= Number of terminal ports at route r
where,
AP = fj, + P& I + M&RA + Ad, + Ar
CIr,= Crew cost per day for the auxiliary tow boat
in route r
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P&IA,= Protection and Insurance cost per day for auxiliary
tow boat in route r
M&R',= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for auxiliary
tow boat in route r
Ad== Administrative costs per day for auxiliary tow boat at
port in route r
gA,= Capital cost per day for auxiliary tow boat at port in
route r
* The cost of a barge sailing route r, Cr is given by,
cr; = Tb~O + rFD, Prr
where,
TS= TT= Time a barge spends sailing route r in days
Ob'= Operating cost of a barge sailing route r
F,= Expected total delay due to queuing in route r in days
D,'= Total operating cost of a barge in delays at route r
Pr,= Probability of delay in route r
And, the operating cost is define as,
Obr = P& Isr + M& r + Adb, + 7br
P&Ir,= Protection & Insurance cost per day for a barge in
route r
M&Rsr= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for a barge in
route r
Adj,== Administrative costs p/day for a barge sailing
route r
br,= Capital cost per day for a barge in route r
* The cost of a barge at port is given by,
Cb = TbOrbPr + br X Tbp
TPf= Time that a barge spent at port in route r
O,,= Total operating cost of a barge at port in route r
•P,= Docking fee for a convoy in route r
r= Number of barges per convoy in route r
Where,
Or = P& If + M& Rt + Adb +•br
P&I6,= Protection and Insurance cost per day for a barge at
port in route r
M&R:r,= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for a barge at
port in route r
Ad6== Administrative costs per day for a barge at port in
route r
br-= Capital cost per day for a barge in route r
Where, the time that a barge spends at port will be a
function of the time that a tow vessel spends sailing each
route on a round trip voyage. Then,
Tbsr= T= + 2 T1r
TJP= Time a barge spends stopping at middle ports
T,= Time a tow vessel spends sailing route r in days
The calculation of the Panamax vessels operating on
each route will be the following,
cs = T so + Ts, + sDP
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C'= Cost of a Panamax vessel sailing route r
Tp= Time of a Panamax vessel sailing route r
Op,= Total operating cost of a Panamax vessel sailing
route r
P,= Pilot fees for Panamax vessels in route r
F,= Expected total delays due to queuing in route r
in days
D;,= Total operating cost of a Panamax in delays at route r
Pr,= Probability of delays in route r
The time that a Panamax spends sailing route r, is
given, same as in the barges, by
dtT' =
Where the total cost of a Panamax sailing route r, is
given by,
Or = (' +G')p, +n + P& I + M& R + Ad' +,
pr pr pr r pr pr pr pr
where,
a•= Oil and lubes consume per day for a Panamax vessel
sailing route r
Gsr= Generator fuel consumption per day for a Panamax
vessel sailing route r
p,= Oil price on route r
cs,= Crew cost per day for a Panamax vessel sailing route r
P&I ,= Protection and Insurance cost per day for a Panamax
vessel
M&R,,= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for a Panamax
vessel
Ad;,= Administrative costs p/day for a Panamax vessel in
route r
gp,= Capital cost per day for a Panamax vessel
The cost of a Panamax vessels operating at ports in
route r is given by,
CpP, = TP OP, + T P,
where,
CP,= Cost of a Panamax vessel at port in route r
Tp= Time of a Panamax vessel at port in route r
Op = Total cost of a Panamax vessel at port in route r
'TP,= Docking, tow, and extra fees for a Panamax in route r
Where the time that a Panamax spends at port route r is
given by,
qpr
TP= q +WT'P24 x PC
qg= Mean amount of cargo to be loaded in tons
WT P= Expected waiting time in port to start the loading
operations in days
PC= Port loading capacity in ton per hour
Where the total cost of a Panamax vessel at port in
route r is,
OP= GP pr+P&I, +M&R+ +Ad5 +qprr Pr Pr Pr
GYP = Generator fuel consumption per day for a Panamax
vessel at port in route r
This model will increase commercial traffic in the
river, but there are critical paths that can be sailed by
one vessel at a time, therefore, the operating performance
of the river will be affected by expected congestions and
queues. The mathematical representation of the expected
queues can be seen as a single channel waiting line M/M/1
system due to the crossing restriction. To analyze the
system, one must express the average or mean number of
arrivals per time period (i), and the average or mean number
of services per time period, which will be represented by
the time spent sailing the critical path (p).
The operating characteristics represented by the
following equations apply only when the mean service rate
(p) is greater than the mean arrival rate (i), in other
words 9=--1I. Otherwise, the number of vessels in the
waiting lines will continue to grow without limits.
Then, the definition of (A) can be written as the
number of expected trips per day in all passages and
I-R, I Tr+T,P r) / 15)+FP,  (Ts+T / 15)
365
And (p) is given by,
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= For all, dtD length of an specific
passage in Kilometers.
Then, the (FI) expected total delay due to queuing in
route r in days, can be expressed as the delay time in
sailing the critical passage plus the average time spent in
the waiting line to sail the passage.
Then,
r,'= ds+dý
ds= Delay time sailing a determined passage.
d,= Delay time in a waiting line for sail the specific
passage.
Where, the average time that a vessel spends in a
waiting line to sail an specific passage is,
AP - A)iA
where,
n=O
=>Aoo +AII +nA2P2+...+ •nP, A(Po +PI + +...+Pn)
= if n = #convoys + vessels
# delay areas
and, Pn Po = X(1- 2)
then,
22dr'= U(~U - •) X AT( - A) AU(- A) X AT( - A)
The delay time sailing a determined passage ds is
expressed by the time of sailing the passage with a
differential speed imposed by the characteristic of the
passage (for this program it is assumed 1.5 Knots less than
the normal speed).
D
YdtD
d-= r × Distance in KilometersD x ASk
Therefore, substituting in the expression for total
delay F~,=d,+d, r we have,
D
i dtD A
rT * +
pr XASk ( ) ~(1- i)
The operating costs of a tow boat waiting in queues is
slightly different from the cost when sailing due to less
consumption of the main engine in reliant. Then,
D,,= Total operating cost of a tow boat in delays at
route r is given by,
D,= aop, + l + P& I + M& Rs + Adg +
where,
aw= Oil and lubes consume per day of a tow boat in waiting
line on route r
p,= Oil price on route r
~Q== Crew cost per day for the tow boat in waiting a line on
route r
P&I,= Protection and Insurance cost per day for tow boat
M&R5= Maintenance and repairs cost per day for tow boat
Adt= Administrative costs per day for tow boat in route r
g,= Capital cost per day for tow boat in route r
Since by regulation of the Argentine Coast Guard,
Panamax vessels have priority in all critical passageways,
it is assumed that the operating costs of a panamax, at
sailing and in queues, is the same OS =Ds. I will
compensate for this difference including a Coefficient of
Priority of Passage in the total delay time. Then,
Fr = 0.8 x FJ (0.8 coefficient of priority)
Finally for tow boats and for panamax vessels the
probability of delay Pr, is given by,
Pr, = - (P0+P =
= - x - + x 1- =
= 1 1
(1 (1-)+(g-62))
= 1.- (1-s2)=
S2.
.Prr=S 2
This model is subject to the following set of
constraints:
Total Supply: The sum of the amount of cargoes carried by
barges, trains or panamax should be equal to the total
amount of grains, subproducts or minerals produced in the
area. Then,
J-1 Z B J-1 Z T Z P J-1 Z
bE;rXb'r +tr r' + P '=J 1X44
i=1 z=1 b=1 i=1 z=1 t=1 z=1 p=1 1=1 z=1
Port Capacity: Loading and unloading facilities in each port
will determine maximum of cargoes that the port would
handle, as well as, the cost of the operations at that
particular port. Then,
jXf .224XC:
z1
for all i={1,...,n)
for all z= (1,...,m)
The calculation of 224 is based on present port-
stevedoring regulations in Argentina. The working day is
defined as 10 hours a day (07.00 AM to 17.00 PM) during
regular working days; and 6 hours on saturday (07.00 AM to
13.00 PM).
Convoys Configuration: Considering the characteristics of
the river given in the previous chapter, convoys
configuration for this section of the river could be 16
barges per tow boat. Then,
Rr(t +t)= (16)-'B, for all z={l,...,m)
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Non-negativity. The decision variables should be non-
negative
R,Bz , Yt, rz ý 0
Then the model can be written as follows:
Min (Cr115R115 + Cb115Bg115 + Cb115Bbll15 + Ct115Yg115 +
Ctll5Ybll5 +
+ Cr215R215 + Cb215Bb215 + Ct215Yb215 + Cr315R315 +
Cb315Bb315 + Ct315Yb315 + + Cr415R415 + Cb415Bb415 +
Cb415Bg415 + Ct415Yb415 + Ct415Yg415 + Cp415Pb415 + +
Cp415Pg415 + Cr515R515 + Cb515Bg515 + Cb515Bb515 +
Ct515Yg515 + Ct515Yb515 + + Cr615R615 + Cb615Bg615 +
Cb615Bb615 + Ct615Yg615 + Ct615Yb615 + Cp615Pb615 +
+ Cb615Bvo615 + Ct615Yvo615 + Cp615Pb615 + Cr715R715 +
Cb715Bg715 +
+ Cb715Bb715 + Cb715Bvo715 + Ct715Yb715 + Ct715Yg715 +
Ct715Yvo715 +
+ Cp715Pb715 + Cp715Pg715 + Cr815R815 + Cb815R815 +
Cb815Bg815 + Cb815Bb815 + + Cb815Bvo815 + Ct815Yg815 +
Ct815Yb815 + Ct815Yvo815 + Cp815Pb815 +
+ Cp815Pg815 + Cp915Pg915 + Cr915R915 + Cb915Bg915 +
Cb915Bb915 + Ct915Yg915 + + Ct915Yb915 + Cp915Pb915 +
Cr1015R1015 + Cbl015Bmil015 + Cbl015Bgl015 +
+ Ctl015Ymil015 + Ctl015Ygl015 + Cpl015Pg1015 +
Cpl015Pmil015 +
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+ Cr1115R1115 + Cb1115Bg1115 + Ctlll5Yglll5 + Cr1215R1215 +
Cbl215Bg1215 +
+ Ct1215Yg1215 + Cp1215Pg1215 + Cr1315R1315 + Cb1315Bb1315 +
Ct1315Yb1315)*
Subject to:
Bgll5Xbgll5 +
Bbll5Xbbll5 +
Bb215Xbb215 +
Bb215Xbg215 +
Bb315Xbb315 +
Bb415Xbb415 +
Bg415Xbg415 +
Bg515Xbg515 +
Bb515Xbb515 +
Bg615Xbg615 +
Bvo615Xbvo6 15
Bb615Xbb615 +
Bvo615Xbvo615
Bg715Xbg715 +
Bb715Xbb715 +
Bvo715Xbvo7 15
Bb815Xbb815 +
Bg815Xbg815 +
Bvo815Xbvo815
Bb915Xbb915 +
Ygll5Xygll5
Ybll5Xybll5
Yb215Xyb215
Yb215Xyg215
Yb315Xyb315
Yb415Xyb415
Yg415Xyg415
Yg515Xyg515
Yb515Xyb515
Yg615Xbg615
<= 200,000
<= 300,000
<= 250,000
<= 200,000
<= 100,000
+ Pb415Xpb415 <= 300,000
+ Pg415Xpg415 <= 450,000
<= 200,000
<= 150,000
+ Pg615Xpg615 <= 4,000,000
+ Yvo615Xyvo615 <= 200,000
Yb615Xyb615 + Pb615Xpb615 <= 150,000
+ Yvo615Xyvo615 <= 200,000
Yg715Xyg715 + Pg715Xpg715 <= 2,100,000
Yb715Xyb715 + Pb715 Xpb715 <= 300,000
+ Yvo715Xyvo715 <= 450,000
Yb815Xyb815 + Pb815Xpb815 <= 500,000
Yg815Xyg815 + Pg815Xpg815 <= 3,200,000
+ Yvo815Xyvo815 <= 600,000
Yb915Xyb915 + Pb915Xpb915 <= 250,000
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Bg915Xbg915 + Yg915Xyg915 + Pg915Xpg915 <= 200,000
Bmil015Xmil015 + Ymil015Xymil015 +
+ Pmil015Xpmil015 <= 850,000
Bgl015Xbgl015 + Ygl015Xygl015 + Pgl015Xpgl015 <= 100,000
Bglll5Xbglll5 + Yglll5Xyglll5 + <= 100,000
Bgl215Xbgl215 + Ygl215Xygl215 + Pgl215Xpgl215 <= 400,000
Bbl315Xbbl315 + Ybl315Xybl315 <= 100,000
Bgll5Xbgll5 <= 224PClg
Bbll5Xbbll5 <= 224Pclb
Bb215Xbb215 <= 224Pc2b
Bb315Xbb315 <= 224Pc3b
Bb415Xbb415 + P415Xp415 <= 224PC4b
Bg415Xbg415 + P415Xp415 <= 224PC4g
Bb515Xbb515 <= 224PC5b
Bg515Xbg515 <= 224PC5g
Bb615Xbb615 + P615Xpb615 <= 2224PC6b
Bg615Xbg615 + P615Xpg615 <= 224PC6g
Bvo615Xbvo615 <= 224PC6vo
Bb715Xbb715 + P715Xpb715 <= 224 PC7b
Bg715Xbg715 + P715Xpg715 <= 224PC7g
Bvo715Xbvo715 <= 224PC7vo
Bb815Xbb815 + P815Xpb815 <= 224PC8b
Bg815Xbg815 + P815Xpg815 <= 224PC8g
Bvo815Xbvo815 <= 224PC8vo
Bg915Xbg915 + P915Xpg915 <= 224PC9g
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Bb915Xb915 + P915Xpb915 <= 224PC9b
Bmil015Xbmil015 + P1015Xpmil015 <= 224PC10mi
Bgl015Xbgl015 + P1015Xpgl015 <=224PC10g
Bglll5Xbglll5 <= 224PC11g
Bgl215Xbgl215 + P1215Xp1215 <= 224PC12g
Bbl315Xbbl315 <= 2688PC13b
R115{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R215{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R315( (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R415{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R515{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R615( (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R715{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R815{ (Trs+Trp)/15} >=
R915( (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R1015{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R1115{(Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R1215((Trs+Trp)/15) >=
R1315{ (Trs+Trp)/15) >=
(Bb115 + Bb215 + Bb315
-1(16)-1 (Bb115 + Bgll5)
(16)-1 Bb215
(16)-1 Bb315
-1
(16)-1 (Bb415 + Bg415)
(16)-1 (Bg515 + Bb515)
(16)-1 (Bb4615 + Bvo615)
-1
(16)-1 (Bg715 + Bb715 + Bvo715)
-1
(16)-1 (Bg815 + Bb815 + Bvo815)
-1
(16)-1 (Bg7915 + Bb7915)
-1
-1
(16)-1 (Bmil0185 + Bgl015)
-1
(16)-1 Bg1115
-1
(16)-1 Bg1215
-1
(16)-1 Bb1315
+ Bb415 + Bb515 + Bb615 + Bb715 +
+Bb815 + Bb915 + Bb1315) Xbb + (Ybll5 + Yb215 + Yb315 +
+Yb415 + Yb515 + Yb615 + Yb715 + Yb815 + Yb915 + Yb1315) Xtb
+(Pb415 + Pb615 + Pb715 + Pb815 + Pb915 + Pbl015 + Pb1215)
Xpb = 2,250,000
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Xbg (Bgll5 + Bg415 + Bg515 + Bg615 + Bg715 + Bg815 + Bg915 +
+Bgl015 + Bg1115 + Bg1215) + Xyg (Yg115 + Yg415 + Yg515 +
+Yg615 + Yg715 + Yg815 + Yg915 + Ygl015 + Yg1115 + Ygl215) +
+Xpg (Pg415 + Pg615 + Pg715 + Pg815 + Pg915 + Pg1015 +
+Pg1215) = 1,120,000
Bmil0156Xbmi + Ymil015Xymi = 850,000
Xbvo (Bvo615 + Bvo715 + Bvo815) + Xyvo (Yvo615 + Yvo715 +
+Yvo815) = 1,250,000
For all positive variables and GIN R115...R1315, GIN
B115...B1315, GIN Y115...Y1315, GIN P415...P1315.
End
End
105
MIN 28.25 R115 + 28.18 R215 + 24.42 R315 + 16.36 R415 + 16.61 R515
+ 14.62 R615 + 14.5 R715 + 13.27 R815 + 12.57 R915 + 11.64 R1015
+ 11.12 R1115 + 10.14 R1215 + 6.69 R1315 + 3.26 BB115 + 3.27 BB215
+ 3.27 BG215 + 2.68 BB315 + 1.94 BB415 + 1.52 BB515 + 1.29 BB715
+ 1.22 BB815 + 1.09 BB915 + 3.26 BG115 + 57.75 YG115 + 57.75 YB115
+ 57.75 YB215 + 57.75 YG215 + 46.2 YB315 + 1.94 BG415 + 31.5 YB415
+ 31.5 YG415 + 49.37 PB415 + 1.52 BG515 + 26.25 YG515 + 26.25 YB515
+ 1.31 BG615 + 21 YG615 + 1.29 BG715 + 1.29 BVO715 + 20.475 YB715
+ 20.475 YG715 + 20.475 YV0715 + 37.8 PB715 + 1.22 BG815 + 1.22 BV0815
+ 19.95 YG815 + 19.95 YB815 + 19.95 YV0815 + 40.24 PB815 + 1.09 BG915
+ 15.75 YG915 + 15.75 YB915 + 47.26 PB915 + 1.04 BMI1015 + 1.04 BG1015
+ 13.125 YMI1015 + 13.125 YG1015 + 74.51 PG1015 + 0.97 BG1115
+ 12.6 YG1115 + 0.63 BG1215 + 10.5 YG1215 + 71.12 PG1215 + 0.4 BB1315
+ 5.25 YB1315 + 1.31 BV0615 + 21 YV0615 + 49.37 PG415 + 36.44 PG615
+ 37.8 PG715 + 40.24 PG815 + 47.26 PG915 + 74.51 PMI1015
SUBJECT TO
2) 2.4 BG115 + 0.025 YG115 = 200
3) 2.18 BB115 + 0.023 YB115 = 300
4) 2.18 BB215 + 0.023 YB215 = 250
5) 2.4 BG215 + 0.025 YG215 = 200
6) 2.18 BB315 + 0.023 YB315 = 100
7) 2.18 BB415 + 0.023 YB415 + 21.6 PB415 = 300
8) 2.4 BG415 + 0.025 YG415 + 24 PG415 = 450
9) 2.4 BG515 + 0.025 YG515 = 200
--MORE--
10) 2.18 BB515 + 0.023 YB515 = 150
11) 2.4 BG615 + 0.025 YG615 + 24 PG615 = 4000
12) 1.8 BV0615 + 0.012 YVO615 = 200
13) 2.4 BG715 + 0.025 YG715 + 24 PG715 = 2100
14) 2.18 BB715 + 0.023 YB715 + 21.6 PB715 = 300
15) 1.8 BV0715 + 0.012 YVO715 = 450
16) 2.18 BB815 + 0.023 YB815 + 32.4 PB815 = 500
17) 2.4 BG815 + 0.025 YG815 + 36 PG815 = 3250
18) 1.8 BV0815 + 0.012 YV0815 = 600
19) 2.18 BB915 + 0.023 YB915 + 32.4 PB915 = 250
20) 2.4 BG915 + 0.025 YG915 + 36 PG915 = 200
21) 2.4 BMI1015 + 0.027 YMI1015 + 36 PMI1015 = 850
22) 2.4 BG1015 + 0.025 YG1015 + 36 PG1015 = 100
23) 2.4 BG1115 + 0.025 YG1115 = 100
24) 2.4 BG1215 + 0.025 YG1215 + 36 PG1215 = 400
25) 2.18 BB1315 + 0.023 YB1315 = 100
26) 2.4 BG115 <= 224
27) 2.18 BB115 <= 161.28
28) 2.18 BB215 <= 44.8
29) 2.4 BG215 <= 448
30) 2.18 BB315 <= 8.96
31) 2.18 BB415 + 21.6 PB415 <= 64.9
32) 2.4 BG415 + 24 PG415 <= 1120
33) 2.18 BB515 <= 35
--MORE--
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34) 2.4 BG515 <= 201
35) 2.4 BG615 + 24 PG615 <= 1904
36) 1.8 BVO615 <= 896
37) 2.18 BB715 + 21.6 PB715 <= 425.6
38) 2.4 BG715 + 24 PG715 <= 1299.2
39) 1.8 BV0715 <= 425.6
40) 2.18 BB815 + 32.4 PB815 <= 1016
41) 2.4 BG815 + 36 PG815 <= 3516.2
42) 1.8 BV0815 <= 481.6
43) 2.4 BG915 + 36 PG915 <= 560
44) 2.18 BB915 + 32.4 PB915 <= 560
45) 2.4 BMI1015 + 36 PMI1015 <= 336
46) 2.4 BG1015 + 36 PG1015 <= 179.2
47) 2.4 BG1115 <= 112
48) 2.4 BG1215 + 36 PG1215 <= 224
49) 2.18 BB1315 <= 224
50) - 3.49 R115 + 0.0625 BB115 + 0.0625 BG115 = 0
51) - 3.49 R215 + 0.0625 BB215 + 0.0625 BG215 = 0
52) - 4.18 R315 + 0.0625 BB315 = 0
53) - 7.5 R415 + 0.0625 BB415 + 0.0625 BG415 = 0
54) - 8.28 R515 + 0.0625 BB515 + 0.0625 BG515 = 0
55) - 9.67 R615 + 0.0625 BG615 + 0.0625 BV0615 = 0
56) - 9.8 R715 + 0.0625 BB715 + 0.0625 BG715 + 0.0625 BV0715 = 0
57) - 10.4 R815 + 0.0625 BB815 + 0.0625 BG815 + 0.0625 BV0815 = 0
--MORE--
58) - 11.71 R915 + 0.0625 BB915 + 0.0625 BG915 = 0
59) - 12.28 R1015 + 0.0625 BMI1015 + 0.0625 BG1015 = 0
60) - 13.15 R1115 + 0.0625 BG1115 = 0
61) - 15.3 R1215 + 0.0625 BG1215 = 0
62) - 15.3 R1315 + 0.0625 BB1315 = 0
63) 2.18 BB115 + 2.18 BB215 + 2.18 BB315 + 2.18 BB415 + 2.18 BB515
+ 2.18 BB715 + 2.18 BB815 + 2.18 BB915 + 0.023 YB115 + 0.023 YB215
+ 0.023 YB315 + 0.023 YB415 + 21.6 PB415 + 0.023 YB515 + 0.023 YB715
+ 21.6 PB715 + 0.023 YB815 + 21.6 PB815 + 0.023 YB915 + 32.4 PB915
+ 2.18 BB1315 + 0.023 YB1315 + 32.4 PB1015 + 32.4 PB1215 = 2250
64) 2.4 BG215 + 2.4 BG115 + 0.025 YG115 + 2.4 BG415 + 0.025 YG415
+ 2.4 BG515 + 0.025 YG515 + 2.4 BG615 + 0.025 YG615 + 2.4 BG715
+ 0.025 YG715 + 2.4 BG815 + 0.025 YG815 + 2.4 BG915 + 0.025 YG915
+ 2.4 BG1015 + 0.025 YG1015 + 24 PG1015 + 2.4 BG1115 + 0.025 YG1115
+ 2.4 BG1215 + 0.025 YG1215 + 24 PG1215 + 24 PG415 + 24 PG615
+ 24 PG715 + 24 PG815 + 24 PG915 = 11200
65) 2.4 BMI1015 + 0.027 YMI1015 = 850
66) 1.8 BV0715 + 0.012 YVO715 + 1.8 BV0815 + 0.012 YV0815
+ 1.8 BV0615 + 0.012 YVO615 = 1250
END
107
LP OPTIMUM FOUND AT STEP
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUE
4485501.0
VARIABLE
R115
R215
R315
R415
R515
R615
R715
R815
R915
R1015
Rl115
R1215
R1315
BB115
BB215
BG215
BB315
--MORE--
BB415
BB515
BB715
BB815
BB915
BG115
YG115
YB115
YB215
YG215
YB315
BG415
YB415
YG415
PB415
BG515
YG515
YB515
BG615
YG615
BG715
BVO715
YB715
YG715
--MORE--
VALUE
2.817245
1.860383
.061455
1.810589
.750214
5.845685
5.837962
11.124280
1.056854
.924606
.198035
.381264
.187384
73.981650
20.550460
83.333330
4.110092
29.770640
16.055050
137.614700
229.357800
114.678900
83.333330
.000000
6031.304000
8921.739000
.000000
3958.261000
187.500000
10221.740000
.000000
.000000
83.333330
.000000
5000.000000
793.333300
83840.000000
541.333300
236.444500
.000000
32032.000000
REDUCED COST
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
57.710780
.000000
.000000
78.185680
.000000
.000000
.000000
31.478370
28.796880
.000000
26.232860
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
20.460410
.000000
108
YV0715
PB715
BG815
BV0815
YG815
YB815
YV0815
PB815
BG915
YG915
YB915
PB915
BMI 1015
BG1015
YMI1015
YG1015
PG1015
BG1115
YG1115
BG1215
YG1215
PG1215
BB1315
YB1315
--MORE--
BV0615
YV0615
PG415
PG615
PG715
PG815
PG915
PMI 1015
PB1015
PB1215
ROW
2)
3)
4)
5)6)
7)8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
--MORE--
2033.333000
.000000
1354.167000
267.555600
.000000
.000000
9866.666000
.000000
83.333330
.000000
.000000
.000000
140.000000
41.666660
19037.040000
.000000
.000000
41.666660
.000000
93.333330
7040.000000
.000000
45.871560
.000000
111.111100
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
SLACK OR SURPLUS
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
24.102090
.000000
.000000
19.936460
19.936290
.000000
20.922650
.000000
15.737950
15.737790
30.062880
.000000
.000000
.000000
13.113550
9886.021000
.000000
12.589350
.000000
.000000
9889.049000
.000000
5.245492
.000000
20.990640
28.607420
22.394530
23.976560
9848.744000
9857.904000
17558.020000
.000000
.000000
DUAL PRICES
817.430800
-2510.870000
-2510.870000
817.427200
-2008.696000
-1369.565000
818.134900
818.314500
-1141.304000
-20.999980
-.780274
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13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)
25)
26)
27)
28)
29)
30)
31)
32)
33)
34)
35)
36)
-- MORE--
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
46)
47)
48)
49)
50)
51)
52)
53)
54)
55)
56)
57)
58)
59)
60)
-- MORE--
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
24.000000
.000000
.000000
248.000000
.000000
.000000
670.000000
.000000
1.000000
.000000
696.000000
125.600000
.000000
.000000
516.000000
266.200000
.000000
360.000000
310.000000
.000000
79.200000
12.000000
.000000
124.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
-. 634163
-1706.250000
-.596214
818.458400
-1662.500000
-.530775
818.517900
.000000
818.542000
818.573800
399.000000
-.196022
.000000
2509.142000
2509.138000
.000000
2007.299000
1368.613000
.000000
1140.550000
.000000
839.414800
.000000
.000000
818.424000
1705.482000
.000000
.000000
1661.778000
.000000
.000000
485.653100
.000000
.000000
419.720200
.000000
8.094556
8.074498
5.842105
2.181333
2.006039
1.511892
1.479592
1.275962
1.073442
.947883
.845627
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61)
62)
63)
64)
65)
66)
NO. ITERATIONS=
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.662745
.437255
.000000
-819.000000
-486.111100
.000000
DO RANGE(SENSITIVITY) ANALYSIS?
?
RANGES IN WHICH THE BASIS IS UNCHANGED:
VARIABLE
R115
R215
R315
R415
R515
R615
R715
R815
R915
R1015
R1115
R1215
R1315
BB115
BB215
BG215
BB315
BB415
BB515
--MORE--
CURRENT
COEF
28.250000
28.180000
24.420000
16.360000
16.610000
14.620000
14.500000
13.270000
12.570000
11.640000
11.120000
10.140000
6.690000
3.260000
3.270000
3.270000
2.680000
1.940000
1.520000
OBJ COEFFICIENT
ALLOWABLE
INCREASE
305440.900000
305440.400000
292660.900000
343.289100
329398.000000
346.488200
375.952500
234.251000
378.982300
129493.700000
254284.600000
161389.300000
121710.000000
5469.930000
5469.921000
7505.826000
4375.912000
2.906351
2486.398000
RANGES
ALLOWABLE
DECREASE
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
111
BB715
BB815
BB915
BG115
YG115
YB115
YB215
YG215
YB315
BG415
YB415
YG415
PB415
BG515
YG515
YB515
BG615
YG615
BG715
BVO715
YB715
YG715
YV0715
PB715
--MORE- -
BG815
BVO815
YG815
YB815
YVO815
PB815
BG915
YG915
YB915
PB915
BMI1015
BG1015
YMI1015
YG1015
PG1015
BG1115
YG1115
BG1215
YG1215
PG1215
BB1315
YB1315
BV0615
YVO615
--MORE--
1.290000
1.220000
1.090000
3.260000
57.750000
57.750000
57.750000
57.750000
46.200000
1.940000
31.500000
31.500000
49.370000
1.520000
26.250000
26.250000
1.310000
21.000000
1.290000
1.290000
20.475000
20.475000
20.475000
37.800000
1.220000
1.220000
19.950000
19.950000
19.950000
40.240000
1.090000
15.750000
15.750000
47.260000
1.040000
1.040000
13.125000
13.125000
74.510000
.970000
12.600000
.630000
10.500000
71.120000
.400000
5.250000
1.310000
21.000000
2.432526
1.407759
2.022749
5540.234000
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
2.860742
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
2518.355000
INFINITY
INFINITY
2.239453
INFINITY
2.397656
3069.867000
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
656.582900
2991.200000
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
657.193600
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
1165.567000
659.068100
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
1208.577000
INFINITY
659.269900
INFINITY
INFINITY
497.181400
INFINITY
3148.595000
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
57.710780
57.710270
57.710180
78.185680
46.167870
INFINITY
31.478090
31.478370
28.796880
INFINITY
26.232860
26.232640
INFINITY
20.985370
INFINITY
INFINITY
20.460410
20.460600
20.465780
24.102090
INFINITY
INFINITY
19.936460
19.936290
19.941340
20.922650
INFINITY
15.737950
15.737790
30.062880
INFINITY
INFINITY
13.112630
13.113550
9886.021000
INFINITY
12.589350
INFINITY
10.493010
9889.049000
INFINITY
5.245492
INFINITY
20.990640
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PG415
PG615
PG715
PG815
PG915
PMI1015
PB1015
PB1215
ROW
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
--MORE- -
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
--MORE- -
49.370000
36.440000
37.800000
40.240000
47.260000
74.510000
.000000
.000000
CURRENT
RHS
200.000000
300.000000
250.000000
200.000000
100.000000
300.000000
450.000000
200.000000
150.000000
4000.000000
200.000000
2100.000000
300.000000
450.000000
500.000000
3250.000000
600.000000
250.000000
200.000000
850.000000
100.000000
100.000000
400.000000
100.000000
224.000000
161.280000
44.800000
448.000000
8.960000
64.900000
1120.000000
35.000000
201.000000
1904.000000
896.000000
425.600000
INFINITY 28.607420
INFINITY 22.394530
INFINITY 23.976560
INFINITY 9848.744000
INFINITY 9857.904000
INFINITY 17558.020000
.000000 62.767950
INFINITY .000000
RIGHTHAND SIDE RANGES
ALLOWABLE ALLOWABLE
INCREASE DECREASE
.000000 .000000
.000000 138.720000
.000000 205.200000
.000000 .000000
.000000 91.040000
.000000 235.100000
.000000 .000000
.000000 .000000
.000000 115.000000
.000000 .000000
.000000 .000000
.000000 .000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
INFINITY
138.720000
205.200000
INFINITY
91.040000
235.100000
INFINITY
115.000000
INFINITY
2096.000000
INFINITY
INFINITY
300.000000
.000000
500.000000
.000000
.000000
250.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
100.000000
24.000000
161.280000
44.800000
248.000000
8.960000
64.900000
670.000000
35.000000
1.000000
1904.000000
696.000000
125.600000
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38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
--MORE--
62
63
64
65
66
1299.200000
425.600000
1016.000000
3516.200000
481.600000
560.000000
560.000000
336.000000
179.200000
112.000000
224.000000
224.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
2250.000000
11200.000000
850.000000
1250.000000
800.800000
24.399990
INFINITY
INFINITY
118.400000
INFINITY
INFINITY
514.000000
INFINITY
INFINITY
176.000000
INFINITY
9.832187
6.492737
.256881
13.579410
6.211773
56.527770
57.212030
115.692500
12.375760
11.354170
2.604166
5.833333
2.866972
INFINITY
.000000
.000000
.000000
1299.200000
425.600000
516.000000
266.200000
481.600000
360.000000
310.000000
336.000000
79.200000
12.000000
224.000000
124.000000
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
INFINITY
.000000
.000000
.000000
.000000
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OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR THE PARANA RIVER
C
program parana
implicit real*8 (a-h,o-z)
c
parameter(nr=14,np=4)
c
dimension ctowve(nr), cbarge(nr,np), ctrain(nr,np),
/ cpanam(nr,np),feetrs(nr),dt(nr),sigmatrs(nr),sigmatrp(nr),
/ oilprice(nr), crewtrs(nr), prottrs(nr), reptrs(nr),
/ admtrs(nr), ctrs(nr), crewauxtrs(nr), PIauxtrs(nr),
/ captrs(nr), ttrs(nr), otrs(nr), repauxtrs(nr),
/ admauxtrs(nr),capauxtrs(nr),terportrs(nr),Lambdad0(nr),
/ timauxpotrs(nr), docktrs(nr), capportrs(nr),
/ admportrs(nr), mrportrs(nr), Oprs(nr),
/ crewtportrs(nr), plfeeportrs(nr), captauprtd0(nr),
/ Ttrp(nr),tbrsp(nr), tau(nr), omegabrp(nr),
/ capbarbr(nr), adbabrs(nr), PIbrs(nr), cprp(nr)
dimension Dbrs(nr), PIbrp(nr), MRbrp(nr), Adbrp(nr),Cprs(nr),
/ qpr(nr), Gprp(nr), WTp(nr), PC(nr), Oprp(nr),
/ CapprdO(nr), omegaprp(nr), Gprs(nr), PItportrs(nr),
/ Adprs(nr), MrprsdO(nr), PiprsdO(nr), Nuprsd0(nr),
/ sigmaprs(nr), Feepr(nr), Tprp(nr),Tprs(nr), dtdd0(nr),
/ dard0(nr), Avgskstard0(nr), sigmaw(nr), captautrtd0(nr),
/ arp(nr), omegatrp(nr), otrp(nr), Ctrp(nr), tbrp(nr),
/ Obrp(nr),Obrs(nr),cbrp(nr),Dtrs(nr),Dprs(nr),Porp(nr),
/ cbrs(nr),pcaptaurd0(nr),Caprd0(nr),dtd(nr),mrbrs(nr),
/ MudO(nr),EnedO(nr),drqd0(nr),drsd0(nr),deltaskstard0(nr)
nroute=nr
nprodu=np
do ir=1,nroute
ctowve(ir)=0.
do ip=l,nprodu
cbarge(ir,ip)=0.
ctrain(ir,ip)=0.
cpanam(ir,ip)=0.
end do
end do
print*, 'COST OF TOW VESSEL SAILING ROUTE IR'
print*,' '
print*,'speed tow boat over water'
read*, speedk
print*,'value of delta ? (1 for upstream, 0 for downstream)'
read*,delta
print*,'current speed ?'
read*,speedw
print*,' '
skstar=speedk + (-1.0)**delta*speedw
print*,'speed Panamax vessel over water'
read*, speedpxk
spxkstar=speedpxk + (-1.0)**delta*speedw
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c MAIN LOOP
c .......................................................................
DO IR=1,NROUTE
print*,'fees due to pilots ($/day) in route',ir
read*,feetrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'distance (km) between ports in route',ir
read*,dt(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'oil and lubes consume/day of tow boat in route',ir
read*, sigmatrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'oilprice on route',ir
read*, oilprice(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'crew cost/day for tow boat on route',ir
read*,crewtrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Protect.and Insurance. cost/day for tow boat on route',
ir
read*,prottrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'mant.and repairs cost/day for tow boat on route',ir
read*,reptrs(ir)
print*, '
print*,'adm. expenses/day for tow sailing route',ir
read*,admtrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'capital cost/day for tow sailing route',ir
read*,captrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'crew cost/day for auxiliar tow boat route',ir
read*,crewauxtrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'P and I cost/day for auxiliar tow boat route',ir
read*,Plauxtrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'mant.and reapirs cost/day for auxiliar tow boat',ir
read*,repauxtrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'adm. expenses cost/day for auxiliar tow boat route',ir
read*,admauxtrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'capital cost/day for auxiliar tow boat at port route',
ir
read*,capauxtrs(ir)
print*,' I
print*,'number terminal ports on route',ir
read*,terportrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'time auxiliar tow boat operating at port',ir
read*,timauxpotrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'docking rate for tow boat',ir
read*,docktrs(ir)
print*,' '
116
print*,'capital cost/day tow boat at port on route',ir
read*,capportrs(ir)
print*,' I
print*,'adm. cost/day tow boat at port on route',ir
read*,admportrs(ir)
print*, '
print*,'mant.and repairs cost/day tow boat at port on route',ir
read*,mrportrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'P and I cost/day for tow boat at port on route',ir
read*,PItportrs(ir)
print*, '
print*,'crew cost/day for tow boat at port on route',ir
read*,crewtportrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'pilot fee at intermediate port on route',ir
read*,plfeeportrs(ir)
print*, '
print*,'total time tow boat spent at port on route',ir
read*,Ttrp(ir)
print*, '
print*,'Time a barge spend stopping in middle ports',ir
read*,tbrsp(ir)
print*, '
print*,'Number of barges per convoy on route',ir
read*,tau(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Docking fee for a convoy on route',ir
read*,omegabrp(ir)
print*, '
print*,'Capital cost/day for barge on route',ir
read*,capbarbr(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Adm. cost/day for barge sailing on route',ir
read*,adbabrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Prot. and Insurance cost/day for barge on route',ir
read*,PIbrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Total Operating cost for barge in delays on route',ir
read*,Dbrs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'P and I cost/day for a barge in route',ir
read*,PIbrp(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Man, and Rep cost/day for barge at port on route',ir
read*,MRbrp(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Admin. cost/day for barge at port on route',ir
read*,Adbrp(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Port loading capacity in ton/hour',ir
read*,PC(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Generator fuel consumption/day for Panamax at port
on route',ir
read*,Gprp(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Expected waiting time at port to start load in days',ir
read*,WTp(ir)
print*,' '
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print*,'Mean cargo to be load in tons',ir
read*,qpr(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Docking and tow and extra fees for Panamax in route',ir
read*,omegaprp(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Capital cost/day for Panamax',ir
read*,Capprd0(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Adm. cost/day for Panamax in route',ir
read*,Adprs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Mantain.and Repair cost/day for Panamax',ir
read*,MRprsd0(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Prot. and Insur. cost/day for Panamax',ir
read*,PIprsd0(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Crew cost/day for Panamax',ir
read*,Nuprsd0(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Generator fuel consumption/day for Panamax when sailing
on route',ir
read*,Gprs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Oil and lube consum/day for Panamax sail on route',ir
read*,sigmaprs(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Pilot fees for Panamax in route',ir
read*,Feepr(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Length of all determinant passes in kilometers'
read*,dtdd0(ir)
print*,'
print*,'number of delay areas'
read*,dard0(ir)
print*,'
print*,'Average speed of tow boat sailing critical passes'
read*,Avgskstard0(ir)
print*,'
Print*,'Oil and lube consum./day for tow boat wait on route',ir
read*,sigmaw(ir)
print*,'
Print*,'Oil and lube consum./day for tow boat at port
on route',ir
read*,sigmatrp(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Total number of tow boats'
read*, Rr
print*,' '
print*,'Total number of panamax vessels'
read*,Pr
print*,' '
ttrs(ir)=dt(ir)/44.448/skstar
Tprs(ir)=dt(ir)/44.448/spxkstar
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Tprp(ir)=qpr(ir)/24./PC(ir) + WTp(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Tprp',Tprp(ir)
LambdadO(ir)=(Rr*(ttrs(ir)+Ttrp(ir))+
Pr*(Tprs(ir)+Tprp(ir))/15.)/365.
print*,' '
print*,'Lambdad0(ir)',LambdadO(ir)
MudO(ir)=dtddO (ir)/44.448/skstar
print*,' '
print*, 'Mud0',Mud0(ir)
EnedO(ir)=(Rr/tau(ir) + Pr)/dardO(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Ened0',Ened0(ir)
drqd0(ir)=Lambdad0(ir)/((Mud0(ir)*(Mud0(ir)-Lambdad(ir))) *
(LambdadO(ir)**EnedO(ir)*(1.0-LambdadO(ir))))
print*,' '
print*,'drqd0',drqd0(ir)
DeltaskstardO(ir)= skstar - AvgskstardO(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Deltaskstard0',DeltaskstardO(ir)
drsd0(ir)=dtd(ir)/44.448/Deltaskstard0(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'drsd0',drsd0(ir)
captauprtd0(ir)= drqd0(ir) + drsd0(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'captauprtd0(ir)',captauprtd0(ir)
Dtrs(ir)=sigmaw(ir)*oilprice(ir) + crewtrs(ir) + prottrs(ir)+
c reptrs(ir) + admtrs(ir) + captrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Dtrs(ir)',Dtrs(ir)
Dprs(ir)=Oprs(ir)
captautrtd0(ir)= 1.25*captauprtd0(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'captautrtd0(ir)',captautrtd0(ir)
PcaptaurdO(ir) = (LambdadO(ir)/MudO(ir))**2
otrs(ir)=sigmatrs(ir)*oilprice(ir) + crewtrs(ir) + prottrs(ir)+
1 reptrs(ir) + admtrs(ir) + captrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'otrs(ir)',otrs(ir)
ctrs(ir)=ttrs(ir)*otrs(ir) + ttrs(ir)*feetrs(ir) +
1 captautrtd0(ir)*Dtrs(ir)*PcaptaurdO(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'ctrs(ir)',ctrs(ir)
arp(ir)=crewauxtrs(ir) + PIauxtrs(ir) + repauxtrs(ir) +
1 admauxtrs(ir) + capauxtrs(ir)
print*,' '
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print*,'arp(ir)',arp(ir)
omegatrp(ir) =docktrs(ir) *Ttrp(ir) +
1 arp(ir)*timauxpotrs(ir)*terportrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'omegatrp(ir)',omegatrp(ir)
otrp(ir)=sigmatrp(ir)*oilprice(ir) + crewtportrs(ir) +
1 PItportrs(ir) + mrportrs(ir) + admportrs(ir) +
2 capportrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'otrp(ir)',otrp(ir)
ctrp(ir)=Ttrp(ir)*otrp(ir) + omegatrp(ir) +
1 plfeeportrs(ir)*Ttrp(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'ctrp(ir)',ctrp(ir)
tbrp(ir)=tbrsp(ir) + 2*ttrs(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'tbrp(ir)',tbrp(ir)
obrp(ir)=PIbrp(ir) + MRbrp(ir) + Adbrp(ir) + Capbarbr(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'obrp(ir)',obrp(ir)
cbrp(ir)=tbrp(ir)*obrp(ir) + omegabrp(ir)*tbrp(ir)/tau(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'cbrp(ir)',cbrp(ir)
obrs(ir)= PIbrs(ir) + mrbrs(ir) + Adbabrs(ir) + capbarbr(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'obrs(ir)',obrs(ir)
cbrs(ir)=ttrs(ir)*obrs(ir) +
captautrtd0(ir)*dbrs(ir)*PcaptaurdO(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'cbrs(ir)',cbrs(ir)
Oprp(ir)=Gprp(ir)*oilprice(ir)+PIprsd0(ir)+Mrprsd0(ir)+
Adprs(ir) + CapprdO(ir)
print*,' '
print*, 'Oprp(ir)',Oprp(ir)
Oprs(ir)=(sigmaprs(ir) + Gprs(ir))*oilprice(ir) + NuprsdO(ir)
+ PIprsdO(ir) + MRprsdO(ir) + Adprs(ir) + CaprdO(ir)
cprp(ir)=Tprp(ir)*Porp(ir) + omegaprp(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'cprp(ir)',cprp(ir)
Cprs(ir)=Tprs(ir)*Oprs(ir) + Tprs(ir)*Feepr(ir) +
1 captauprtd0(ir)*Dprs(ir)*PcaptaurdO(ir)
print*,' '
print*,'Cprs(ir)',Cprs(ir)
END DO
end
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CHAPTER V
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PARANA-PARAGUAY RIVER BASIN
The utilization of the Parand-Paraguay River Basin
represents an essential step for the commercial development
of the region. This area, rich in raw materials (grains,
minerals, and wood), could contribute to world food supply.
To this end, the transportation system should be
reliable, efficient, and competitive. The model previously
described helps us to identify and asses the areas where
further improvement is required. These areas are the
following:
(1) Water side: aids to navigation, VTS systems, and fleet
modernization;
(2) Land side: port and terminal infrastructure, port
planning and organization;
(3) Geopolitical strategy and international shipping.
As the basin crossed many countries, they must agree on
common navigational conditions, aids to navigation, and
regulations. Progress should be uniform along the basin,
and have a maintenance system common to all users.
Technological transference should serve local needs as well
as the country's reception capacities. Therefore, I suggest
the creation and financing an international body, composed
of the nations' delegates, to centralize the activities of
maintenance and developments in the basin. Figure 8 shows
the organizational structure and the main tasks assigned:
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Figure 8:
Organization Structure
Maintenance
Electronic Charts
Regulations
Notice to Mariners
Project Evaluation
The department of Aids to Navigation will develop and
implement an electronic chart system able to compile all the
information and bring better navigational tools to sail the
river. Also, it will develop a suitable maintenance system,
with common standards and regulations.
The VTS department will design, implement, regulate,
and maintain a vessel traffic system for the basin.
The department of planning and development will be
responsible for dredging and maintenance, port
infrastructure requirements, and introduction of new
technologies.
Modern management methods should be introduced
(information technology, data compilation and transmission,
real time equipment) to revitalize traffic; speed up the
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turnaround time for barges, improving cargo handling; to
forecast demands in terms of cargo weight, volume, and hold
capacity; and to incorporate technology to enhance the
waterway network.
This chapter focuses on water and port improvement,
Chapter VI on organizational issues. The geopolitical
strategy and international shipping commerce, though
important, go beyond the scope of this thesis.
1. WATER IMPROVEMENT
Water improvement has three main areas: (1.1) aids to
navigation, (1.2) vessel traffic system, and (1.3) fleet
modernization.
1.1 Aids to Navigation
There are four areas to improve to reach an efficient
level of operation and international navigational standards:
1.1.1 Improvement of navigational conditions
1.1.2 Improvement of the buoying system
1.1.3 Maintenance system
1.1.4 Improvement of charts and notice to mariners
1.1.1 Improvement of navigational conditions
This is a basic requirement. The critical passes
identified in Chapter II should be fixed to bring safe
navigational margins to barges and river vessels (to dredge
and maintain critical zones, to rectify critical curves that
limit the average length of the convoys, to remove rocks,
and to make auto-dredging protection for some curves).
Each section of the river with its natural limitations,
as described in the previous chapter, has different types of
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barges and optimum length of convoys. The barges will have
to adapt to the characteristics of each section. It is
important to remark that the dredging activities proposed
here are not oriented to adapt the river to the barges. The
model considers barge characteristics suitable to each
section instead.
The ParanA-Paraguay River Basin is a sensitive
environmental area. Therefore, any dredging that may affect
the natural water course should have a previous
environmental study. Based on studies conducted by the
hydrographic centers of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, I
can say that the dredging improvements proposed here do not
have any predictable negative environmental impact.
However, further activities, such as dredging the river from
Rosario to Buenos Aires up to 32 or 40 ft should be subject
to thorough environmental study, addressing the question of
where to dispose of highly polluted dredged materials of
Campana, the Delta and the port of Buenos Aires.
The following exhibit summarizes the actions to improve
the critical passes. The main sources for this part of the
chapter are the national centers of hydrography, and
Internave,an hydraulic company from Brazil. River
improvements are divided into two categories: short and long
term activities.
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Exhibit 5.1
Section Activity ShoVt Term Long Term
m /yr m /yr
CAceres *Dredging of critical 6,500,000 8,200,000
to passes and curves
Ponta do *Dredging maintenance 550,000 950,000
Morro *Clean-cut out
vegetation regularly regularly
*Removal of rocks 5,000 6,500
Ponta do *Dredging of critical 905,000 850,000
Morro passes and curves
to *Dredging maintenance 240,000 330,000
Corumba *Clean-cut out
vegetation regularly regularly
*Removal of rocks 33,000 45,000
*Dredge Tamengo's
channel 1,800,000
*Protection of rocks in
curves 15,000 4,000
Corumba *Dredge of critical 3 350,000 220,000
to passes and curves m
Apa River *Dredge of maintenance 100,000 125,000
*Clean-cut out
vegetation --- ---
*Removal of rocks 1,000 ---
Apa River *Dredging of critical 3,100,000 3,900,000
to passes and curves
Asunci6n *Dredging maintenance 2,100,000 3,500,000
*Removal of rocks,
include Remanso
Castillo 110,000 19,000
*Protection of rocks in 110,000 19,000
curves
Asunci6n *Dredging of critical 6,640,000
to passes and curves
Santa Fe *Dredging maintenance 2,700,000 2,700,000
*Protection of rocks in
curves 3,500 2,500
*Clean-out river bottom
kms:785, 890, 968,
1068, 1133, 1143, 1216, 10,000
1320, 1591, 1604, 1622.
Santa Fe to *No dredging or any
Buenos Aires other action required
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1.1.2 Improvement of the buoying system
To obtain a competitive transportation system we
have to ensure 24 hours of navigation.
With the present buoying system, sailing is only
possible during daylight since navigation relies on
natural landmarks: trees, houses, and rocks.
Also, the system varies along the basin not only
where it belongs to a different country but also within a
country's territory. It is important to solve these
discrepancies to improve safety in navigation, reduce
maintenance costs, and ease nautical charts design and
clarity.
The following exhibit summarizes the corrections
required in this area:
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Exhibit 5.2
Section Improvements
Chceres *Install 200 photovoltaic buoys and marks
to *Install temporary moorings
Corumba *Install 10 monitoring buoys CMB 3280 1
*Install 20 water level recorder buoys WLR 31902
*Install 3 automatic weather stations AWS 27003
*Install 2 Doppler current meter DCM 124
Corumba *Signpost 7 critical points
to *Install temporary moorings
Apa River *Install 6 monitoring buoys CMB 3280
*Install 14 water level recorder buoys WLR 3190
*Install 2 automatic weather stations AWS 2700
*Install 2 Doppler current meter DCM 12
Apa River *Install 50 photovoltaic buoys and marks
to *Install temporary moorings
Asunci6n *Install 8 monitoring buoys CMB 3280
*Install 16 water level recorder buoys WLR 3190
*Install 2 automatic weather stations AWS 2700
*Install 2 Doppler current meter DCM 12
Asunci6n *Install 250 photovoltaic buoys and land marks
to *Install temporary moorings
Santa Fe *Install 6 monitoring buoys CMB 3280
*Install 20 water level recorder buoys WLR 3190
*Install 4 automatic weather stations AWS 2700
*Install 4 Doppler current meter DCM 12
Santa Fe *Install 270 photovoltaic buoys and land marks
to *Install temporary moorings
Buenos Aires *Install 6 monitoring buoys CMB 3280
*Install 10 water level recorder buoys WLR 3190
*Install 2 automatic weather stations AWS 2700
1 The CMB 3280 Coastal Monitoring Buoy is a solar-powered moored data
buoy which measures weather and sea/river state conditions. It is typically
equipped with sensors for wind speed and direction, air temperature,
barometric pressure, wave height, near surface current, and water temperature.
Real-time and storage data versions are available.
2 The WLR 3190 Water Level Recorder is a cost-effective, shore-based
station designed for accurate monitoring of water level with real time
correction for barometric pressure fluctuations.
3 The AWS 2700 Automatic Weather Station is a rugged self-contained
station designed for use in remote locations without electricity supply.
4 The DCM 12 Doppler Current Meter measures current velocity at the
surface and 5 depths, wave height, and water level. The instrument is
available in a real-time version, with a cable link to shore, and a self-
contained version with internal recording.
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1.1.3 Implementing a maintenance system.
Without maintenance, the corrections proposed will
deteriorate and be ineffective.
In the present system each country works
independently, causing many problems: fluctuating and
lean budgets, contrasted priorities for maintenance and
repairs, contrasted information about buoying conditions
along the basin. The result is an undependable system
that ignores international standards and affects inland
water transportation productivity.
The maintenance program should be constant along the
basin. It should follow minimum standards.
The international body mentioned before will
indicate maintenance stations provided with the necessary
equipment, technical autonomy, and supply boats to carry
out their tasks.
Based on the requirements detailed on previous
chapters, I suggest the creation of 20 maintenance
stations, located in: Montevideo, La Plata, Buenos Aires,
Nueva Palmira, Zarate, Rosario, Santa Fe, Hernandarias,
Reconquista, Corrientes, Formosa, Asunci6n, Antequera,
Concepci6n, Vallemi, Olimpo, Esperanza, Coruimba, Ponta
do Morro, and Caceres.
Each station will cover the area to the south up to
the next station. The stations of Corumba, Concepci6n,
Corrientes, Santa Fe, and Buenos Aires will gather
maintenance records of all activities and programs
performed. These stations will share this reports with
ports and users. The information will be also linked
with the electronic chart system and VTS.
Regarding the buoys, I suggest the use of synthetic
buoys that have produced very good results in Holland,
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Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. Coast
Guard is also working to replace roughly 1,600 iron buoys
with synthetic ones.
Synthetic buoys are lighter, cheaper and have lower
maintenance cost.
Iron buoys need painting and more maintenance. The
paint contains a volatile organic component (VOC) that in
the case of the U.S is applied in place polluting the
water. The cost of deploying a steel buoy for the USCG
is between $13,000 and $16,000, while a new synthetic
buoy ranges between $18,000 and $20,000. As
environmental regulations on VOC content in coating
paints become more strict, the development of synthetic
buoys that do not require this paint is financially and
environmentally attractive.
U.S Coast Guard officials also stress that steel
buoys can sink when holed in a collision, while synthetic
buoys stay afloat when damaged.
Finally, as a synthetic buoy weighs 6,000 to 7,000
pounds (compared to at least 12,000 pounds of a steel
buoy), the small supply boats proposed for the Parand-
Paraguay River could carry many buoys, increasing their
autonomy.
1.1.4 Improvement of the chart system and notice to
mariners.
It is urgent to improve cartographic information on
the basin. There are several shortfalls that affect
safety.
Chart information is highly inconsistent.
Brazilian, Paraguayan and Argentinean editions display
incompatible data on same passes. They also take a
different initial point to numerate the buoys. The
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number of the buoy depends on what chart is used. These
discrepancies confuse navigators and affect safety. In
addition, the information is rarely updated.
Notice to mariners are not efficiently distributed
and do not always show the latest information.
To solve these problems, I suggest setting up an
electronic chart system. There are several models
available in the market. The most expensive and time
consuming are those where the geographic data re-
collection is digital. There are others, less expensive
and of rapid implementation, where present charts are
scanned. This system could be easily introduced in the
Parand-Paraguay basin. Once the charts have been scanned
and made compatible, they should be updated. With the
installation of this electronic chart system, we should
consider the used of real-time information buoys and
center stations to compile and process. This information
should also be reported to the VTS system and to the
users.
1.2 Vessel Traffic System
Current traffic in the River Plate requires a
Vessel Traffic System. If river traffic increased as
proposed in this thesis, then a VTS system becomes
critical.
The goal of a VTS is to reduce the risk of vessel
casualties, to promote public safety, to protect
environmental pollution, and to facilitate commerce.
These objectives are accomplished through an effective
collection of traffic information, verification, and
dissemination. This valuable information will assist
people onboard and bring safety to vessel operations.
The VTS should be a modular system, adaptable and
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designed to permit the incorporation of future
technologies. It has to be interactive so as to indicate
to the operators the position of different vessels, aids
to navigation, anchorage, channels, and other pertinent
data. To do that, the system should cover two
dimensional perceptions electronically displayed: visual
and audio.
Radar coverage will ensure a 100% tracking under all
weather. Video record cameras will allow the checking of
relative presentations and real situations at critical
places. And, radio communications will allow the
interchange of information to effect safe levels of
sailing. It is also important that the system can record
meteorological information such as wind speed and
direction, temperature, visibility, and barometric
pressure to forecast weather and prevent maneuver
conditions. This information has to be complemented with
hydrological data (currents, depths, tide) to identify
the best maneuvers and handle the traffic efficiently.
It is also very important to implement the VTS in
conjunction with an ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and
Information System), which has emerged as a promising aid
to navigation that may result in significant benefits to
the shipping industry in general. With the arrival of
the DGPS (Differential Global Positioning Systems) and
the development of GIS (Geographic Information System),
the ECDIS is a real-time high-reliable system that
combines both spatial and textual data in a very useful
operational way.
Developed countries like the Netherlands, Germany,
and the U.S are using VTS systems with favorable results.
Radar, radio, and video information are combined into a
single 128 Kbps serial link at all remote site
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subsystems, for transmission to the vessel traffic
centers. Some of the processes and information that VTS
systems perform are:
* Track relative position of vessels converting the
data for all the radar of the system to a common
one. The representation can be external or
internal as it is being perceived in one of the
vessels involved.
* The radar are auto-calibrated to compensate
azimuth and range errors.
* The VTS performs vessel position calculations
for vessels whose track position lies outside
the active range of a tracking radar. The
position is automatically generated along a pre-
defined route to prevent dangerous
maneuverings or traffic congestion in critical
points.
* It calculates expected transit time, vessel
encounters, relative presentations and alternative
maneuverings.
* When a vessel enters into areas for which
overlapping radar coverage occurs, the system.
determines the most accurate vessel position using
a data fusion algorithm that allows the
correlation of the information and arrives at the
best position.
* An alarm is started when the closest point of
approach between two vessels is selected. Vessel
collision alarms can be selected for all vessels
in the system.
* Transverse and longitudinal distances of safety
can be defined to check orientations and
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evolution in respect to the ideal axis of
maneuvering.
* An alarm is activated when a vessel inside a
traffic lane crosses either lane boundary.
* An alarm is activated when a vessel incurs a
speed violation or an excessive speed
reduction.
* The system predicts vessels encounters, traffic
congestion, and allows the optimization of port
and channel utilization.
* As it receives real time information, the system
not only brings real weather and Hydrographic
information but also communicates aids to
navigation discrepancies.
* The vessel information and positioning system
(VIPS) eliminates the need for a middleman and
voice communication, transmitting all the
information available to the operator--usually the
pilot--in a user-friendly visual format.5
Neither the countries of the Parand-Paraguay River
Basin nor those of River Plate have this system. Vessel
traffic control is conducted with rudimentary practices,
lacking organization and technology to meet international
safety standards. Even worse is that nations'
authorities do not understand the importance of a VTS
systems for the area.
The following figure shows the suggested positions
for remote subsystem stations and vessel traffic centers
in the River Plate:
s For more features and capacities of present VTS systems see System
Design Document for the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service System by the
Commandant United States Coast Guard May 1993; and Specifications for the
Vessel Traffic Service 2000 same author August 1993.
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Figure 9: VTS Stations in the River Plate
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With the 9 stations shown in the chart, the River
Plate would have 100% coverage.
Exhibit 5.3 shows the suggested places and section
of the river under their control (details on the required
instruments are included in appendix 11):
Exhibit 5.3
Station Name Type Coverage
Ponton R 30 NM Entrance and Punta Indio's
Recalada channel
San Antonio R 35 NM Traffic coming from South
Punta del R 35 NM Traffic coming from North
Este
Montevideo C 25 NM Montevideo Channel and Port of
Montevideo.
Punta Piedras C 30 NM Punta Indio and Intermedio
Channel.
Punta Atalaya R 25 NM Intermedio and Banco Chico
Channel.
La Plata R 25 NM Banco Chico Channel, Access to
Bs As and Farallon Channel
Colonia R 25 NM Paso Farallon and Martin Garcia
Buenos Aires C 25 NM Access to Bs As and Emilio
Mitre's Channel.
In the case of the Parana, 100% coverage will be
very difficult and costly to achieve due to the sinuosity
of the river. To cover as much as possible at a
reasonable cost, I suggest video recorders in the
critical curves combined with radar stations in
intermediate places.
The following table shows the positions for remote
subsystem stations and vessel traffic centers in the
Parand River:
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Exhibit 5.4
Station Name Technical Type Kilometers
Description Uncovered
Is. Lucha V/R R 8
Gualeguaychi R R 7
Vuelta del Inojo V R -
Campana V/R C -
V. del Este V R -
Zdrate V/R R -
San Antonio V/R R -
Vuelta de Las Minas V R -
Vuelta del Pelado V R 1
Vuelta de Los Patos V R -
Vuelta Romero V R
Zanja Mercadil V/R R -
Angostura de la V/R R 5
Base
Is. Las Palmas V/R R -
Is. San Pedro V R 5
San Pedro V/R R -
Paso Los Ratones R R 10
Vuelta de Obligado V R -
Paso Las Hermanas R R 3
Ramallo V/R C -
Is. Tonelero V R -
San NicolAs V/R R 5
Abajo Vaguaron V R -
Constituci6n V/R. R 4.
Pta. San Martin V/R R 12
Rosario South V/R R -
Rosario North V/R C -
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Exhibit 5.4 (continued)
San Lorenzo V/R R -
Is. Encanto R R 2
Is. Correntosa V R 3
Pto. Gaboto V R 4
Paso Paranacito V/R R 3
Is. Las Pencas V R 1
Is. Los Huevos V/R R 5
Diamante V/R R 3
Pta. Alvear V/R R 6
Is. Paciencia V/R R 6
Parana V/R R 8
Santa Fe V/R C 1
Villa Urquiza R R 1
Is. Espinoza V R 5
Curtiembre R R 6
Hernandarias V/R R 4
Is. Alcaraz V/R R 3
Is. El Verde V/R R 4
La Paz R R 2
Is. San Juan V R 7
Is. Garibaldi V/R R -
Costa Brava R R 2
Travesia Inga V R 7
Is. Las Cruces V/R R 6
Punta Pelada R R 4
Is. Pindoti V/R R 3
Costa Del Talar R R 4
Is. Mal Abrigo V/R R 2
Is. Yaguarete V/R R 3
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Exhibit 5.4 (continued)
Riacho Las Vivoras V/R R -
Goya V/R C 5
Is. Dama V/R R -
Lavalle V/R R 2
Paso Cafete R R 5
Is. Guabiyu R R -
Pto. Ocampo V/R R 4
Bella Vista V/R C 3
Is. Yuruhata V R 4
Is. Piracuacito R R 2
Paso Laurelti V R 3
Chimbollar R R 4
Hermes Cue V/R R 4
Punta Mercedes V/R R 2
Vuelta del Sombrero V/R R -
Is. Calia R R -
Corrientes V/R C 1
Is. Pelon R R 1
Paso de La Patria V/R C 5
Total Uncovered --- --- 212
Resulting % Covered --- --- 83%
This distribution allows 83% river coverage. The
System Design Document for the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic
Service System displays the instruments required. (See
appendix 11)
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1.3 Fleet Modernization
Finally, to enhance the transportation network in
the basin, we need to improve the fleet. For example,
the Argentinean fleet, the most important in the basin,
operating from Asunci6n to the River Plate, is remarkably
old. Exhibit 5.5 shows the barge fleet by year of built.
Exhibit 5.5
Type of Barge 0-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 More 30 TOTAL
Years Years Years Years Years Years
Open 10 44 32 32 0 26 144
Hopper 0 18 24 0 0 44 86
covered
Tanker 0 7 7 11 2 31 58
Hopper 0 0 4 2 0 24 30
uncovered
TOTAL 10 69 67 45 2 125 318
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Barge Fleet per Year Built
(to January 1994)
The following exhibit shows the tug fleet by year of
construction.
Exhibit 5.6
Type of 0-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 More 30 TOTAL
Tug Yr Yr Yr Yr YrYr
# HP # HP # HP # HP # Hp # Hp # Hp
Main Tug 3 3800 4 3400 3 4100 3 2800 2 1200 19 1500 34 76.2
Push
Auxiliary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 600 12 7.2
Tug
TOTAL (K) 3 11.4 4 13.2 3 12.3 3 8.4 2 2.4 31 35.7 46 83.4
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Tug Fleet per Year Built
(to January 1994)
Considering the results obtained from the
optimization model, we can see that the required barge
and tugs fleet are the following:
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Exibit 5..7
Route I Tugs Number of Barges by Type Total Total
Barges Convoys
Open Tanker Hopper Hopper
Covered
115 3 83 0 44 30 157 10
215 2 84 0 21 0 105 7
315 1 0 0 5 0 5 1
415 2 188 0 20 10 218 13
515 1 84 0 16 0 100 6
615 6 794 112 0 0 906 56
715 6 542 237 69 69 917 57
815 12 1355 268 100 130 1853 115
915 2 84 0 65 50 199 12
1015 1 42 0 100 40 182 11
1115 1 42 0 0 0 42 3
1215 1 94 0 0 0 94 6
1315 1 46 0 0 0 46 3
TOTAL 39 3438 617 440 329 4824 300
Following there is a ten year replacement and
incorporation schedule:
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Exhibit 5.8
Type of 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Vessel
Tug 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Open 676 676 676 676 676 26 32 32
Barge
Hopper 90 90 90 90 90 44 24 18
covered
Barge
Tanker 124 124 124 124 124 31 12
Barge
Hopper 66 66 66 66 66 30
Barge
TOTAL 965 959 959 959 959 134 71 53 3 3
=LL - :- -1 - -
2. LAND SIDE IMPROVEMENT
Ports and Terminals Infrastructure
Even though the land side is in better conditions
than the water side, there are some ports that need to
improve their capacities. The main port infrastructure
improvement required to meet production projections are
the following:
2.1 Port of Ciceres
Presently the grain bag capacity of this port is
adequate. However, it needs to improve loading facilities
for grain and to build a wood terminal. With the
MERCOSUR treaty, an increase in automobile exports from
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Brazil to Argentina is espected. Therefore, it could be
worthy to expand port facilities building an iron
terminal. The recommended facilities for this port are:
* 1 Grain Terminal with 3,000,000 tons/yr capacity
* 1 Wood Terminal with 800,000 tons/yr capacity
* Silos with a capacity of 300,000 tons
* Docking place for barges
2.2 Central Aguirre
Grain loading capacity corresponds to projected
demands. However, it has to improve unloading and
storage room for fertilizers. It needs also to improve
cotton and mineral loading facilities. The recommended
improvements are:
* 1 Mineral terminal with 300,000 tons/yr capacity
* Storage room
* 2 Conveyor belts 1000 tons/h
2.3 Ports of Corumba and Ladario
Mineral receptions are in condition. They need to
increment loading/unloading capacity for grains. They
also need to improve silo capacity and tanks for oil
storage. Corumba needs to connect with the train line.
The recommended improvements are:
* 1 Grain terminal of 300,000 tons/yr
* Oil storage 100,000 tons/yr
* Train connection
1.4 Port of Concepci6n
Grain, coal, and cotton reception facilities could
be improved. Land access to the port has to be enhanced
and a train connection has to be built. The port also
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needs storage capacity for cotton and grain in bags and
bulk. The recommended improvements are:
* 1 Grain terminal with 300,000 tons/yr capacity
* Silos 150,000 tons capacity
* 2 Conveyor belts 1,000 tons/yr
* Storage Place
1.5 Port of Villa Hayes
The mineral capacity is quite enough to handle
demand projections. It needs a new crane and minor
modifications in the structure of the piers. The
recommended improvements are:
* 1 Crane 5/8 tons
* Train access
1.6 Port of Asunci6n
This port needs to improve its grain capacity.
Loading facilities are poor, cranes for wood loading are
insufficient and obsolete. It also does not have
adequate silo capacity. The recommended improvements
are:
* 1 Grain terminal 700,000 tons/yr
* 1 Wood terminal 600,000 tons/yr
* Silos 250,000 tons
* Improve land access and train transfer rates.
1.7 Port of Villeta
It needs to improve mineral loading capacity and
minor reforms in the piers. The recommended improvements
are:
* 2 Conveyor belts 2000 tons/h
* Train access
* Docks reconditioning
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1.8 Reconquista and Barranqueras
These ports will increase their volume of cargo
movements considerably, in part due to transshipments
from the north of the basin and in part due to the
economy of water transportation as compared with trucks.
The recommended improvements are:
* 2 Grain terminals of 600,000 tons/yr
* 1 Mineral terminal 300,000 tons/yr(transshipment)
* Silos capacity 100,000 tons
* Train access for Reconquista
1.9 Port of Santa Fe
As ocean vessels are no longer recommended for this
port, the installations are adequate for river barges.
The capacity is according to projected movements. The
oil terminal needs to be modernized and to increase its
capacity and safety to comply with international
standards. The required improvements are:
* Oil terminal 500,000 tons/yr
* Reception facilities
* Piers and docks repairs
1.10 Port of Diamante
The port of Diamante needs to improve grain
capacity. Loading and unloading rates are not adequate.
It also needs more storage. The recommended facilities
are:
* 3 Conveyor belts 800 tons/h
* Train transfer rates
* Storage room
146
1.11 Port of Rosario
The port of Rosario has adequate capacity to move
cargoes. It needs to improve train access and a
modernization plan. Though the facilities are too old,
they are still working properly. The recommended actions
are:
* Train access and transfer infrastructure
* General modernization
From the port of Rosario to Buenos Aires no major
improvements are required. We have to remember that the
requirements mentioned are the minimum to start operating
the river as a main transportation network. In general,
the ports along the basin are old and with technology
from the seventies. Therefore, a progressive
modernization plan for conveyor belts, cranes,
communication, and information systems should be
implemented.
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CHAPTER VI
PORT PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION
Introduction.
To successfully implement the optimization program and
the improvement suggested in this paper it is important to
have a solid and well-based port system.
Many projects theoretically strong fail at the moment
of their implementation. Though I am not concerned with the
application of the Parand-Paraguay optimization model, I
feel it necessary to address some issues that might become
crucial at future stages.
This chapter is oriented to identify Argentina's port
organization and to provide a clear understanding of the
situation. The information presented is based on an
eighteen day visit to 10 Argentinean ports in 1995: Buenos
Aires, La Plata, San Lorenzo, Rosario, Mar del Plata,
Quequdn, Madryn, Bahia Blanca, Comodoro Rivadavia, and
Ushuaia.
1. The port privatization program. Introduction to the
Privatization
In 1992 the population of Argentina was 33.1 million,
with a growing rate of 1.3% during the period 1983-1992.
The total land area is 3.76 million sq kilometers, with most
of the population living in urban settlements (86%) and 49%
of it in Buenos Aires. GDP per capita is about U$S 6,050
with a growing rate of 0.4% in the last ten years. However,
in the 1990s there has been a significant improvement in the
economy, with a growing GDP of 8% between 1990-1992,
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although the rate for 1993 has declined to 5.7% and it is
expected to be sustainable in the short term.
After 7 years of dictatorial regimes and the Malvinas
War, the country fell on a traumatic period of hyper
inflation, reaching monthly rates of 200% (July 1989).
In response to that crisis, the democratic government
undertook two stabilization programs. Since 1991, the
national government has sustained structural and
institutional reforms with an impulsive plan of
privatization and a re-structuration of liabilities with
domestic and foreign creditors. The government has pursued
an accelerated timetable privatization program with a
partial or total divestiture of national companies. Starting
with the telecommunication companies most the industries
have been covered: petroleum, water services, electricity,
air transportation, minerals, roads, railroads, and the
ports.
In October of 1991, the Argentine government issued a
domestic deregulation decree. This was the end of several
market regulations and regulatory agencies. Then, through
what was called the Pacto Fiscal signed with the provinces,
the port sector was deregulated with a revenue sharing
agreement between the nation and the provinces.
In this unsystematic process of deregulation, the
transportation sector, which plays one of the most important
roles, has not been clearly and efficiently treated. Now,
there is a debate whether coastal shippers, river barges
shippers, and truckers are operating under similar
centralized and unionized rules and regulations. During many
years, truckers have had a fair amount of river barge
traffic; therefore, further deregulation in transportation
will have a significant impact on regenerating traffic
movement both by barges and coastal ships.
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A country's sine-qua-non condition to reach an economic
sustainable growth is to have efficient ports and effective
and competitive intermodal transportation with the
hinterland. After 1990 Argentina's economy has started to
emerge becoming an attraction for foreign markets and global
investors. According to Francisco-Carrara Bravo', Latin
American economies are expected to double in the next eleven
years, creating huge opportunities for U.S exporters of
industrial goods and materials. In fact, Argentina has
ranked 8 of the top 10 emerging markets by the Ernst & Young
survey for the next decade2 .
An important step for Argentina's growth is to find an
economic way to move cargoes to ocean ports. Presently,
74.8% of the cargoes in Argentina are moved by trucks. Only
7.3% is transported through water systems. Whereas in most
developed countries, water systems move around 90% of total
cargoes.
The following figure shows percentages of distribution
of cargoes in Argentina.
1 From the American Graduate School of International Management.
2 Journal of Commerce, Shipping Review and Outlook, January 9,
1995.
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Cargo Transport in Argentina
Trains
8%
Trucks
75%
MTrucks UWater
DAir OTrains
Poor urban planing and intermodal 
systems coupled with
the absence of proper technologies 
are the principal aspects
that produce the situation pictured 
in the diagram. Roads
and train lanes have a radial 
design centered in the port of
Buenos Aires, which has shallow 
waters (32 feet); and it is
technically inefficient.
Train systems are in crisis, showing 
a continuous
decreased in cargo movements. This 
is one of the main
factors that affects the efficiency 
of the port of Buenos
Aires. The next figure shows 
Argentine train cargo
movements in the last decade.
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I
Train Cargo Movements in Argentina
1982 83 84 85 86 87
Years
88 89 90 91 92
If we add up the high cost of moving cargoes by trucks
to the inefficient infrastructure of the port of Buenos
Aires, plus the shallow waters of the River Plate, it
appears that it will be very difficult to improve the volume
of exports. And, not only the port of Buenos Aires faces
these problems, almost all the Argentine ports suffer the
same difficulties.
2. SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN ARGENTINE PORTS
2.1 General Framework
In an effort of integration with international
standards and to participate more intensively in
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international markets, Argentina has signed the following
treatments:
* International Convention for Safety of Life at SEA: SOLAS
74 and its 1978 Protocol
* International Convention of Load Lines: LL 66
* Convention on International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at SEA: COLREG 72
* International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification, and Watchkeeping: STCW 78
* International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships and its 1978 Protocol: MARPOL 73/78:
Annex I Oil
Annex II Noxious Liquid Substances Transported in
Bulk
Annex III Noxious Substances Transported in Packet
Form
Annex V Garbage
* Oil Pollution Response Convention: OPRC 92
Argentina is also a member of two regional
environmental protection agreements: ROCRAM and Vifa del
Mar. The Operative Network for Regional Co-Operation among
Maritime Authorities of South America, Mexico and Panama
(ROCRAM) was established in 1983 to support its members to
protect and preserve the marine environment. In October
1989, the Secretariat of ROCRAM approved the ROCRAM 1900-
2000 Strategy for the Protection of the Marine Environment."
This document established the specific considerations and
actions required to meet international standards in four
areas:
* The prevention of pollution from ships
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* The prevention of pollution produced by offshore oil
platforms
* The prevention of pollution from dumping and
incineration at sea and transboundary movement of
wastes
* The prevention of marine pollution from land based
sources
The Vifia del Mar agreement is a Latin American
agreement on port state control adopted in 1992 pursuant to
article 63 of the ROCRAM Strategy, which considers the
adoption of an effective ship control system and the
development of a coordinated system of inspections. The
agreement establishes standards for vessel inspections,
processing of violations, and exchanging of information
among member countries.
The ROCRAM Strategy 2000 and the Vifia del Mar
agreements provide an excellent summary of the content and
the intent of the international agreements to which
Argentina is a party. For more details see these documents.
The ROCRAM and Vifa del Mar agreements establish some
specific goals for Argentina that help frame the
observations and recommendations detailed in this chapter.
Article 51 of the ROCRAM Strategy 2000 commits the
Maritime Authorities of ROCRAM to carry out the activities
in the following areas to advance the level of compliance
with the requirements of MARPOL 73/78:
* reception facilities required by the Convention;
* monitoring jurisdictional waters regarding
prohibited discharges;
* application of Convention regulations to inshore
navigation vessels;
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* a coordinated system for surveys in the region, and
administrative control of these surveys;
* the procedures and fines for infringement of
Convention regulations;
Article 52 of the ROCRAM Strategy contains the intent
of the member countries concerning reception facilities:
* to promote and approve low cost projects for building
reception facilities for:
-dirty ballast, tank washing waters, bilge waters
and residues in tanker terminals
-bilge waters in commercial ports
-lubricants used in fishing ports
-chemical residues in ports for chemical tankers
-garbage in all ports and maritime terminals
* to supervise their systems for treatment, operation
and maintenance;
* to monitor content of their discharges effluent and
the final destination of the residues received;
* to ensure that the tariffs for reception services are
reasonable, thereby promoting their use
Section 1.3 of the Vifa del Mar agreement commits
member states to make an effort to reach, within three years
of the effective date of the agreement, a goal of inspecting
"a minimum level of 15% of the individual foreign ships that
have entered the ports of its state each year for compliance
with relevant international agreements and conventions."
Unfortunately, the Argentinean government felt that by
pushing the privatization program and signing these kinds of
international agreements the nation would be automatically
enjoying benefits of first world markets. Currently, the
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level of compliance with these international agreements is
under 20%. This situation must be changed if Argentina
wants to grow and to be competitive in international
markets. This chapter is oriented to identifying and
summarizing the safety and environmental failings in
Argentinean ports that would affect the level of'operations.
2.2 High Risk Situations Requiring Immediate Attention
On the visit to the Argentinean ports, three situations
were observed that present an unacceptable level of risk.
Risk has two components: the probability of occurrence of an
event and the potential impact of the event. Risk
mitigation measures, therefore, can reduce either the
probability that an accident will occur or can create the
ability to minimize the impact of an accident.
1. The Dock Sud in Buenos Aires poses an exceptional
navigational, safety, and environmental hazard. Both
the probabilities of an accident and the potential
health, safety, and environmental impact of an event
are very high. The Dock Sud is an artificial waterway
with stagnant water and is heavily polluted with oil
and other wastes. Navigation is very difficult at the
entrance to Dock Sud and within the narrow waterway
itself (see appendix 12). Vessels must be turned and
backed into the slip with tugs, minimizing a pilot's
control and maneuverability. The danger of this
situation lies in the presence of the new container
terminal near the entrance. Although the marine
environment in Dock Sud is severely damaged, the
immediate threat is safety. A major fire or explosion
could easily start and could not be contained with the
available resources.
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2. Hazardous cargoes are not adequately monitored and
controlled creating a fire, explosion, or toxic release
hazard in many ports. Privatization of ports has
resulted in a competition for all cargoes, including
hazardous cargoes resulting in the dispersion of these
cargoes among competing facilities. In Buenos Aires in
particular, there does not seem to be any effective
control over the location, storage, stowage, and
transport of hazardous cargoes. All containers are
transported by truck and containers with hazardous
materials were observed intermingled with other
containers and stored in areas next to the roadways and
population centers. A toxic release from a container
on the facility or from a truck in a populated area
could have catastrophic consequences. After my visit
to this port, in April, two containers with phosphoric
acid in the port of Buenos Aires, fell down from their
stack starting a huge fire and contamination of the
area.
3. The region of Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego in
Argentina are extremely sensitive areas due-to the
existence of natural reserves, whales, penguins, sea
lions, elephant seals, fur seals, dolphins, etc. The
environmental impact from a major pollution event would
cause extensive environmental damage and would attract
international attention.
2.3 Chronic Environmental and Safety Problems
Seven constant conditions that create environmental or
safety hazards in Argentine ports were identified. In each
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of these areas, preventive action is required to mitigate
the risk of accidents and environmental damage.
1. Derelict vessels pose both a safety and environmental
problem in many Argentine ports. These vessels are
typically fishing vessels--foreign vessels that were
seized for illegal fishing by the PNA (Argentine Coast
Guard) or the Navy or Argentine-flag vessels that were
abandoned for economic reasons. There does not appear
to be any program for scrapping, storing, or managing
the vessels and they sink at the dock, drift up on the
beach, or drift free, becoming a hazard to navigation.
Many of these vessels still contain bunkers full of
fuel and most are not adequately secured to permanent
moorings. There are 20 vessels in Puerto Madryn, many
more in Mar del Plata. Local PNA officials do not have
any idea of when and how this problem would be
resolved. As time goes on, more vessels will sink at
the dock, creating expensive and difficult salvage
problems.
2. Lack of shore side reception facilities for oily
wastes, garbage, and sewage is a problem in all the
ports. Although Argentina has accepted Marpol 73/78,
it has not implemented it. The port of Bahia Blanca
has a truck collection system that is adequate for
bilge water and oily wastes, but can not handle tanker
ballast.
Several ports have garbage pick up at the dock using
municipal services, but garbage disposal at sea
(particularly by fishing vessels) is a problem in all
ports and especially in Golfo Nuevo. Garbage pick up
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and reception facilities are not available at'the
single point moorings. Of all the ports visited, only
Ushuaia and Comodoro Rivadavia have included reception
facilities as part of their current port modernization
plans.
3. Existing pollution levels from non maritime sources or
from historic pollution are a serious problem in all
ports. None of the ports has anything but primary
sewage treatment. Most cities pump raw or minimally
treated sewage directly into the ocean, bay or river.
Industrial discharges of polluted wastewater into the
Parand River were observed.
Petroleum ports such as Dock Sud and La Plata have
historically been contaminated by recurrent oil
spills. This will make disposal of dredge spoils a
significant environmental problem. Oil will leach from
channel bottoms and banks for years. The responsibility
for clean up is not clear.
4. Transfer of petroleum products and bunkering of vessels
is not conducted in an environmental sound manner. In
particular, I saw two operations that should not be
permitted to continue. In Puerto Madryn fishing
vessels receive bunker fuel from trucks without
adequate safeguards. I observed a truck bunkering a
fishing vessel with no person on deck of the vessel, no
deck containment, and a connection manifold that was
missing all connection bolts and was held together by a
pair of "C" clamps.
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In the port of Comodoro Rivadavia, YPF transfers
refined products from a dock that has been damaged and
submerged (pipe is bent and submerged) and has been
converted into a de-facto single point mooring.
Eventually, the submerged severely stressed pipe will
rupture and a significant spill will occur.
Even operations at well-managed facilities appear to
spill small amounts of oil routinely. Small slicks
were observed during the bunkering of a fishing vessel
in Ushuaia and the transfer at an SPM in Bahia Blanca.
PNA has transfer-related regulations, but they are
clearly not enforced or followed. PNA officers did not
believe that enforcement actions would result in
significant or timely penalties. The attitude is one
of acceptance of non compliance and of the routine
occurrence of small spills.
5. Single point moorings used in several ports pose
several potential environmental problems. Pilotage is
not required at the SPM in Bahia Blanca and Comodoro
Rivadavia. Reception facilities for bilge wastes and
tank washing are not provided at these offshore oil
terminals (although the original SPMs were designed to
receive such wastes). Garbage is not collected at the
SPMs. The single point moorings are in areas where
containment of a spill is not possible due to current
and winds and preventative booming of transfer is not
attempted.
6. Aids to navigation and vessel traffic management are
poorly funded and are not coordinated. The Navy is
responsible for maintaining aids to navigation, through
its hydrographic service. The present conditions of
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the aids to navigation in the Parand River are
extremely poor. Many light buoys are off station or
missing. Under the privatization the aids to
navigation in the Parand River still depend on the
Ministry of Works and Public Services. Aids to
navigation in the lower Parand will become a
responsibility of the private contractor responsible
for the lower Parana River dredging project--Jun de Nul
Co.
With the expected increase in river traffic due to the
Hydrovia's Project, it will be very important to have
good aids to navigation and an efficient traffic
control system. Both are non-existent today in
Argentina.
Moreover, the cartographic system should be improved.
The development and adoption of electronic charts
should be considered for the Argentine authorities.
The PNA traffic control system is a rudimentary system
of tracking vessels by self reported radio positions.
This is used throughout the country, Parana River,
River Plate, and Patagonian coast. No capability
exists for verifying the self reported location,
course, and speed of vessels.
7. Argentine ports do not provide adequate fenders for
ships resulting in increased risk of damage to ships
and piers. In many cases, fenders are non existent or
are composed of used automobile tires. This is the
case in the port of La Plata for example, and Comodoro
Rivadavia, main oil ports of the country. In most
ports, ships provide their fenders. This appears to be
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a minor issue, but it could lead to a major incident if
a ship's hull were ruptured during a collision with a
dock. PNA should not allow ships to dock at unsafe
piers. A pier or dock without fenders is unsafe.
2.4 Emergency Response
Preventive actions will not prevent all maritime
accidents; an effective response capability is an essential
component of risk mitigation. There are four areas where
the ability to respond to port and waterway emergencies are
considered inadequate.
1. Fire fighting resources in ports that handle
significant petroleum products are not adequate to
control a vessel or facility fire. In Dock Sud, the
fireboat is over 50 years old and was inoperative when
I visited. Fixed fire monitors on petroleum docks in
Dock Sud, except at the new Shell terminal, appear to
be minimal and did not have the elevation necessary to
reach the deck of a tanker. In La Plata, the YPF has
donated a 40 year old fireboat to the PNA. The boat
is being rehabilitated and will be crewed and operated
by the PNA. The current fire fighting facilities at
the La Plata YPF terminal are inadequate, but the
system is being modernized and expanded. In all ports
PNA has a shoreside fire fighting brigade that is
augmented by the municipal authorities.
2. The oil pollution response capability is inadequate in
environmental sensitive areas. A significant amount
of equipment (booms, harbor booms, absorbent booms,
skimmers) has been bought by the oil companies (at a
cost of $10M) and has been distributed to major oil
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ports and terminals around the country. PNA has been
funded to maintain and deploy the equipment and has
trained personnel in pollution response. This
equipment is not, however, adequate to handle a major
spill in areas such as off shore Patagonia, Tierra del
Fuego, or in the Parana River. The response
capability in Puerto Madryn and Ushuaia is inadequate
when compared with the potential environmental impact
of a spill in these areas. Similarly, the resources
available in the largest petroleum port, Comodoro
Rivadavia, are not appropriate or adequate to contain
a spill in the typical wind, swell, and current
conditions experienced in the port.
3. The offshore rescue and salvage capability are
inadequate in Patagonia to meet projected needs.
Offshore oil exploration and oil transshipment will
increase in Patagonia. Increasing eco-tourism in
Patagonia will result in an increase in passengers
both on coastal vessels (whale watching, tours of
Golfo Nuevo, Beagle Channel) and deep draft vessels
(cruises from Buenos Aires to Tierra del Fuego,
cruises to Antarctica). The exposure of these
passengers to some of the most hazardous waterways in
the world is not yet seen as a safety problem.
However, a minor incident involving a passenger vessel
or a tanker could turn into a major incident, since
there is no rescue or salvage capability in Patagonia.
PNA rescue helicopters and large vessels are located
in Buenos Aires at 1,500 nautical miles away.
There are not tugs at all in Ushuaia or Puerto Madryn,
or at the monobuoys in Comodoro Rivadavia. Also,
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single point moorings are located in Bahia San
Sebastian in Tierra del Fuego, and there are not
commercial salvage resources south of Buenos Aires.
4. Contingency planning for a major maritime accident or
pollution is still evolving. Significant improvements
in both the planning process and product are required.
PNA has drafted a national plan as required by OPRC
and PNA is in charge of spill response. Plans appear
to be based on current organizational capabilities,
not on potential problems or scenarios. Regional and
local plans have been generated by local prefecture.
These plans are, however, primarily listing of
organizational responsibilities and resources.
Environmental and scientific resources do not appear
to be involved in the planing process or the response
organization. PNA--Navy coordination is not
contemplated.
3. PORT ORGANIZATION IN ARGENTINA. OPERATIONAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
Most of the existing working port facilities have been
built before World War II, and although there are some
modern installations, the systems are technically and
operatively obsolescent. All the ports are administrated by
a federal organism called General Port Administration (AGP).
The congress has passed a law to reform the port sector
based on the Pacto Fiscal and Apertura Econ6mica (Fiscal
Pact and Open Economy)3. These reforms conceive of the
3 Expressed in laws 23.693; 24.093; and decrees 2.074/90;
2.284/91; 817/92 and 1092/92.
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deregulation of the ports and the creation of independent
organizations to replace the AGP.
The slogan of the government is "privatize whatever,"
and in this accelerated process, important organizational
gaps have emerged.
There are five major institutional and operational
"fault lines"; areas where either gaps in conceptual,
organizational responsibilities exist or where institutional
rivalries could impede safety, efficient and environmental
port improvements:
3.1. The roles of federal, provincial, and local
authorities in the port privatization era ensuring
that port facilities follow environmental and
safety laws and regulations (including MARPOL) have
not been defined, effectively stopping progress
toward compliance in many ports. Now, a major
impact on the use of formal port planning has been
introduced by the requirement for environmental
port impact assessment.
3.2. The federal, provincial or local authorities do not
provide port goals. Moreover, there is a lack of
planning in the development of integral transport
links to move the cargoes in and out of the ports.
The primary function of a port is to ensure and
provide efficient and continuous flow of cargoes
between land and water.
3.3. The institutional rivalry between and overlapping
responsibilities of the Navy and the Argentine
Coast Guard (PNA--Prefectura Naval Argentina)
complicate planning for response to safety and
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environmental emergencies, obstructing ports in
following international standards.
3.4. The local relationship and division of
responsibilities between PNA and the local port
authorities are still evolving with little central
coordination or direction, resulting in a wide
range of local agreements and nonprofessional
practices. PNA is a highly corrupt organization
still driven by bribes.
3.5. The lack of technical and comparative analysis of
commercial shipping alternatives, and unclear
concession patterns in the privatization and bid
processes, result in inefficient long term
investments, which do not contribute to a
sustainable port growth.
3.1. Federal, Provincial, and Local Roles and
Responsibilities
Before privatization, the federal General Port
Administration (AGP) operated and administered facilities
in more than 60 ports. These federal facilities were also
regulated by other federal agencies (PNA, and Ministry of
Works and Public Services), although the effectiveness of
this oversight is questionable. AGP was abolished by the
National Law of Ports and its authority has been
distributed between federal, provincial, and local
organizations.
The port privatization program turned ports over to the
provinces. The major exception is that the portion of the
Port of Buenos Aires within the capital district that is
166
administered by the National Direction of Ports and
Waterways.
The portion of the port outside the capital district
(Dock Sud) is administered by the Province of Buenos Aires.
Often, the ports are being operated by independent
consortia that are attempting to lease port facilities to
private companies.
Currently, it is not clear how the authority to
regulate and inspect facilities has been distributed among
the federal, provincial, and local authorities. Although
Art. 24 of the Argentine Law of Ports assigns these
responsibilities to the National Direction of Ports and
Waterways, the delegation and implementation of these
responsibilities are not understood at local levels.
The new privatized facilities are, as a result,
operating as self regulated entities. There are not
specific rules and each company is virtually doing
"whatever they want" with the cargoes. For example, the
port of Buenos Aires has been divided in two sections
DArsena Norte and Ddrsena Sur.
DArsena Norte is operating with containerized cargoes,
general cargo, hazardous materials, grains, and passengers.
Ddrsena Sur is operating with oil, gas, chemicals, and
containers. It moved 474,512 TEU containers last year. As
this is a relatively small market for four container
terminals, the competition among each other results in a
dangerous handling of cargoes in the port. There is not
differentiation of areas of hazardous cargoes and general
cargoes; they are mixed all over the port. In a recent port
visit, I saw containers with liquid oxygen, general cargo,
and with EDA (Ethyl Aluminum Dichloride) all mixed in
different stacks all over the port. On top of that most
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of them were stacked on the side of a public road in
downtown Buenos Aires.
It is clear with this small market (500,000 TEUs) that
in a few years these terminals will have to merge to
survive.
The PNA (Argentine Coast Guard) is the only significant
regulatory presence in most ports and PNA does not take any
active role on the land side except providing security.
As a conclusion for this point, I argue that PNA should
define MARPOL requirements and with the National Direction
of Ports and Waterways, they should demand those
requirements as a condition for private concessions. If
the port is operated by a public consortium, the consortia
should be required to create the facilities.
Either PNA should be given authority to inspect for
compliance, or an effective compliance mechanism should be
created with the National Direction of Ports and Waterways.
Enforcement of international standards should be done
by a federal agency, not by a provincial or local agency.
The government should define clear goals according to
the economics projections of the country and give to the
private consortia the general directions as to where the
country is moving.
3.2. Port Planning and Port Cargo Flow
The transportation sector plays a crucial role in the
economic development of a port. Due to an unbalanced growth
of Buenos Aires's terminals, a deep imbalance between port
handling capacity and transportation or flow capacity has
been created. Many people believe that the port has
automatically improved its capacity because it has now more
than 15 modern gantry cranes. Official reports are
forecasting a port capacity of 1.0/1.5 millions TEU for the
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next year/ 2 years. Considering that with the present
500,000 TEU the port storage areas and routes in Buenos
Aires are totally congested, it cannot be pictured what
could happen with 1.5 millions TEU. The worst of this, it is
not the physical feasibility of this project, but the fact
that they are doing these projections without realizing
that:
- The cargo that the port will move is not proportional
to the number of cranes that are installed.
- Shippers will not want to have their cargo stacked in
the port, waiting to move out.
- It is very questionable that a port that moves 85% of
its containerized cargoes by trucks could compete to
attract 1.5 million TEU. Economically this equation
is impossible to solve. It is also questionable whether
the capability of moving almost 1.5 millions TEUs by
truck through the federal district exists, when the
city is fully congested with 500,000 TEUs. And, when
there are not highways that go into the port and the
trucks have to move through regular streets.
- A port with poor train facilities and without double
stack systems will never ensure and provide an
efficient and continuous flow of cargoes between land
and water.
- A shallow water port with 32' must be managed
carefully and intelligently to be efficient. The
geographic disadvantage of the port is the main barrier
to ensuring a competitive development.
As the population and industries concentrate in Buenos
Aires, the natural development of the transport network is
radial. Probabilities of congestion and delays increase
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enormously with the proximity to the center of dispersion.
Poor urban planning and development of the city make this
problem more critical.
The world fleet features a growth in ship dimensions
with post-Panamax vessels becoming the norm in new
shipbuilding. Current statistics4 show there are 47 post-
Panamax ships awaiting delivery for the next year. Such
vessels cannot be served in Buenos Aires. It is still
unclear if these vessels will be introduced into the South
American trade or will be focused on long trade routes like
the transpacific one. But, if they are introduced into
South America, the port of Buenos Aires would have a low
probability of being selected as a load center, smaller
ships would be required and chances are that the hub would
have to be a deep water port such as Bahia Blanca or a
Brazilian port.
These critical points are difficult to judge.
Currently, the majority of Argentina trade with North
America, North Europe, and the Far East is not served by
direct point to point services. The main carriers are
operating in a complex and relatively inflexible network of
mainland and regional services, operating through regional
transshipment centers. For example, Maersk carries both its
North Europe and Far East cargo to Argentina through Miami,
from where it is transshipped to the U.S. service. While
the East-West service of Maersk is carried out by large
Panamax vessels, the South-North employs relatively small
vessels.
If this tendency continues, large ships will not call
at Buenos Aires or any other Argentine port.
4 Containerization International, September 1994.
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Foreseeing this controversy, Argentine and Chilean
ports are trying to attract the movement of cargoes from the
Far East to Europe through deep water ports like Bahia
Blanca (Argentina) and Chacabuco (Chile), promoting the
construction of a hinterland connection.
As a conclusion for this point, the government and the
private consortia should define realistic goals, port
projections and long-term objectives.
The growth of cargo movement in the port side must be
accompanied by a simultaneous growth in transportation
facilities to ensure an efficient flow of cargoes.
Total deregulation of the transportation systems should
occur to guarantee fair competition between trains and.
trucks, and reduce transportation costs.
Inland water transportation should be developed as an
efficient alternative way of moving cargoes.
Train network facilities should be improved to
interconnect different productive areas in the country with
deep water ports.
3.3. Prefectura Naval Argentina vs. Navy
The Prefectura Naval Argentina (PNA) is the Argentine
maritime law enforcement and safety agency. It has been
tasked with enforcement of MARPOL and SOLAS standards as
port state and flag state, and with OPRC pollution response
responsibility. PNA also is responsible for port fire
fighting, vessel traffic control, salvage, and search and
rescue.
The Navy has traditional defense functions but also has
a significant law enforcement and safety responsibilities.
The Oceanographic Institute of the Navy is responsible for
maintaining aids to navigation (lighthouses, fixed aids,
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buoys), for hydrographic services (charts), and for issuing
notice to mariners.
The division of responsibilities of the two
organizations is clear with few exceptions. Both services
are responsible for enforcing fishery laws and regulations
in the 200 nautical mile economic zone, both track
commercial vessel traffic (although for different reasons),
and both see themselves as responsible for offshore search
and rescue and salvage.
According to international organizational models, PNA
is the legal marine safety and response organization.
However, in Argentina it has significant police and security
functions and does not have the resources required to fully
execute its marine safety responsibilities, particularly in
the areas of emergency response.
PNA has a presence in each port, but significant gaps
exist between responsibilities and capabilities. PNA fire
fighting capabilities are minimal in most harbors.
The navy has deep draft vessels, experience and
professional people, logistics, command, and control
capabilities that the PNA does not have. The navy does not
have significant salvage and pollution response capability.
The PNA-Navy institutional conflict has historical
roots. PNA was a specialize service within the Navy until
1983, when President Alfonsin issued a decree declaring the
PNA as an independent organization under the Ministry of
Defense.
PNA officers believe the PNA must maintain its-
independence. Navy officers express the opinion that PNA
did not have and was unlikely to develop the professionalism
and the expertise required for their new task.
The result of these discussions is that the National
Contingency Plan called for by OPRC has been drafted but has
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not been approved by the government, possibly due to the
internal PNA-Navy disagreement over assignment of
responsibilities. Therefore, the organization for compliance
with safety standards in Argentina is still undefined and
subject to a ridiculous institutional rivalry, which goes
against the national interests.
As a conclusion of this point, I argue that an
independent, adequately funded, and equipped marine safety
agency is the proper way to enforce international and
national safety, environmental standards and to have an
emergency response capability.
Therefore, the PNA-Navy rivalry should have an
institutional and economic solution to ensure a proper
compliance with international regulations.
3.4. Prefectura Naval Argentina--Ports
The relationship between PNA and local port authorities
after the privatization is still evolving. Unfortunately,
it appears to be evolving somewhat differently in each port.
In some ports, for example, PNA provides all security while
in others security is provided by private security forces.
In some ports, PNA is the primary fire fighting resource
responsible (even when they do not have the resources) while
in others it is not. In some ports, the PNA is concerned
about safety of private facilities, but in most of the ports
it is not.
As PNA salaries and educational levels are low, it
generates a social predisposition to a wide range of local
economic agreements and non-professional practices that
affect the efficiency and safety of the port system. Under
these circumstances it will be very difficult for PNA to
manage the system.
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As conclusion of this point, I argue that the PNA
organizational structure should be reviewed to ensure its
role as an efficient regulatory body.
3.5. Lack of Technical Analysis and Unclear Concession
Patterns
From the perspective of world bulk trade, the area with
one of the highest throughput and one of the most restricted
ports and terminal facilities are the River Plate basin and
the area of the port of Buenos Aires. Port and draft access
have been major problems for trade development in the
Argentine shipping history. Argentina has been primarily a
grain bulk exporter. The Soviet Union was traditionally one
of its biggest buyers, but since the collapse of the Russian
economy Argentina is trying to diversify its market. At
present, the problems of Argentine ports are again to the
fore, following the improvement of reception facilities in
East Europe. Indeed, as Argentina attempts to diversify
grain export markets, the limitations of port facilities are
again a critical factor. This is underlined by the current
buyer emphasis in the grain trade, where prices are at an
all time low and transportation economies are of major
significance in the maintenance of market share. If
Argentina wants to keep its place as world grain exporter,
transportation economy and port efficiency must be improved.
Argentina exported an average of 24 million tons/year
of grains in the last 10 years. The up-river ports between
Rosario and Buenos Aires account for about 70% and 75% of
total exports. Dreyfus Exporters projects a 6% growth in
grain productions.
As part of the privatization process and with the
intention of promoting grain exports, the government has
hired the Belgium company Jan de Nul to dredge the river to
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32 feet up to the port of Rosario. The work will take 10
years. The maintenance will also be done by Jan de Nul. It
is important to point out that the length of the channel
from the beginning of the River Plate to Rosario is
approximately 550 Kilometers. The government will invest
$345,000,000 million dollars for dredging in addition to
$78,000,000 million in equipment (NPV of the investment is
shown in appendix 10). The resulting channel fee proposed by
Jun de Nul is 0.97 $/grt.
In my opinion this decision has been taken without
conducting any alternative analyses or studies either
intentionally or dodged by political.or economic interests.
If we compare the cost of moving grains down the river
with Panamax vessels with the use of barges to a floating
transfer station in deep waters of the River Plate, as I did
in chapter 4, we see that there is a significant reduction
in cost per ton, favoring the barges. The river section
cost analysis gives 6.68 $/ton for Panamax vessels and 3.18
$/ton for barges.
Chapter 5 also shows that Panamax has not been assigned
cargoes in the river. This is because it is cost effective
to move the cargoes down the river by barges, and after
passing Buenos Aires in deep waters, to transship the
cargoes to Panamax vessels. This option optimizes both the
shipper and shipowner interests.
Furthermore, If.we look at the cost of the
transshipment operation compared to the direct one, we find
that, for example on the Buenos Aires-Rotterdam grain trade,
the cost is the following:
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Exhibit 6.1
Alternative 1985 1995
Direct 30,000dwt
Cost based 26.99 34.53
Freight market based 15.54 20.36
Transshipped
160,000dwt shipment
Cost based 14.33 15.53
Freight market based 9.51 13.72
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants
Therefore, I argue that the dredging project impulse by
the privatization program of the government is irrational.
Decision makers have taken the decision overlooking that:
- Cost per ton of a panamax vessel sailing up to
Rosario throughout the dredged channel is substantially
higher than the cost per ton of barges.
- For ship owners it will represent more money and time.
There are 16 maritime companies operating with grains
in Argentina, and they have a mean of 2 vessel per
month in this route. If they spend 1.45 days sailing
from River Plate to Rosario, this represents 5.8 days
for two vessels round trip. So, two vessels will spend
52 days per year sailing the river. From the company's
point of view, this means 1.3 trips less per year in
European trade.
- The country will be forced to maintain dredging on the
channel, a high economic disadvantage in long term
basis. Moreover, it is unthinkable to keep 550 Km of
channel dredged to 32 feet with the level of
sedimentation of the Parana Basin.
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- A Panamax vessel fully loaded5 will still not sail even
with the channel dredged to 32 feet.
The government alternative does not help the Argentine
shipping bulk market to be more elastic. Grain export still
depends on small vessels or bigger vessels partially loaded
that will be completed in other ports (usually Brazil). In
addition, a Panamax vessel with 32 feet is almost in 70% of
its total cargo condition; then, calling another port for
the remaining 30% will not always be attractive. Therefore,
the shipowner may prefer to keep running smaller vessels in
this route and assign big vessels to other routes.
As conclusion of this point, I argue that technical and
comparative analysis of commercial shipping alternatives
should be carefully performed before taking any managerial
or planning decisions. The organizations in charge of port
planning at national and local levels should be structured
to involve appropriate scientific groups and experts.
5 Required depth is 44 feet.
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CONCLUSION
The natural conditions of the Parana-Paraguay River
allows barge navigation all the year, even though
improvements in the critical passes should be done. To
enhance safety, facilitate sailing and increase size of
convoys some dredging activities will be required.
The improvements in the buoying and cartographic system
coupled with the implementation of a VTS will allow 24 hours
of operation.
Port infrastructure, in general, is old. Port capacity
in 7 ports has to be improved. Modern loading and unloading
technology has to be introduced to reduce vessel turnaround
times. Even with these deficiencies ports are able to
operate the throughput of projected demands at lower costs
than trucks and trains.
We found that considering the existing river and port
conditions, which could and should be improved, both allow
cargo transport operations at lower cost than the
competitive alternatives.
Using the optimization model described in chapter IV,
which considers the river limitations, existing port
infrastructures as well as regulations and tariffs, we found
the following facts:
* The most cost efficient way to move cargoes in the area
(grains, minerals, vegetable oil, etc.) is by using
barges.
To satisfy existing supply and demand it will be
necessary to increase the fleet of barges and tugs. Go
back to exhibit 5.7 to see number and type of each one.
As the existing fleet is on average old, 23 years for
barges and 21 years for tugs, a fleet modernization plan
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should be considered (See modernization plan on pages
139-143).
* A considerable amount of cargo should also be moved by
train to complement the river barge system. It
represents the most convenient cost alternative. The
necessary wagons and train convoys are displayed in the
optimization results on pages 107/115.
Train connections with ports should be developed and some
of the existing ones should be improved.
* The optimization model showed that Panamax vessels
sailing up the river do not represent a cost efficient
alternative. Capital and operating costs of these
vessels plus the opportunity cost of having these ships
sailing at 7 knots through the river represent a
diminution in profit margin.
Moreover, panamax vessels can not sail fully loaded
through the river, which also it is not attractive for
shipowners.
The results for the panamax are negative without consider
the cost of dredging 550 Km of river, which in fact will
not represent any improvement in market and service
alternatives and will result in a huge increase in cost
operations.
* Floating transfer stations --barges-general cargo
vessels-- in the deep waters of the River Plate are more
convenient.
* Areas where dredging is cost effective are given in the
model by the increment of (T), (Fr,) (see pages 106-120).
The parameter (p) tell us where and when these dredging
activities are justified by the existing traffic.
179
* Trucks represents the higher cost mode to move bulk
cargoes in the area. This mode should be replaced by
integrated barge systems and trains.
The Parana-Paraguay River basin is the most efficient
transportation alternative for the countries in the area.
Through a successful implementation of the model suggested
in this work, South-American countries will offer more
competitive export prices; it will represent an improvement
in its world market position.
The intensification of inland water transport will
bring industrial as well as social development for areas
presently living in a marginal economic situation.
With South-American products at lower exporting costs,
and with the reforms and ideas suggested in this work, a
North-South American block of commerce can be envisioned,
and this will be the starting point to increment the north-
south axis of commerce.
This is an axis that will never compete with the East-
West, which has totally different demand and throughput, but
it will be a perfect alternative axis to complement
downsides of the market.
In the existing modernization process of South American
countries, where ports are being privatized, new technology
is being introduced and the organizations redesigned, if the
optimization model described is implemented:
* What would be the final cost per pound of each exporting
product?
* What new markets will those new products attract and
which ones will be intensified?
* What would be the competitive responses?
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* Which country will most likely provide the tug and barge
fleet?
* Which country will most likely provide the required port
infrastructures, train infrastructures, communications
and navigation systems?
* Which country will most likely provide container services
to offer final products to the hinterland of the basin?
Those are some of the questions that now are open and
ready to be explored...
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APPENDIXES
pendix 1: Pluviometric Regime in the Parana-Paraguay Riverfor 1994.
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Appendix 3: Emilio Mitre's Channel.
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Appendix 5: Air View of a Panamax Vessel Sailing the Curve
of San Antonio.
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Appendix 6: Curve Of San Antonio Hydrographic Details.
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Appendix 7: Selzo-Pindoty Pass.
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Appendix 8: Corumba's Approach, Air View.
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Appendix 9: Port of Rosario
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Appendix 9 Cont.: Port of Rosario
216
Appendix 10: Dredge Cost Analysis. NPV
The following calculation is based on the estimated
costs submitted by Jun de Nul to the Argentine government
for dredging of the Rosario-Buenos Aires channel. The work
will be done in a 10 year period.
Cost of work :
Equipment cost:
Maintenance :
$ 345,000,000
$ 78,000,000
$ 5,000,000/year
Estimate Investment Distribution
PV of Investment : $310,740,000
PV of Maintenance: $ 36,800,000
NPV .................... $347,540,000
217
Year Percentage of Cost in millions Present Value
Investment. dollars Factor @ 10%
1 35% 148.05 0.909
2 15% 63.45 0.826
3 10% 42.30 0.751
4 10% 42.30 0.863
5 5% 21.15 0.621
6 5% 21.15 0.564
7 5% 21.15 0.513
8 5% 21.15 0.467
9 5% 21.15 0.424
10 5% 21.15 0.386
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Appendix 12: Dock Sud Chart
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